



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D.C. 20535

April 30, 2019

MR. JASON LEOPOLD



FOIPA Request No.: 1193607-000  
Subject: KHAN, SAMIR

Dear Mr. Leopold:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

**Section 552**

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

50 USC 3024(i)(1)

☐ (b)(4)

☒ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☒ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☒ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

**Section 552a**

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

1,636 pages were reviewed and 571 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

- ☒ Documents were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agencies [OGA].
- ☐ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. The **"Standard Responses to Requests"** section of the Addendum applies to all requests. If the subject of your request is a person, the **"Standard Responses to Requests for Individuals"** section also applies. The **"General Information"** section includes useful information about FBI records.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following website: <https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov). Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Information Management Division

Enclosures

The enclosed documents represent the twelfth interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

To minimize costs to both you and the FBI, duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

Upon receipt of the enclosed Compact Disc (CD), please go to [www.pay.gov](http://www.pay.gov) to make an electronic payment\* in the amount of **\$15.00**, or make a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and mail it to the Work Process Unit, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Information Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602. Please include the FOIPA Request Number with your payment. Failure to pay for this release within thirty (30) days from the date of this letter will close any pending FBI FOIPA requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIPA requests.

*\*Pay.gov is a secure web-based application that accepts credit card and ACH payments online, and is hosted by the United States Department of Treasury, Financial Management Service. For frequent FOIPA requesters, it is recommended to create a Pay.gov account to retain an online history of payments made through Pay.gov and to retain specific information for future payments. To make an electronic payment, complete the FBI Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Form located on Pay.gov. Please note: if a refund is necessary, there is less processing time to refund a credit card payment than an ACH payment.*

## FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter, the FBI FOIPA Addendum includes information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. If you submitted a request regarding yourself or another person, Part 2 includes additional standard responses that apply to requests for individuals. If you have questions regarding the standard responses in Parts 1 or 2, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under “Contact Us.” Previously mentioned appeal and dispute resolution services are also available. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful.

### Part 1: Standard Responses to All Requests: See Below for all Requests

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the [fbi.gov](http://fbi.gov) website.
- (ii) **National Security/Intelligence Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of national security and foreign intelligence records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) as applicable to requests for records about individuals [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2); 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3); 50 USC § 3024(i)(1). This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that national security or foreign intelligence records do or do not exist.

### Part 2: Standard Responses to Requests for Individuals: See Below for all Requests for Individuals

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) **Requests for Records for Incarcerated Individuals.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any incarcerated individual pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(E) and (b)(7)(F) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

### Part 3: General Information:

- (i) **Record Searches.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching those systems or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. Most requests are satisfied by searching the Central Record System (CRS), an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course of fulfilling its dual law enforcement and intelligence mission as well as the performance of agency administrative and personnel functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters (“FBIHQ”), FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (“Legats”) worldwide. A CRS search includes Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records.
- (ii) **FBI Records**  
Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Requests for Criminal History Records or “Rap Sheets.”** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks –often referred to as a criminal history record or “rap sheets.” These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative “FBI file.” An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at [www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks](http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks). Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at [www.edo.cjis.gov](http://www.edo.cjis.gov). For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.
- (iv) **The National Name Check Program (NNCP).** The mission of NNCP is to analyze and report information in response to name check requests received from federal agencies, for the purpose of protecting the United States from foreign and domestic threats to national security. Please be advised that this is a service provided to other federal agencies. Private citizens cannot request a name check.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

#### **SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a**

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 139

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Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 19 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Page 136 ~ Duplicate;  
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(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-07-2016

b6  
b7C  
b1  
b3  
b7E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/26/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SSA  
SA  
IA  
SOS

b6  
b7C

To:

Attn: SSA

To:

Attn: SA

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: CTD Team I

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: Team 1  
SSA  
SOS

b6  
b7C  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: Team 2  
SSA  
SSA  
IA  
IA

From: Charlotte

Contact: SOS

Approved By:

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)  
(U)

(Pending)  
(Pending)

b3  
b7E

Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/PRODUCTION  
COUNTERTERRORISM

(U) ~~(S)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 04/26/2010

b3  
b7E

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ This communication provides [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] Samir Khan, subject of [redacted] Based on the information reviewed and analyzed, a follow-up investigation to further identify this individual is recommended.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090645~~

~~Declassify On: 203500426~~

(U)

Administrative: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ The Charlotte [redacted] was requested to conduct [redacted]

(S)

[redacted] Samir Khan (hereafter referred to as Khan). To conduct this [redacted] Charlotte [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] Searches of identifiers also were conducted using [redacted] while open-source information was acquired via the Internet.

(U//~~FOUO~~) E-mail Communication Review

(S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 04/26/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) For Information.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Team 1: For Information.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Team 2: For Information.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Info)

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] For Information.

b7E

Set Lead 5: (Action)

b7E

(S) ~~(S)~~ The Charlotte [redacted] recommends you consider with  
(S) CTD concurrence the [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 04/26/2010

(S) [redacted] It is requested that [redacted] notify  
the writer of the initiation of any investigation.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Set Lead 6: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Team I: For your concurrence, please  
review the Charlotte recommendation [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

♦♦

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/03/2010

b6  
b7C

To: Seattle

Attn: SA

Counterterrorism

Attn: Team 1

b7E

International Operations

Attn: Unit

SSA

IA

Attn: SA

SA

Attn: SSA

SA

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Charlotte ✓

b7E

Attn: SA

SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

SA

From:

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(S)  
(S)  
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(S)

b7E

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/03/2010

Title: (S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Synopsis: (U) To document contact with captioned subject.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350503~~

Details: (U) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

[redacted] provided the following  
information:

(U) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/03/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] This  
documentation was not available during the interview.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/03/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Anwar al-Aulaqi [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Aulaqi. [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted]  
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted] b1  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/03/2010 b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U)

(U)

b6  
b7C

(U)

(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/03/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted] indicated he would be willing to speak with  
representatives of the USG again in the future.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 05/03/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/10/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

b7E

From: Charlotte

b6  
b7C

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

jet

Case ID #: (U)  
(U)  
(U)

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To provide results of international calls made or  
received [REDACTED]

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350510

Details: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted], 05/10/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted] of interest, despite not relating to Yemen,  
[redacted]

[redacted] there is no further  
information on this Pakistani number.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U)  05/10/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3  
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 03-07-2016 BY

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-07-2016

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 1:44 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Immediate [REDACTED]

(S) On 5/10/2010, at 10:34 am pt, Mr. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] will [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Investigative Operations Analyst

[REDACTED] (Office)  
[REDACTED] (Blackberry)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 9:12 AM

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Subject: Immediate [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

(S) [REDACTED] can you please [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b5

Thank you.

SA [REDACTED]  
FBI Charlotte [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350510  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/06/2010

To: Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Contact: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

~~(Pending)~~  
~~(Pending)~~Title: ~~(S)~~ (U) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
(U) STATS(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To document stats to date in captioned case.~~(S)~~ (U)~~Derived From : G-1~~  
~~Declassify On: 05/06/2035~~(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ This report documents all statistics earned from 03/04/2010 to present. The majority of these stats were a team effort and thus, all team members will receive credit for the majority of the below-listed stats. Due to high workload, substantial details of the below statistics are not included in this EC. See case file [REDACTED]

b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]b1  
b3  
b7E*OK*b3  
b7E



(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/06/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

[redacted]

(U)

(S)

[redacted]

b7E

(U)

(S)

released:

on 04/22/10;

on 04/28/10;

on 04/29/10.

b7E

(U)

(S)

Disseminations to

on 03/05/10;

on 03/09/10, 04/05/10,  
04/15/10, and 04/21/10.

b7E

b7D

(S//NF)

[redacted]

b1

b3

b7E

(U)

(S)

On 04/28/10, [redacted] was provided  
an update briefing on Khan case.

b7E

(U)

(S)

Case information was released to DoD on a regular  
basis.

(S//NF)

[redacted]

b1

b3

b7E

These reviews have been documented in "weekly updates"  
that have been disseminated widely to other divisions  
and FBIHQ on an almost weekly basis (and uploaded to  
ACS and the case sharepoint site).

(S//NF)

[redacted] is  
observed. These reviews have been documented in  
"weekly updates" that have been disseminated widely to  
other divisions and FBIHQ on an almost weekly basis  
(and uploaded to ACS and the case sharepoint site).

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1

b3

b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/06/2010

**Accomplishment Information:**

Number: 100

Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]

b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Number: 100

Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]

b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Number: 35

Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]

b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Number: 19

(S) Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Number: 10

(S) Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/06/2010

Number: 1  
Type: CONDUCT OPERATIONAL TRAINING/PRESENTATION #  
Attendees/Recipients: 50  
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(S) Number: 1  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C

(S) Number: 1  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C

Number: 100  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

b7E

b6  
b7C

Number: 100  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

b7E

b6  
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/06/2010

Number: 35

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

b7E

ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

Number: 100

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

Number: 100

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

Number: 35

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

b7E

ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

Number: 100

Type: [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED]

b7E

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/06/2010

Number: 100

Type: [REDACTED]

b7E

ITU: [REDACTED]

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

Number: 35

Type: [REDACTED]

b7E

ITU: [REDACTED]

ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-07-2016

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2010 7:23 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: (S) FW: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] - when I get the order(s) I will forward to you.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b5

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 6:54 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: (S) [redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

(S) Tonight at 6:42pm AAG David Kris orally authorized [redacted]  
Samir Khan.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b5

[redacted] will handle the initial draft and [redacted] will pick it up again on Wednesday. Thanks!

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/23/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: Team 1

b6  
b7C  
b7E

SSA  
SOS

Charlotte

SA  
SOS

SA

SA

From: Charlotte

Contact: IA

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)  
(U)  
(S) ~~(S)~~  
(U)

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/ PRODUCTION  
COUNTER TERRORISM

(U) ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ ANWAR NASSER AULAQI  
IT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: (S) ~~(S)~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(KS)

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

Re: (U) [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Samir Khan, the subject of [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted] the subject of [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7A  
b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~

~~Declassify On: 20350423~~

(U)

[redacted] b7E

Administrative: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Enclosure(s): (S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

Details: (S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] To conduct this research and subsequent  
analysis, the Charlotte [redacted] utilized the following databases:

(S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Identity

(S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]



(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 04/23/2010

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Background Information

(S//~~NE~~)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that Khan is involved with al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and actively planning attacks against the US.

(S//~~OC/NE~~)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7A  
b7E

(S//~~OC/NE~~)

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 04/23/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) CT-1. Read and Clear

Set Lead 2: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

(U) Read and Clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

(U) Read and Clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT

(U) [REDACTED] /TEAM 1. Read and Clear.

♦♦

b7E

b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

Serial

[Redacted]

ESC

*[Handwritten signature]*

KU

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 03-07-2016 BY [Redacted] NSICG

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Memorandum

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]



b1  
b3  
b7E

To : Mr. David S. Kris  
Assistant Attorney General  
National Security Division  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Room 2200 C

Date 05/10/2010

FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-07-2016

b6  
b7C

From : *James* Mr. James W. McJunkin  
Assistant Director  
Counterterrorism Division

Subject : (S//~~NI~~) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN (hereafter Khan), a USPER.

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S//~~NI~~) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

DETAILS

(S//~~NI~~) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615  
Declassify On: 20350510

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

Memorandum To: Mr. David S. Kris

From: Mr. James W. McJunkin

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 05/10/2010

(S)

BASIS FOR REQUEST:

(S//~~NF~~)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted] Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that Khan is involved with AQAP and actively planning attacks against the US.

(S//~~NF/OC~~)

b7E

(S//~~OC/NF~~)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

Memorandum To: Mr. David S. Kris

From: Mr. James W. McJunkin

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 05/10/2010

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

TARGET FACILITIES:

(S//~~NOFORN~~) [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S//~~NOFORN~~) [redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) The points of contact for this matter at  
FBIHQ are SSA [redacted] SOS [redacted]  
[redacted] and NSLB AGC [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 03-07-2016 BY  NSICG

b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C

(K)

*[Handwritten signature]*

(K)

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

Memorandum To: Mr. David S. Kris

From: Mr. James W. McJunkin

(S) Re: (U) [redacted] 05/10/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

<b>APPROVED:</b>	ASD _____	FD _____	NSB _____
Director: _____	CD _____	INSD _____	NSLB _____
Deputy Director: _____	CID _____	OCA _____	RMD _____
Assistant Director: <i>JWM</i>	CIRG _____	OCIO _____	SecD _____
Deputy Assistant Director: <i>[Signature]</i>	CTD _____	OIO _____	TDD _____
	CYBER _____	OPA _____	Unit Chief <i>[Signature]</i>
	DI _____	OPR _____	Asst. Section Chief <i>[Signature]</i>
			Section Chief <i>[Signature]</i>
			SSA <i>[Signature]</i>

VERBAL CA  
5/10/10  
*[Signature]*

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E



FBI INFO  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (B,C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-07-2016

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/18/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

International Operations

Attn: [redacted] Unit

UC [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]

Contact: Legat [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]  
(U) [redacted]

(Pending)  
(Closed)

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Synopsis: (S//~~DF~~) To provide a second update to CE on captioned

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301  
Declassify On: 20350303

(U) [redacted]

(U) Reference: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

b3 -  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Lead @ [redacted]  
K13/11/13 9/23/10

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

SA [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

To: Charlotte From: [redacted]  
Re: [redacted] 05/18/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b7D

**Details:** Upon receipt of referenced communication, Legat apprized [redacted] of the request from FBI Charlotte. The following day [redacted] came back and asked Legat who was CE and Legat explained that it was Charlotte, and he advised he was sending a communication back to [redacted] for guidance.

b7E

On 3/18/2010, Legat spoke telephonically with the [redacted] and he advised he had sent the request back to [redacted] for guidance and had not heard back.

b7E

On 5/17/2010 before the beginning of the Senior Staff meeting at the embassy Legat raised the subject with the [redacted]. He advised he would look into the status of his earlier query to [redacted]. On 5/18/2010 Legat contacted [redacted] and he again advised he had not heard anything back from [redacted]. As efficient [redacted]

[redacted] Charlotte should contact [redacted] directly and speak with [redacted] and seek a definitive answer from him on how to proceed.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] considers the lead in referenced communication as covered.

b7D

**BACKGROUND:**

**SAMIR KHAN CASE OVERVIEW**

(S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted] Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence [redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7D  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: [REDACTED] 05/18/2010

suggests that Khan is involved with AQAP and actively planning attacks against the US.

AQAP

(U) ~~(S)~~ On 01/19/2010, AQAP was designated as a terrorist organization by Treasury and the United Nations.

(U) Open source media indicates AQAP claimed [REDACTED]

b7E

(S)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U)

(S)

(S) In June 2008, FBIHQ [REDACTED]

(S//~~NOFORN~~)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7D  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]

Re: [REDACTED] 05/18/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-07-2016

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]  
From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 7:39 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: (S) [REDACTED] SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN (AFFIANT [REDACTED] CASE AGENT:  
Attachments: (S) [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED] as promised...

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2010 7:37 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: (S) [REDACTED]  
Subject: (S) [REDACTED] SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN (AFFIANT [REDACTED] CASE AGENT:

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b5

~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~



(S)

(S) Attached you will find [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will serve [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Signed: 5/13/10 @ 3:20p

[REDACTED]  
*Management and Program Analyst*

(S)

Room [REDACTED]

(BB)  
(Pager)

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 02-23-2016

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, May 17, 2010 2:17 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigative Operations Analyst

(Office)  
(Blackberry)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] b6  
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2010 4:49 PM b7C  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) Thanks [REDACTED] - [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 8:06 PM b6  
To: [REDACTED] b7C  
Cc: [REDACTED] b7E  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigative Operations Analyst

(Office)  
(Blackberry)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 12:41 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Thanks.

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 2:41 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S)

[REDACTED]  
Investigative Operations Analyst

b6  
b7C

(Office)  
(Blackberry)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 10:43 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thank you!  
Let me know if you have more questions.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 1:35 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Investigative Operations Analyst

b6

(Office)

b7C

(Blackberry)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 10:20 AM

To:

(SF)

Cc:

(FBI)

(FBI)

Subject: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thank you!

SA [REDACTED]

FBI Charlotte [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350514  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350514  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350514  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350515  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



[redacted]  
From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 11:56 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted] Samir Khan

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
It is [redacted]'s desire, if possible, to charge Khan with terrorism-related violations prior to him being captured. We do not want to have to depend [redacted]  
[redacted]

b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Once you have a clear way forward, maybe [redacted] and all of our AUSAs can have a coordination meeting to discuss.

All the best,

SA [redacted] b6  
FBI Charlotte [redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7E

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350514  
~~SECRET~~

**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 14, 2010 12:34 PM  
**Subject:** Read: [redacted] Samir Khan

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Your message was read on Friday, May 14, 2010 12:33:48 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 02-23-2016

b6  
b7C  
  
b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/15/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SA  
SOS

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350515~~

(U) [REDACTED]

b7E

(S) Administrative: [REDACTED]

WARNING: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

*[Handwritten signature]*

b7E  
b3

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/15/2010

Package Copy: (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

Details: (S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hiira. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

contain data that dates back to 2006. The data that is requested to be uploaded into [redacted] is UNCLASP and spans from 2006 to early May 2010.

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/15/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICC  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 02-23-2016

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2010 6:23 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] question

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED] I know [REDACTED] emailed you about this last week. Just to keep you in the loop, here's the latest. Can you advise if there is anything I need (or anyone in [REDACTED] needs) to do?

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thanks-

-----Original Message-----  
From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2010 8:12 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] question

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

I am not sure about that one. Hopefully, [REDACTED] can track that kind of stuff. [REDACTED] should be handling it.

SSA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Team 1  
[REDACTED] Room [REDACTED]  
Office - [REDACTED]  
Blackberry - [REDACTED]  
NSTS (Green) - [REDACTED]  
Pager - [REDACTED]  
Unclass: [REDACTED]  
FBINET: [REDACTED]  
SCION: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----  
From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2010 1:58 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] question

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED] obviously my computer accessed it [REDACTED] but can't [REDACTED] run a check on who [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

b3

~~SECRET~~

accessed this document via ACS? How do we know who else in the whole wide Bureau accessed it?

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2010 12:00 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED] question

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

All,

(S) I just spoke to Ms. [REDACTED] She will file the report on the [REDACTED] system and follow-up with the [REDACTED] Unit Security rep. Please collect the [REDACTED] #s of any computers that were used to upload or access [REDACTED] electronically. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

Thanks in advance to all for this effort. It was unavoidable and steps are being taken to rectify the situation.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

SSA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Office - [REDACTED]  
Blackberry - [REDACTED]  
NSTS (Green) [REDACTED]  
Pager - [REDACTED]  
Unclass: [REDACTED]  
FBINET: [REDACTED]  
SCION [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2010 7:09 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: [REDACTED] question  
Importance: High

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]  
Got it,

(S) Who [REDACTED] If it was the [REDACTED] unit, I need to know the following questions:

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
If it is another Division, we can report, but the CSO from that Division has to handle the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]  
report the incident. It can be found on [REDACTED] The originating  
division is what/who gets put into the [REDACTED]

b7E

Thanks,

[REDACTED] \* Associate Chief Security Officer  
COOP Coordinator / FBI - CTD

b6  
b7C

HQ LINE: [REDACTED]  
LX LINE: [REDACTED]  
BLACKBERRY: [REDACTED]  
UNCLASS EMAIL: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 2010 4:55 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] question

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED]  
Please see below. It would seem that a [REDACTED] has occurred re: the below [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b5

Thank you.

SSA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Team 1 b6  
[REDACTED] Room [REDACTED] b7C  
Office - [REDACTED] b7E  
Blackberry - [REDACTED]  
NSTS (Green) [REDACTED]  
Pager - [REDACTED]  
Unclass: [REDACTED]  
FBINET: [REDACTED]  
SCION: [REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 2010 3:26 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] question

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

[redacted] another doozy for you. Please read from the bottom up. get the picture

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
What to do now?

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 2010 1:29 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted] question

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b3  
b7E

Nope, please do not assume the title has been downgraded.  
I will email the folks listed on the EC in OGC and [redacted] and see how we proceed.  
Thanks,  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

SSA [redacted]  
[redacted] Charlotte Division  
Office: [redacted]  
Blackberry: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 20, 2010 11:07 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: [redacted] question

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted]  
I have a question. Can you please view [redacted] in ACS (I would have attached it, but you'll understand why soon)? [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]  
Can I assume the title has been downgraded? What do we do...?

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350420  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 02-23-2016

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
  
b1  
b3  
b7E

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/19/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

Team Leader

Attn: [REDACTED]

UC [REDACTED]

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

International Operations

Attn: [REDACTED]

UC [REDACTED]

Attn: A/Legat [REDACTED]

Attn: [REDACTED]

A/SSA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/PRODUCTION  
COUNTERTERRORISM

(U) ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ To provide research results and assessment  
concerning an individual associated with Samir Khan, subject of  
captioned case, and recommend [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] by receiving office.

b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350519~~

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/19/2010

Reference: (U) [redacted]

b7E

Administrative: (U) Reference email and telephone exchanges with SSA [redacted] and SSA [redacted] on 02/18/2010 - 02/19/2010. Reference email exchange with UC [redacted] and A/SSA [redacted] on 05/19/2010.

b6  
b7C

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: (S//OC/NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) As the above referenced subject is currently located [redacted] and per conversations with CTD (see Administrative Section), it was agreed that the above referenced subject would be provided to the appropriate Field Office with extraterritorial investigative responsibilities.

b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/19/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For [redacted] For information only.

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For [redacted] For information only.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For [redacted] For information only.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Info)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT [redacted]

(U) For [redacted] For information only.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

[redacted]  
AT [redacted]

(U) For Legat: For information only.

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/19/2010

Set Lead 6: (Action)

b7E

[redacted]  
AT [redacted]

(S//~~OC/NF~~) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Additional research results/predicated information is located in  
referenced [redacted]

♦♦

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/20/2010

To: [REDACTED]

b7E

From: [REDACTED]

Contact: TFO [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #:

b7E

b3  
b7ETitle: INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION  
COUNTERTERRORISM

**Synopsis:** Claim statistical accomplishment for self directed surveillance and interview of subjects in the above referenced case numbers.

**Details:** On May 18, 2010, TFO [REDACTED], TFO [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

TFO [REDACTED]

and TFO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] along with CBP Officers, CGIS, [REDACTED] Port Authority Police and TSA initiated a surveillance and subsequent interview of a passenger [REDACTED]

This passenger is the subject of an FBI investigation and a (terrorist) match in the CBP data bases. [REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED

b3  
b7E

(KS)

UNCLASSIFIED

To: [REDACTED] From: [REDACTED]  
Re: [REDACTED] 05/20/2010

b7E

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 6  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: INDIVIDUAL/NON-INFORMANT  
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY  
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By: [REDACTED]  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 6  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: INDIVIDUAL/NON-INFORMANT  
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY  
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By: [REDACTED]  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 6  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: INDIVIDUAL/NON-INFORMANT  
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY  
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By: [REDACTED]  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 6  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: INDIVIDUAL/NON-INFORMANT  
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY  
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By: [REDACTED]  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

To:  
Re:

[REDACTED]

From:

[REDACTED]

05/20/2010

b7E

♦♦

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 02-23-2016

b6  
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2010 5:59 PM

b6  
b7C  
b7E

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Subject: RE: [redacted]

Attachments: [redacted] Samir Khan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

All - I'll give you a long answer and a short answer.

Long Answer -

[redacted] has not yet made a criminal case on Khan. Obviously with his current activities he has violated numerous federal violations relative to international terrorism, [redacted] have a case.

b5  
b7E

[redacted] at the ground level is always looking for an angle so that we can obtain charges on Khan [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] Our AUSA is working with DOJ-Main and we are exploring options, [redacted]

b5  
b7E

As you can see from the attached email [redacted] Khan [redacted]  
[redacted]

b5

And to ensure everyone understands that we know the priorities, we get it that gaining intel is our number one priority [redacted]

b5

[redacted] Khan [redacted]  
[redacted] Khan [redacted]

Short Answer -

Bottom line - [redacted] charges on Khan, but we're [redacted] Khan [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b5

SA [redacted]  
FBI Charlotte [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2010 4:50 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

5/18/2010

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] is working on this in response to an email from [redacted] I will have to defer to him to respond as far as possible charges against KHAN go.

SSA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] Team 1

Room 4W200

Office - [redacted]

Blackberry - [redacted]

NSTS - [redacted]

Pager - [redacted]

Unclass: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

---

From: [redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2010 3:19 PM

To: [redacted]

Subject: FW: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] see below...what do we need from the [redacted] that would assist in the indictment of Samir Khan?

A/UC [redacted]

Operations Group

[redacted]

[redacted] - desk

[redacted] - cell

[redacted] - internal

b6  
b7C

---

From: [redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2010 9:16 AM

To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

5/18/2010

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

(S)

b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b5

Those are my thoughts, let me know..

[Redacted]

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350518~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350518~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350518~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350518~~  
~~SECRET~~

IMAGE CAPTURE TIME: 09.51.53

\*\*

\* END OF MESSAGE \*

\*\*\*\*\*

IMAGE CAPTURE TIME: 08.30.43

\*\*

\* END OF MESSAGE \*

\*\*\*\*\*

IMAGE CAPTURE DATE: 2009-10-23  
IMAGE CAPTURE TIME: 09.52.13

\*\*

\* END OF MESSAGE \*

\*\*\*\*\*

IMAGE CAPTURE TIME: 08.55.06

\*\*

\* END OF MESSAGE \*

\*\*\*\*\*



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 09-09-2015

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2010 4:52 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: (S) FW: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Attachments: [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E



[REDACTED] - To do my due diligence, now that you are the case agent for [REDACTED] I wanted to pass this request/requirement to you. [REDACTED] never replied. Please let me know if you have any questions.  
Thanks-

b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2010 11:09 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

(S) [REDACTED] Because of this determination, some serials from two of your cases have to be pulled and replaced with the attached redacted documents. You can advise your SST that the serials need to be pulled from ACS, and the hardcopy case file, because of an (S) [REDACTED] (this is a valid reason to pull files in this manner).

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Please note the following serials need to be pulled, both electronically from ACS and physically from the case file:

b3  
b7E

Please let me know if there are any questions. I am sorry for the inconvenience.

SA [REDACTED]  
FBI Charlotte [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350427

~~SECRET~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/21/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

[REDACTED] UNIT/ROOM [REDACTED]

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

b3  
b7E

(U)

Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources~~

~~See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.~~

~~Declassify On: 20350423~~

(U)

Classification Authority Reference: ~~(S)~~ "FBI NSISCG 06152009"  
and attached court documents.

Enclosure(s): (S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b7E

Details: (U) A scanned copy of the order and motion to withdraw  
were e-mailed to the appropriate offices for service on  
04/23/2010.

(S)

~~(U)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten Signature]*

b3  
b7E

*[Handwritten Signature]*

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/21/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

CC: 1 - [REDACTED] (w/o enclosures)

b6  
b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/17/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

SSA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) Synopsis: (S//~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301

(U)

Declassify On: 05/17/2035

(U) [REDACTED]

b7E

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Enclosure(s): (S//~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

Details: (S//~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S//~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/17/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(S//~~NF~~) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 02-23-2016

b6  
b7C

(FBI)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2010 5:12 PM  
To: (S) [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Subject:

Attachments:

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Subject is a USPER

<name of OIPR attorney> [redacted] office [redacted]  
<File Number>: [redacted]  
<translating agency> [redacted] FBI

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thank you.

SSA [redacted]  
[redacted] Team 1  
[redacted] Room [redacted]  
Office - [redacted]  
Blackberry - [redacted]  
NSTS [redacted]  
Pager - [redacted]  
Unclass: [redacted]  
~~SECRET~~: [redacted]  
~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350524~~  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

**Subject is a USPER**

<name of OIPR attorney>: [redacted] office [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b3  
b7E

<File Number>: [redacted]

<translating agency> [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

Send to FBINET [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 02-23-2016

b6  
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

From:  
Sent:  
To:

Monday, May 24, 2010 2:47 PM\*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Cc:

Subject:

(S)

RE: Immediate [redacted] again...

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigative Operations Analyst

Desk  
Blackberry

b6  
b7C  
b7E

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2010 4:59 AM  
To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: Immediate [redacted] - again...

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thank you.

SA [redacted]  
FBI Charlotte [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350524

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/20/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn:

Attn:

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted] UNIT/Rm. 7291

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [redacted]

(U) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources  
See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.  
Declassify On: 20350511~~

(U) Classification Authority Reference: (S) "FBI NSISCG 06152009"  
and attached court documents.

Enclosure(s): (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) Details: (S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

*DM*

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL

b3  
b7E

(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/20/2010

(U)

~~(S)~~

b1  
b3  
b5  
b7E

(U) The verified application will be sent by a separate communication.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL

b3  
b7E

(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/20/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED]

b7E

AT

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

CC: 1 -

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/25/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Charlotte

b7E

Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~ To provide the [REDACTED] with a  
listing of email addresses/individuals for further [REDACTED]

b7E

~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350419~~

Administrative: (U) Reference email and telephone exchanges with [REDACTED]  
A/UC [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) Details: (S//NF) [REDACTED] The Charlotte [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
TDY analysts have been conducting detailed research and analyses on  
[REDACTED] Samir Khan in order to [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [redacted] (Pending), 05/25/2010

[redacted] Research and analyses results assess the  
[redacted] with Samir Khan, [redacted]  
[redacted] provided a recommendation of  
investigations, if appropriate, based upon the findings and are  
memorialized in [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ Charlotte developed a research and assessment  
[redacted] these [redacted] Each [redacted]

b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ To conduct the research and consequent analyses,  
Charlotte [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] Automated Case Support (ACS). [redacted]

[redacted] Searches of identifiers  
also were conducted using [redacted] while open-source information was  
acquired via the Internet. In addition, the Samir Khan [redacted]  
[redacted] located at [redacted]

[redacted] aspx, was utilized as a quick reference guide [redacted]

[redacted] Samir Khan and his local, online, [redacted]

~~(S)~~ TDY analysts who previously assisted Charlotte with the  
writing of [redacted] are no longer TDY'd to Charlotte and use  
of future TDY analysts, due to budget issues, is not an option. In  
addition, [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] A/UC [redacted]

Charlotte is requesting the assistance of the [redacted] in the preparation  
of the remaining [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Charlotte has identified [redacted]  
[redacted] Samir Khan who may pose a potential threat to the US  
Homeland and/or US interests abroad. [redacted] requests that any  
[redacted] completed by the [redacted] on these [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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b7E

(S)

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b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [redacted] (Pending), 05/25/2010

individuals be documented in [redacted] and that any  
potential [redacted] issued be documented in [redacted]

b3  
b7E

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(S//~~NE~~)

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(S)

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(S)

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b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [REDACTED] (Pending), 05/25/2010

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(S//NF)

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(S)

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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b7E



(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [redacted] ending), 05/25/2010

(S)

(U// <del>FOUO</del> )		
(U// <del>FOUO</del> )		
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(U// <del>FOUO</del> )		
(U// <del>FOUO</del> )		

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(S)

[redacted]

b1  
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b7C  
b7E

(S)

(U// <del>FOUO</del> )	[redacted]	[redacted]
(U// <del>FOUO</del> )	[redacted]	[redacted]

(S//~~NE~~)

[redacted]

(S//~~NE~~)

[redacted]

b1  
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b7C  
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(S// <del>NE</del> )	
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(S)

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b1  
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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [REDACTED] ~~(Pending)~~, 05/25/2010

(S//NF)  
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(S//NF) [REDACTED] In September 2006, [REDACTED] posted  
a comment on Samir Khan's blog, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] regarding his willingness to commit jihad. Khan's reply  
indicated that he was willing to continue their discussion via email.

b1  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Initial ACS, [REDACTED] checks were negative, but  
Charlotte requests follow-on, in-depth searches be run on all FBI  
systems, [REDACTED] databases, and the Internet to try to identify  
[REDACTED] can be accessed  
on the Samir Khan [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [REDACTED] (Pending), 05/25/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

A

For the [REDACTED] Per email/phone exchanges  
between writer and A/UC [REDACTED] the above listing of email  
addresses/individuals is being provided to the [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 222

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Page 5 ~ Duplicate;  
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Page 14 ~ Referral/Consult;  
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Memorandum

(S)

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b7E

To : Mr. David S. Kris  
Assistant Attorney General  
National Security Division  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Room 2200 C

Date 05/24/2010

b6  
b7C

FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-25-2016

From : *Jim* Mr. James W. McJunkin  
Assistant Director  
Counterterrorism Division

Subject : (S//~~NE~~)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S//~~NE~~)

b1  
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b7E

DETAILS

(S//~~NE~~)

b1  
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Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615  
Declassify On: 20350524

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~

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b3  
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Memorandum

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]



b1  
b3  
b7E

To : Mr. David S. Kris  
Assistant Attorney General  
National Security Division  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Room 2200 C

Date 05/24/2010

b6  
b7C

FBI INFO.  
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-25-2016

From : Mr. James W. McJunkin  
Assistant Director  
Counterterrorism Division

Subject : (S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
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(U) ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
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(S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

DETAILS


(S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
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Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615  
Declassify On: 20350524

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~ [redacted]

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Memorandum

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~



b1  
b3  
b7E

<b>APPROVED:</b>  Director: _____  Deputy Director: _____  Assistant Director: <u>Jhm</u>  Deputy Assistant Director: <u>DMO/g</u>	ASD _____	FD _____	NSB _____
	CD _____	INSD _____	 _____
	CID _____	OCA _____	RMD _____
	CIRG _____	OCIO _____	SecD _____
	CTD _____	OIO _____	TDD _____
	CYBER _____	OPA _____	Unit Chief _____
	DI _____	OPR _____	Asst. Section Chief <u>EC</u>
			Section Chief <u>[Signature]</u>
			SSA _____

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN/ORCON~~



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HA 2010-1457-

b6  
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~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-25-2016

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/20/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn:

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

(S) [redacted] UNIT/Rm. [redacted]

Contact: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Approved By: [redacted] SS/AT

Drafted By: [redacted] BW

(U) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

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b7C  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources  
See Classification Authority Reference  
Section  
Declassify On: 20350511~~

(U) Enclosure(s): (S) Charlotte - [redacted]

Details: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO "~~SECRET~~" UPON REMOVAL OF THE ENCLOSURES.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN~~

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per NSIG [redacted]  
Date 7/28/2019

b6  
b7C

(S)

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 05/20/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) READ AND CLEAR

CC: 1 - [REDACTED] (w/o enclosures)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

♦♦

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-25-2016

b6  
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(FBI)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 12:37 PM  
To: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: (S) FW: [redacted]  
Importance: High  
Attachments: (S) Feedback for [redacted] ~~SECRET~~.pdf

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(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b1  
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(S) See mention of KHAN [redacted]

b1  
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SSA [redacted]  
CTD [redacted] Team 1  
[redacted] Room [redacted]  
Office - [redacted]  
Blackberry - [redacted]  
NSTS - [redacted]  
Pager - [redacted]  
Unclass: [redacted]  
~~SECRET:~~ [redacted]  
~~TOP SECRET:~~ [redacted]

b6  
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From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 11:40 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: (S) FW: [redacted]  
Importance: High

b6  
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(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

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A/UC [redacted]  
Operations Group  
[redacted]  
[redacted] desk  
[redacted] cell  
[redacted] internal

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 10:31 AM  
To: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

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
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Subject: (S) [redacted]  
Importance: FW: [redacted]  
High

b1  
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~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~  
(S) RECORD [redacted]

b1  
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[redacted]

b6  
b7C

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 9:30 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: (S) [redacted]

b6  
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(S) RECORD [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1  
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b7E



(S) [redacted]

b1  
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Sincerely,

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Intelligence Analyst

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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[Redacted]

Desk [Redacted]

BB [Redacted]

Cell [Redacted]

[Redacted] (unclass)

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~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350528~~

~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~



CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-29-2016

b6  
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b6  
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[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 10:51 AM

To: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Cc: [REDACTED]

(S) Subject: RE [REDACTED] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 4:54 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

(S) Subject: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Thanks-

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

5/28/2010

b3  
b7E


①

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of 3

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)



b6  
b7C

5/28/2010

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information

DECLASSIFY ON: 20350527

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

5/28/2010

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/17/2010

To: [Redacted]  
International Operations  
Counterterrorism

Attn: LEGAT [Redacted]

Attn: [Redacted]

Attn: [Redacted]

SSA [Redacted]

IA [Redacted]

SSA [Redacted]

Attn: [Redacted]

SSA [Redacted]

SA [Redacted]

Attn: SA [Redacted]

Charlotte

From: Counterterrorism

Contact: SOS [Redacted]

Approved By: [Redacted]

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: [Redacted]

(S)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)

Title: (S) [Redacted]

(U) (S) [Redacted]

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - Global Extremist Inspired

(U) [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: Counterterrorism  
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 05/17/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) [redacted]

Synopsis: (S) (S//NF) [redacted] Acting Section Chief [redacted]  
(S) [redacted] provides authority to disseminate the enclosed  
SECRET, NON USPER [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615  
Declassify On: 20350517

(U) [redacted]

b3  
b7E

Reference: (U) [redacted]

Administrative: (S) (S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U//FOUO) Pursuant to Attorney General Guidelines, for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom), Part VI.B.1.d., the dissemination of the enclosed information is in the interest of national security of the United States. The information is relevant to the recipient's authorized responsibilities, its dissemination is consistent with the National Security interests of the United States, and the FBI has considered the effect such dissemination may reasonably be expected to have on any identifiable U.S. person.

(U//FOUO) [redacted] has reviewed the information contained in the enclosed communication. Passage of this information is consistent with the standards for dissemination of U.S. person and non-U.S. person information to foreign authorities as authorized in the AGG-Dom.

b7E

(U) (S//NF) The FBI will undertake reasonable steps to ensure that any intelligence information that the FBI disseminates to the [redacted] pursuant to this authorization is not and will not be used for either assassination prohibited under Executive Order 12333 or

b7D

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: Counterterrorism  
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 05/17/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

torture, as defined in U.S. criminal law. To this end, the FBI shall take the following actions:

1. The FBI shall notify the recipient agency that the information in this document is for intelligence and lead purposes only. The information in this document may not be used in any legal proceedings or disseminated to any other agency within the recipient's government without the advanced authorization of the FBI. The FBI shall direct the recipient agency to not take any overt investigative steps (including but not limited to any type of formal legal process or direct contact with the subject) based on the information in this communication without first coordinating with the FBI;

b3  
b7E

3. LEGAT shall report to CTD and OIO any indication that the recipient agency to whom this information has been provided did not honor the caveat regarding use or dissemination of this information, or used the information for either assassination or torture.

Details: (S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7D  
b7E

(S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (S) (X) [redacted] 05/17/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted] Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. Finally, in October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra.

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: Counterterrorism

(S) Re: (U) [redacted] 05/17/2010

(U//~~FOUO~~) Questions regarding this communication  
should be directed to SSA [redacted] IA  
[redacted] or SOS [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: Counterterrorism

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) Re: (U) [redacted] 05/17/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

[redacted]

b7E Per FBI

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ CTD/[redacted] requests [redacted] pass the enclosed tear-line to the appropriate [redacted] and to report any non-compliance with the tear-line caveat, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Administrative Section of the EC. b7D b7E

(U) [redacted] X X

b3  
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/25/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Attn: CTD [redacted]

MPA [redacted]

Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]

From: Charlotte

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] (LS)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [redacted] W

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

Pending)

(S) (X) [redacted]

Pending)

(U) [redacted]

Pending)

Title: (U) (S) [redacted]

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) [redacted]

b7E

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [REDACTED], 05/25/2010

b1  
b3  
b3  
b7E

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615  
Declassify On: 05/25/2035~~

(U)

b7E

Administrative: (S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S//NF)

~~(S)~~ On 05/20/2010, Charlotte received e-mail authorization from CTD [REDACTED]'s SSA [REDACTED] and SSA [REDACTED] to proceed with this proposed operation. On 05/20/2010, Charlotte received e-mail authorization from [REDACTED]'s SSA [REDACTED] to proceed with this proposed operation. On 05/21/2010, Charlotte received e-mail authorization from [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] to proceed with this proposed operation. Based on this aforementioned authorization, Charlotte will proceed with this operation as outlined below.

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~(S)~~ Details: ~~(S)~~ Charlotte seeks to [REDACTED] first captioned subject, SAMIR KHAN, [REDACTED] In addition, Charlotte seeks to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Details are as follows.

b1  
b3  
b7E

#### UNDERCOVER BACKGROUND

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [redacted] 05/25/2010

b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

CASE BACKGROUND

(S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted] Individuals close to KHAN have expressed concern that KHAN may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, KHAN traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that KHAN is involved with AQAP and actively planning attacks against the US.

(S) [redacted] BACKGROUND

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted]

CURRENT SITUATION

(S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [REDACTED] 05/25/2010

b3  
b7E

CHARLOTTE THEORY

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

[REDACTED]

CHARLOTTE PROPOSAL FOR OPERATIONAL PLAN

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

(S//NF)

[REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [REDACTED] 05/25/2010

b3  
b7E

OBJECTIVES

(S) ~~(S)~~ The primary objective of this operation is to gain  
intelligence on SAMIR KHAN. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: [redacted] 05/25/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] SSA [redacted] Read and clear

b7E

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Set Lead 5: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) SA [redacted] Read and clear

b6  
b7C

♦♦

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-30-2016

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] (FBI)

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 2:55 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: (S) FW: [REDACTED] CASE .  
AGENT [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Attachments: (S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

FYI

b3  
b7E

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2010 2:19 PM  
To: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Cc: (S) [REDACTED]  
Subject: [REDACTED] CASE AGENT [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~

b3  
b7E



(S)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Signed: 5/27/10 @ 5:29p

[REDACTED]  
**Management and Program Analyst**

(S)

**Room 7291/7947**

(BB)  
(Pager)

b6  
b7C  
b1  
b3  
b7E

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OB

b3  
b7E



CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-30-2016

b6  
b7C  
b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/02/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

b7E  
b6  
b7C

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b7E  
b6  
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (Pending)

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~(S)~~ (U) Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301  
Declassify On: 06/02/2035

(U) [REDACTED]

b7E

Enclosure(s): (S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7D

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

~~(S) SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7D

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/02/2010

b6  
b7C  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

♦♦

~~(S) SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(FBI)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2010 3:06 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted] matter - closing the loop

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted]  
information was redacted (easily - it was [redacted]  
(S) Nothing related [redacted] was on the CD.  
No more emails on this.  
Thanks-  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2010 3:01 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted] matter - closing the loop

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted] - I spoke to both [redacted] and charging out the serial in ACS  
(S) permanently is fine. Please note on the charge out [redacted] Please  
give me the hardcopy serial so I can provide to [redacted]  
Thank you!  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2010 10:51 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: [redacted] matter

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b3  
b7E

(S) [redacted] I spoke to [redacted] since the serial that [redacted] uploaded is duplicative to what I  
uploaded/redacted/re-uploaded, can we simply charge out the [redacted] serial permanently? This  
will solve the problem if we document the charge out [redacted]  
I can review the 1A and [redacted] I will  
review the CD, but I do not think it has information [redacted] that needs to be  
redacted.  
Please advise on all of this.  
Thanks-  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2010 9:39 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: FW: [redacted] matter

b6  
b7C

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED] I did not think about this when I originally sent this to you, but I now see that  
(S) [REDACTED] submitted [REDACTED]  
data that needs to be redacted.  
How do I get the information in this serial redacted?  
(S) The way we did it in Charlotte was to take the original document, delete the [REDACTED]  
data (and any references to it), and resubmit that document for uploading. We even put  
(S) the word "redacted" [REDACTED]  
(S) I've attached an example above (titled [REDACTED])  
(S) Is it also possible for her to resend the CD with the [REDACTED] data not included? We  
can destroy the current CD.  
Please let me know your thoughts.  
Thanks-  
[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2010 2:25 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] matter

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED] - this is TOTALLY my fault but I wanted to keep you in the loop on this...don't  
think it will come back your way but I wanted you to be aware. Again - my oversight  
completely.  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2010 2:15 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: [REDACTED] matter

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

[REDACTED] - here is a bootleg draft copy (not approved/uploaded vet) of something that is not  
your problem, but is/was mine. This is just an FYI. [REDACTED] it's  
been mitigated, happens more often than you think, etc.  
Based on [REDACTED] there is nothing further needed to do  
operationally on this matter.  
All admin that can be done from here is done.  
It's been THAT kind of week.  
[REDACTED]

b6  
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b7E

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350422  
SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350422  
SECRET//NOFORN~~

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DECLASSIFY ON: 20350422  
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DECLASSIFY ON: 20350422  
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~~(S)~~ SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/02/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]  
IA [redacted]  
SOS [redacted]  
SSA [redacted] RA

Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
SOS [redacted]  
[redacted]  
A/UC [redacted]  
IA [redacted]

From: Charlotte

Contact: IA [redacted]

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)  
(U)

Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/PRODUCTION  
COUNTERTERRORISM

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S//NF)

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350602

~~(S)~~ SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN

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b7C

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b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/13/2010

b3  
b7E

(U) [redacted]

b7E

Administrative: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: (S//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Overview: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

#### BACKGROUND

(U) (S) [redacted] (hereafter referred to as [redacted] is [redacted] traveled to United States (US) from [redacted] in [redacted] and eventually gained [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) An open-source biographical statement about [redacted] states: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] During this time he has been involved in [redacted] programs, Islamic conferences, and various national training conventions. He has [redacted] he [redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/13/2010

b6  
b7C

IDENTIFIERS

(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

EDUCATION

(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E



(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/13/2010

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/13/2010

(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

OTHER REPORTING

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) 05/13/2010

(U)

~~(S)~~ On 05/07/2007, a CHS reported that

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[ANALYST NOTE:

(U)

~~(S)~~ On 05/17/2007, a CHS reported that

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~(S//NF)~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 05/13/2010

(S)

~~(S)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] An agent within the Charlotte  
Division advised that as 02/10/2010, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S//~~NE~~)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) An open-source Internet search for [REDACTED]  
reveals a very active web presence, primarily in association with  
[REDACTED] has Facebook and Twitter profiles  
and videos of himself [REDACTED] on  
YouTube.

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Overall Assessment and Recommendations

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/13/2010

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/13/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

RESIDENT AGENCY, [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/24/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
IA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]  
SSA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]  
SSA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Contact: IA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(U)  
(S) ~~(S)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/PRODUCTION  
COUNTERTERRORISM

(U) ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Synopsis: (S//~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFOR~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Derived From: ~~FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
Declassify On: ~~20350524~~

(U)

b7E

Administrative: (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: (S//~~FOUO~~)

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b6  
b7C

BACKGROUND

(S) is [redacted] (hereafter referred to as [redacted])  
[redacted] In [redacted] was  
married to [redacted] (hereafter referred to

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFOR~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E



(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

as (hereafter  
referred to as

b6  
b7C

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

IDENTIFIERS

(S//NF)

(S)

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]


(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted], 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E



OTHER REPORTING

(S) ~~(S)~~ A review of FBI reporting indicates that [redacted] has been interviewed multiple times [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S) ~~(S)~~ In an interview conducted on [redacted] stated that he [redacted] The [redacted] was somewhat arranged between [redacted] and [redacted] Between [redacted] [redacted] lived in [redacted] relocated to [redacted] and was later joined by [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S) ~~(S)~~ While living in [redacted] has lived with [redacted]  
(S) [redacted] received financial support from [redacted]  
(S) [redacted] [ANALYST NOTE: FBI reporting indicates that [redacted] necessitating [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U)

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S)

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] He  
further claimed to not know much about [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S)

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(U//~~FOUO~~) A Facebook search for [redacted] email address  
[redacted] yielded a profile page assessed to belong to  
[redacted] The page contained no significant or  
revealing personal information. The profile picture was an image  
of two small children, likely to be [redacted] children.

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~)

b6  
b7C

BACKGROUND

(U)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S//~~FOUO~~)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

IDENTIFIERS

(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S//NF)

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

OTHER REPORTING

(U) ~~(S)~~ In a 1997 open-source magazine interview, [redacted]

b6  
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ In an interview conducted on [redacted] through a translator [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) Overall Assessment and Recommendations

(S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E



(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT [redacted]

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

Please advise writer of open cases or assessments.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT [redacted]

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

Please advise writer of open cases or assessments.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

RESIDENT AGENCY, [redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

For your concurrence,

(S) please review the Charlotte [redacted] recommendation [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/24/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

♦♦

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(Rev. 06-04-2007)

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/27/2010

To: Operational Technology

Attn: FEDA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

From: Charlotte [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b7E  
b6  
b7C

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

(Pending)

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S//NF) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Derived From : ~~FBI NSISCG 20080301~~  
Declassify On: 20350301

(U) [redacted]

b7E

(S) Administrative: [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

WARNING: (S//NF) [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Operational Technology From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 05/27/2010

b3  
b7E

Package Copy: (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: (S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that Khan is involved with AQAP and actively planning attacks against the US.

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted] (S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Operational Technology From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 05/27/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY

AT ERF/FEDA

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Action)

OPERATIONAL TECNOLOGY

AT ERF

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-25-2016

b6  
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 6:32 PM  
To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: SAMIR KHAN DESIGNATION

~~SECRET~~

RECORD DESIGNATION FOR SAMIR KHAN

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted] supports [redacted] We would recommend [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b7E

SSA [redacted]  
CTD [redacted]  
[redacted] RA) Room [redacted]  
Office - [redacted]  
Blackberry [redacted]  
NSTS [redacted]  
Pager [redacted]  
Unclass [redacted]  
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]  
TOP SECRET: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 5:09 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: SAMIR KHAN DESIGNATION

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

RECORD DESIGNATION FOR SAMIR KHAN

b1  
b3  
b5  
b7E

SSA [redacted] is the [redacted] embed and [redacted] is the [redacted] embed.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thanks.

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

Supervisory Special Agent  
FBI Counterterrorism Division  
[redacted] Unit Chief

work and STE  
fax  
Blackberry

[redacted] NSTS

[redacted] pager

b6  
b7C

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 2:59 PM  
To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: RE: SAMIR KHAN DESIGNATION

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

RECORD DESIGNATION FOR SAMIR KHAN

To be clear, KHAN has NEVER/NEVER advocated attacks on the US in a public forum. We have no derog on KHAN that

b1  
b3  
b7E

SSA [redacted]

CTD [redacted]

RA) Room [redacted]

Office - [redacted]

Blackberry - [redacted]

NSTS [redacted]

Pager [redacted]

Unclass: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 10:14 AM  
To: [redacted]

Cc: [redacted]

Subject: SAMIR KHAN DESIGNATION

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

RECORD DESIGNATION FOR SAMIR KHAN

b7E

[redacted] Coord w/ [redacted] and [redacted] to see what can be done.

b6  
b7C

I know it has only been 10 days since these last emails, but according to what I am "hearing" from [redacted] this issue needs to be addressed. Here is the email regarding our prior discussion regarding not designating at this time: [redacted]


b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thank you.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6  
b7C




Supervisory Special Agent  
FBI Counterterrorism Division  
Unit Chief



work and STE  
fax  
Blackberry

INSTS

pager



~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350611~~

~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350611~~

~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350611~~

~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350611~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 03-25-2016

b6  
b7C  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(FBI)

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 6:22 PM  
To: [redacted]

Subject: FW: SAMIR KHAN DESIGNATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ b3  
b7E

(S) Team [redacted] b1  
b3  
b7E

Still working on getting [redacted] See below.

b7E

SSA [redacted]  
CTD [redacted]  
[redacted] RA) Room [redacted]  
Office [redacted]  
Blackberry [redacted]  
NSTS [redacted]  
Pager [redacted]  
Unclass: [redacted]  
~~SECRET~~: [redacted]  
~~TOP SECRET~~: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 11:13 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: RE: SAMIR KHAN DESIGNATION

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD 415

All,

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S) I spoke with [redacted] on [redacted] Khan issue. He is going to get us [redacted] at DOJ to figure out if an [redacted]  
(S) [redacted] so it would make sense to talk with DOJ about this.

(S) All of our smoking guns for Khan [redacted] According to [redacted] all of his open source blog comments have been within the range for first amendment protected rights [redacted]  
[redacted] that, then we can see if [redacted]  
package. Of course then you would have a indictment on Khan and we could see if [redacted]  
him concurrently with the indictment. It all depends on what, if anything [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b5  
b7E

Once I get a DOJ POC from [redacted] I'll pass it along to [redacted] for follow up. Let me know if anyone else has any other ideas.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Thanks!

[redacted]  
Intelligence Analyst  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office: [redacted]  
Secure [redacted]

b6  
b7C

From: [redacted]  
Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 10:14 AM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]  
Subject: SAMIR KHAN DESIGNATION

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

RECORD DESIGNATION FOR SAMIR KHAN

(S) From [redacted] meeting this morning. Khan is [redacted]  
[redacted] He continues to play an active role in AQAP and it will be only a matter  
of time when we have another Maj Nidal Hassan except that the subject will have been inspired by or in contact w/ Khan  
rather than Aulaqi. "With that said, [redacted] would like us to [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

[redacted] Coord w/ [redacted] and [redacted] to see what can be done.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

I know it has only been 10 days since these last emails, but according to what I am "hearing" from [redacted] this issue needs  
to be addressed. Here is the email regarding our prior discussion regarding not designating at this time: <[redacted]>

b7E

Thank you.

[redacted]  
Supervisory Special Agent  
FBI Counterterrorism Division  
Unit Chief

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]  
work and STE  
fax  
Blackberry

[redacted] NSTS

[redacted] pager  
[redacted]

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign CounterIntelligence Investigations~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350611~~

~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350611~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~

~~DECLASSIFY ON: 20350611~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Date: 06/16/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: [Redacted]  
Attn: [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

ROOM [Redacted]

Contact: [Redacted]

Approved By: [Redacted]

SS/AT

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Bjw

Case ID #: (U) [Redacted]

(Pending) [Redacted]

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From: Multiple Sources  
See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.  
Declassify On: 20350526~~

Classification Authority Reference: ~~(S)~~ "FBI NSISCG 06152009"

(S)

Enclosure(s): (S) [Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S) Details: ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte and [REDACTED]  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

b3  
b7E

(U) [REDACTED] will be sent by separate communication to the Main File Room of the Office of Origin.

b7E

(S)

~~(U)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte [REDACTED]  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

b3  
b7E

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

CC: 1 - [REDACTED] (w/o enclosures)

b6  
b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/22/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Intelligence Directorate

Attn:

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SSA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(U)

(S)

(U)

(U)

Title:

(S)

TDY MATTER

(U)

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

Synopsis: (U) To provide documentation of a request and  
authorization to use a

b7E

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350622

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/22/2010

b3  
b7E

Administrative: (U) Reference email exchanges with [redacted] (UC  
[redacted] and MPA [redacted] and SSA [redacted]  
6/16/2010 - 6/18/2010.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ On 6/16/2010 writer requested funds from [redacted] in  
support of a TDY request. On 6/18/2010, the request was approved  
by [redacted] UC [redacted]. Below are additional details regarding  
the TDY request:

b6  
b7C  
b7E  
b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

[redacted] (U) Upon completion of the TDY and per the request of the  
[redacted] writer will prepare a communication memorializing the work  
completed by IA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/22/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) [REDACTED]: Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) [REDACTED] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED]: Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/23/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: (S) [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
IA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

CT-1

Contact: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) (U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]  
(U) [REDACTED]

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S) [REDACTED]

(U) (S) ANWAR NASSER AULAQI  
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 06/23/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350623~~

(U) [redacted]

b7E

Administrative: (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) Reference [redacted]

Details: (S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
(X) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 06/23/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~(S)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (S) (X) [redacted] 06/23/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) For [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

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Page 369 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 370 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 371 ~ Referral/Consult;



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~~SECRET~~

HQ 2010-1712-

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]

b6  
b7C

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035

DATE: 07-21-2017

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/16/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

To: Charlotte

Attn: [redacted] *13*

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

[redacted] UNIT/ROOM [redacted]

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U) [redacted] nding)

b6  
b7C

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From: Multiple Sources~~

~~See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.~~

~~Declassify On: 20350526~~

Classification Authority Reference: ~~(S)~~ "FBI NSISCG 06152009"

(S)

(U) Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ Charlotte - [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: (U) The [redacted] is being sent to the Main  
File Room of the Office of Origin (OO).

(S)

~~(S)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO "~~SECRET~~" UPON REMOVAL OF  
ENCLOSURES.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Per  
Date

7/28/14

~~IS Comint Doc's moved to  
IS sub file~~

b6  
b7C

*13*

*(KS)*

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 06/16/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~(S)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

b3  
b7E

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC (w/o enclosures)

(U) Read and clear.

CC: 1 - [REDACTED] (w/o enclosures)

b6  
b7C

♦♦

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/16/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn: REPORTS SECTION

Intelligence Directorate

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(S)  
(U)

(Pending)  
(Pending)

Title: ~~(S)~~

(S)

~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~

document transmission of and  
request

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350616

Administrative: (U) Captioned investigation was initiated based upon new information obtained from Charlotte considers related leads covered.

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) 06/16/2010

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(S)

(S)

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(S)

(S)

Enclosure(s): (U) Enclosed is the electronic

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(U) Details: (S) Based upon the receipt of new information,  
Charlotte has determined that

b7E

Recent Information:

(S)

(S)

On 06/03/2010

b1  
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(S//NF) SAMIR KHAN (KHAN), main subject of  
(Pending)

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(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
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b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

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b7C

~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

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(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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(S)

(S)

(S)

Background:

(S)

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(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010


b3  
b7E

(S)



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b6  
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

(S/NOFORN)



(S)



(S)



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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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[redacted]

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Support for Fundraising Efforts of Suspected Non-  
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) With Ties to Terrorism

(S)

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] GRF being  
a support organization (front) for the Islamic Army (Al-Qaeda).  
GRF assets were frozen following the events of 9-11.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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[redacted] KINDHEARTS is suspected of being the replacement NGO  
to the HLF.

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(S)

(S)

Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

(S)

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(U)

(S)

[redacted] In an interview on 1/16/04 with [redacted]  
[redacted], who [redacted] was a former member of various faction  
groups of [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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identified twenty some individuals in Charlotte who were considered to be members of the MB. These individuals, while not considered violent or dangerous in his opinion, attended or were members of the ICC. [redacted] identified [redacted] as a possible member of the MB. [redacted] had been interviewed on [redacted] relative to his organizational affiliations as a youth.

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(S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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### Other Nefarious Contacts

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[redacted] has been interviewed by the  
FBI on [redacted] and was cooperative. [redacted]  
[redacted] He had contact  
with [redacted]  
[redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

(S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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[redacted] was interviewed on [redacted] by  
the FBI. [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] His DOB is [redacted]  
SSAN [redacted] and resides at [redacted]

(S)

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[redacted] was  
interviewed on [redacted] by the FBI relative to that investigation.  
[redacted] explained his circumstances in coming to the U.S. as

[redacted] The Syrian government made  
inquiries about [redacted] while in the U.S. at school. He opined  
that their interest was due to his association in high school  
with individuals who later became members of the Muslim  
Brotherhood. [redacted] said he was not a complete believer in  
the Muslim Brotherhood and that he was never formally asked to  
join the group. He acknowledged attending [redacted]  
while at school in [redacted]

[redacted] He listened to  
religious tapes distributed by the Muslim Student Association.  
He said in [redacted] he would have been considered a Muslim  
fundamentalist in his religious beliefs. He expressed concern of  
Western influence over his family, and specifically his older

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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daughter, who he wanted to send to Syria to experience her  
cultural heritage. After the events of 9-11, [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] His home telephone is [redacted] and  
business telephone [redacted]

(S)

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Suspected Foreign Power:

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Pertinent Sensitive Investigative Matters:

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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Additional Information/Intelligence:

(S) required (S) [redacted]: Coordinate [redacted] as

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) [REDACTED]: To notify of the  
initiation of captioned [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) [REDACTED]: Coordinate [REDACTED] as  
required based upon information in the Details above.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) [REDACTED] which is being  
submitted via email to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and appropriate supported systems.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) [REDACTED] Read and Clear.

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/16/2010

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b3  
b7E

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]: Read and Clear.

b7E

Set Lead 6: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]: Read and Clear.

b7E

Set Lead 7: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]: Read and Clear.

b7E

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]: Read and Clear.

b7E

Set Lead 9: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) [Reports Section]: Read and Clear.

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/16/2010

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♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 07-31-2017

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 06/30/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

Sgt  
IA  
SA

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From:

Contact: Det

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S)

(U)

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(S)

b1  
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Title: (S)

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
IT - AL QAEDA;  
00 : CE

(S)

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Synopsis: (S)

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(S)

Derived From : FBI NSISGC 20080301

(U) Declassify On: 06302035

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

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b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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(U) [redacted]

b7E

Administrative: (S) [redacted]

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Details: (S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

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b3  
b7E

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/30/2010

(S)

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b7C

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

To: [REDACTED] From: [REDACTED]  
(S) Re: (S) [REDACTED] 06/30/2010

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Accomplishment Information:

Number:2

Type: POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE FBI

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Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

b6  
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LEAD(s):

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and Clear

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read & Clear.

◆◆

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN//X1~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 07-31-2017

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[redacted] (FBI)

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b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2010 4:17 PM  
To: [redacted] (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted] (FBI)  
Subject: (S) RE [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Attachments: [redacted]

b7E

UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

[redacted] thanks, I'm good with it.

b6  
b7C

From: [redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2010 3:37 PM  
To: [redacted] (FBI)  
Subject: (S) [redacted]

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b7E  
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UNCLASSIFIED  
NON-RECORD

(S) [redacted] Attached is the summary I'm sending to OGC [redacted]  
Please let me know if you have any comments, additions, edits, etc.

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Thanks.

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET~~

Revised July 2009

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 07-31-2017

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(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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1.

[redacted]		OFFICE PHONE		[redacted]
FIELD OFFICE	Charlotte	DATE	06/16/2010	

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b7C  
b7E

b1  
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b7E

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 07-31-2017

b6  
b7C  
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b6  
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2010 4:57 PM  
To: [redacted] (FBI)  
Cc: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Subject: (S) [redacted] SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN [redacted]  
[redacted]

Attachments: (S) [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

b3  
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(S) [redacted]  
Thanks-  
[redacted]

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b3  
b7E

From: [redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2010 4:23 PM  
To: [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Cc: (S) [redacted] (FBI)  
Subject: [redacted] SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN [redacted] (FBI)

~~SECRET~~  
~~RECORD~~ [redacted]

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b7E

(S) [redacted]  
  
(S) [redacted]

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b7E

(S) [redacted]  
Management and Program Analyst  
[redacted]  
[redacted] (desk)  
[redacted] (blackberry)  
[redacted]

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~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources  
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/02/2010

To: Charlotte [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]  
Attn: [redacted]

b6  
b7C

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) [redacted] UNIT [redacted]  
Contact: [redacted]

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b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

(Pending) [redacted]

b3  
b7E

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b3  
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~~Derived From : Multiple Sources~~

~~See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.~~

~~Declassify On: 20350624~~

(U) Classification Authority Reference: (S) "FBI NSISCG 06152009" and  
[redacted]

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b3  
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b6  
b7C

(S) Enclosure(s): (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S) Details: (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(U) The [redacted] will be sent by separate  
communication to the Main File Room of the Office of Origin.

b7E

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E



~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte [REDACTED]  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/02/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte [REDACTED]  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/02/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) READ AND CLEAR.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED]

b7E

AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Set Lead 3 : (Action)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Set Lead 4 : (Action)

[REDACTED]

b7E

AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte [REDACTED]  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/02/2010

b3  
b7E

Set Lead 5 : (Action)

b7E

[REDACTED]  
AT [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

CC: 1 - [REDACTED] (w/o enclosures)

b6  
b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

Automated Serial Permanent Charge-Out  
FD-5a (1-5-94)

Date: 07/13/10 Time: 08:23

Case ID: [REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

Description of Document:

Type : EMAIL

Date : 07/06/10

To : CHARLOTTE

From : CHARLOTTE

Topic: KHAN UPDATE FROM [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Reason for Permanent Charge-Out:

Other

RDU approval granted on 07/13/2010 via email. Serial deletion requested by SA [REDACTED] Reason for deletion: Limited distribution; the document should not be in the case file at this time.

b6  
b7C

Employee: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

b3  
b7E

(Rev. 05-01-2008)

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/02/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

(U)

Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources  
See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.~~

~~Declassify On: 20350624~~

Classification Authority Reference: (S) "FBI NSISCG 06152009"

(S)

Enclosure(s): (S) Charlotte - [REDACTED]

Details: (U) The [REDACTED] is being sent to the Main  
File Room of the Office of Origin (OO).

(S)

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO ~~"SECRET"~~ UPON REMOVAL OF  
ENCLOSURES.

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per  
Date

7/28/14

~~IS~~ ~~Comint~~ attachment moved to ~~IS~~ sub file [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

b7D

b1

b3

b7E

b6

b7C

b3

b7E

b1

b3

b7E

b1

b3

b7E

b1

b3

b7E

b6

b7C

b3

b7E

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON, NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/02/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~(S)~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON, NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte  
From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/02/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC (w/o enclosures)

(U) Read and clear.

CC: 1 - [REDACTED] (w/o enclosures)

b6  
b7C

♦♦

~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON,NOFORN~~

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/05/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U) (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S//~~NF~~)

~~(S)~~ Derived From : FBI NSISGC, 20080301  
~~(U)~~ Declassify On: 07/05/2035

(U)

Enclosure(s): (S//~~NF~~)

Details: (S//~~NF~~)

(S//~~NF~~)

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E



(S)

~~SECRET//NOFOR~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/05/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(S//~~NOFOR~~)

b1  
b3  
b7E

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFOR~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/08/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Contact: IOA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (Pending) - [REDACTED]

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350708~~

(U) [REDACTED]

Reference: (U) [REDACTED]

Details: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Lead 2 in [REDACTED] considered covered by [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~b6  
b7C  
b7Eb6  
b7Cb3  
b7Eb1  
b3  
b7E

b7E

b3  
b7Eb1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7Cb3  
b7Eb3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/08/2010

b3  
b7E

**Accomplishment Information:**

(S) Number: 1  
Type: [REDACTED]  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By: [REDACTED]  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/08/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) For information only.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 07-31-2017

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/08/2010

To: Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(U) [REDACTED] (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
(U) STATS

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To document stats to date in captioned case.

~~(S)~~ Derived From : G-1  
(U) Declassify On: 07/08/2035

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ This report documents all statistics earned from 05/06/2010 to present. The majority of these stats were a team effort and thus, all team members will receive credit for the majority of the below-listed stats. Due to high workload, substantial details of the below statistics are not included in this EC. See case file or [REDACTED] for further details.

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb1  
b3  
b7Eb6  
b7C  
b7Eb3  
b7Eb3  
b7Eb1  
b3b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/08/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

-

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~

b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~

Disseminations to [redacted]

b7D

(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~(S)~~

On 05/19/10, writer participated in a subject interview of [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(U)

~~(S)~~

Case information was released to DoD on a regular basis.

(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

These reviews have been documented in "weekly updates" that have been disseminated widely to other divisions and FBIHQ on an almost weekly basis (and uploaded to ACS and the case sharepoint site).

(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

These reviews have been documented in "weekly updates" that have been disseminated widely to other divisions and FBIHQ on an almost weekly basis (and uploaded to ACS and the case sharepoint site).

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/08/2010

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 25

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 7

(S)

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Number: 3

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/08/2010

b3  
b7E

Number: 3

(S)

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Number: 1

(S)

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Number: 1

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 25

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E



(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted], 07/08/2010

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 25

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 100

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 25

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

♦♦

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

b6  
b7C  
  
b1  
b3  
b7E



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

```
Precedence:  Priority
```

Date: 06/2/2010

**To:** Counterterrorism

[illegible]

SA

SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

SA

Attn: SA

SA

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SA

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Attn: SA

Attn: SA

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SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

5

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [Redacted] 06/2/2010

b3  
b7E

[Redacted]

Attn:  
Attn:  
Attn:

SA  
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SA

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Counterterrorism

[Redacted]

Contact: SSA

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By:

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

Case ID #:

[Redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/2/2010

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S) Title: (X)

(U) (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U) ALL OTHERS

b7E

(S) Synopsis: (X) To request the opening [redacted]  
[redacted] on captioned subject, and provide opening LHM for  
passage to DOJ.

b1  
b3

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350602~~

(U)

b7E

Administrative: (U) Section Chiefs Armando Fernandez [redacted]  
Michael Stienbach [redacted] and Philip A. Selton [redacted] have  
been consulted regarding the opening of captioned matter and  
agree with this action.

b7E

~~(S//FOUO)~~

b1  
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b7E

Details: (S//NF)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/2/2010

b3  
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(S)

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(S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

[redacted] Investigation has shown Khan becoming increasingly religious and radical over time. In addition, investigation has shown that Khan, [redacted] [redacted] has become a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating and recruiting them for jihad. Khan has been in nefarious contact with numerous terrorism subjects, both inside and outside of the US. Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that Khan is involved with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and actively planning attacks against the US.

(S//NF)

SAMIR KHAN [redacted]

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/2/2010

b3  
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(S)

(S//NF)

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b7C

(S)

(U) A review of the 'Ignored Puzzle Pieces of Knowledge' revealed that part of the blog's stated mission includes the following:

"We do our best to bring the readers the reality on the ground in the lands of jihad, and exposing the lies and deception of the disbelievers and hypocrites. We do our best to make ourselves a channel against the Western media since they only bring lies and deception. They are the fulfillment of the haddith regarding the last age, 'the liar will be believed, and the truthful one will be disbelieved.'"

(U) On 16 May 2008, Fox News did an article on the blog titled, North Carolina Web Site Said to Be 'Gateway Drug' to Terror. In the article it quotes the blog as referring to a suicide bombing conducted in Iraq by former Guantanamo inmate Abdullah Saleh al-Ajimi as so, "This is what you call a success story," and then the blog went on to refer to Aimi as a hero, a "martyrdom bomber" who sacrificed "his life for the sake of Islam." The article goes on to point out that blog contains a list of the top "scholars of Islam" and people to "take knowledge

(S)

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/2/2010

from," is a list of 63 names containing mostly known terrorists, to include Usama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The blog is observed to include numerous videos of US military Humvees exploding from roadside bombs in Iraq, as well as pro-jihad messages aimed at radicalizing readers. The article quotes cyberterrorism expert Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean of the Jewish human rights group the Wiesenthal Center, as noting, "This website is one of the premiere English-language site promoting terrorism." Cooper has presented a report on Capitol Hill on the dangers Internet sites like this pose to young, impressionable Muslims. In his report, "Digital Terrorism and Hate 2.0," he references the site four times as an example of how Islamic extremists recruit for Al Qaeda. The article also quotes Jarret Brachman, director of research at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. Bachman refers to the blog as 'gateway drug.' Bachman then states, "The goal is to hook people, to get more people in this country to become radicalized and se the world through the lens of Al Qaeda."

(U) The blog was ranked at one time in the top one percent of one hundred million Internet websites in the world. The blog contains postings that support violent jihad to include links to hundreds of videos that graphically depict the killing of US soldiers in Iraq, suicide attacks on coalition facilities, and speeches by Usama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri (Al Qaeda's number 1 and number 2 leaders). In the blog KHAN has stated his desire to bring about the Islamic Caliphate and that he feels the West is a hypocrisy.

(S) (X) In February 2009, KHAN created *Jihad Recollections*. He has enlisted the help of numerous CT subjects to assist in writing articles and publish the magazine.

b1  
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b7E

(S//OR/NF/)

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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/2/2010

b3  
b7E

(S//NF)

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b6  
b7C

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S//NF)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/2/2010

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b7E

(S)

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b6  
b7C

(S//~~NOFORN~~)

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/2/2010

b3  
b7E

Suspected Foreign Power:

~~(S//NF)~~ As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that KHAN is involved with AOAP and actively planning attacks against the US. [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

Investigative Plan:

(S)

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b3  
b7E

CPI Code(s):

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Descriptive Data:

~~(S)~~

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S)


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U)  06/2/2010

b3  
b7E


(S)

b1  
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b7E  
b6  
b7C

Additional Information/ Intelligence:

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/2/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b3  
b7E

(S) (S) This [redacted] will be operated from FBIHQ [redacted] The case agent assigned will be SA [redacted] The [redacted] program managed by [redacted] SSA [redacted] and SOS [redacted] [redacted] Upon approval and upload of this document, [redacted] will ensure accompanying LHM is passed to DOJ/CTS.

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Field Office Guidance

(S) (S) ~~(U)~~ All Field Divisions with current cases under this [redacted] [redacted] are instructed to dual caption all relevant case documents (ECs, 302s, etc.) created for their respective case files with the above captioned [redacted] file number.

b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) Records Management Division is requested to create a new HQ operational case file number for use in this matter.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/12/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(Pending)

(Pending)

(Pending)

(Pending)

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
b7C

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

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ANWAR NASSER AULAQI

CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM-MIDDLE EAST

Synopsis: (S)

~~(S)~~ Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301

(U) Declassify On: 07/12/2035

(U)

Administrative: ~~(S)~~ For file, attached in a 1A

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/12/2010

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Details: (S) [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/12/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/12/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED]

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AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

[REDACTED]

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AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~



(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/14/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

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From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

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Approved By:

b6  
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Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

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(Pending)

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(U) Title: ~~(S)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

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(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~

To memorialize the case overview and executive summary for the Samir Khan investigation as of 07/14/2010, as well as provide a link to the Samir Khan case sharepoint site.

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~~(S)~~

(U)

Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301

Declassify On: 07/14/2035

(U)

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(U) Details: ~~(S)~~

This EC documents, as of 07/14/2010, the case overview and executive summary for the Samir Khan investigation.

(U) ~~(S)~~

In addition, the Samir Khan case sharepoint site can be found at:

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On this open sharepoint site (requires no permissions), numerous documents can be found, to include a list of the investigative team and their contact information, up-to-date biographical information on Khan, weekly (case) updates from 2008 to present, and much more.

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/14/2010

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CASE OVERVIEW

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[REDACTED] Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED] In January 2010, intelligence suggested that Khan became involved with AQAP and was actively planning attacks against the US. In July 2010, AQAP released an online, English language magazine known as "Inspire" that contains advice on making a bomb and preparing for jihad. Intelligence suggests that Khan is a major contributor to "Inspire." Based on knowledge of Khan's skills, network, and mindset, FBI Charlotte concludes that Khan's roles in AQAP are that of a propagandist, recruiter, operational planner, and potential martyr.

CASE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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(U) The [REDACTED] discovered an online blog maintained by Khan, which identified his interest in the Tanzeem-e-Islami-affiliated, US-based organization, Islamic Organization of North America (IONA), and in jihad. It was discovered that Khan stated that his view of jihad and IONA's view of jihad differ in that IONA does not publicly support the physical fighting aspect of jihad.

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/14/2010

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Investigation has revealed that Khan, a self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi, administered his fundamentalist Islamic, pro-jihad, online blog from 2005 until late 2009. Also, Khan is a registered member on several other online forums with similar content.

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(U) An earlier version of Khan's online blog was ranked among the top one percent of one hundred million Internet web sites in the world. His most recent online blog contained postings that support violent jihad to include links to hundreds of videos that graphically depict the killing of US soldiers in Iraq, suicide attacks on coalition facilities, and speeches by Ayman al Zawahiri and UBL. On his online blog, Khan has stated his desire to bring about the Islamic Caliphate and that he feels the west is a hypocrisy.

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As this investigation has progressed, it has revealed that Khan has become more radical, has become a radicalizing influence to others, has become more religious, and has continued to increase his association with nefarious individuals. FBI Charlotte has concluded that this combination of indicators has resulted in Khan becoming involved with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and actively planning attacks against the United States.

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Based on knowledge of Khan's skills, network, and mindset - as well as information from sister agencies on his operational activity and current association with AQAP (as determined from [REDACTED] - FBI [REDACTED] concludes that Khan's roles in AQAP are that of propagandist, recruiter, operational planner, and potential martyr - or all four. Based on higher than ~~Secret~~ information, FBI [REDACTED] is aware of at least one other operational role Khan currently fills for AQAP.

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 07/14/2010

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(U) Details are as follows:

(S//~~NOFORN~~) [REDACTED] RADICALIZATION.

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(S) [REDACTED]  
- In [REDACTED] reported to the FBI that [REDACTED] had [REDACTED] Khan because Khan was becoming more radical in his views, especially as it concerned jihad. [REDACTED] reported that Khan made statements such as, "the mujahidin have good hearts" and "we should go and leave and support the jihadis."

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- An individual [REDACTED] reported to the FBI (in April 2009) that [REDACTED] was worried, in approximately March 2007, that Khan was going to travel overseas to participate in jihad and that [REDACTED] talked him out of doing this.

- In [REDACTED] the same aforementioned [REDACTED] reported that a [REDACTED] told him that [REDACTED] were concerned that Khan may martyr himself.

- In October 2007, the New York Times published an article titled, "An Internet Jihad Aims At US Viewers." Khan, the focus of the article, was identified as "inshallahshaheed" and as a resident of Charlotte, NC. In the article Khan states that he had dreams about meeting UBL and that he would not rule out picking up a weapon himself one day. This article, and subsequently Khan, received significant media and press coverage, both locally and nationally.

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/14/2010

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INCREASED RELIGIOSITY:

- In July 2007, Khan engaged in a religious argument with non-Muslim individuals at the local mosque. Khan made statements taunting the individuals with threats of killing Americans.
- In [REDACTED] told the FBI that Khan does not have any friends because he (Khan) was too intense in his religious views.

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- During the investigation, it was discovered that Khan expressed an interest in studying Arabic at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan.

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/14/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/14/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/14/2010

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~~(S)~~ Investigation into Khan continues. The primary goal of this investigation was, while Khan was in the US, to determine if Khan

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/14/2010

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[REDACTED] Since Khan traveled to Yemen in late 2009, the FBI has concluded that Khan has become operational with AQAP and poses a significant threat to the West based on the fact that he may be recruiting, may be helping with propaganda, may be operationally planning, or may be a potential martyr (or all four). The FBI's current goals now consist of [REDACTED]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] .07/14/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 08-09-2017

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/10/2010

To: Counterintelligence  
Counterterrorism

Attn: IA [REDACTED]  
Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S) Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

Title: (S/NE) [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: (U) [REDACTED]

Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615  
Declassify On: 20350610

Reference: (U) Re 06/04/2010 secure telcall of SA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] FBIHQ, [REDACTED] and  
06/04/2010 BuEmail and Unet email from SA [REDACTED] to IA  
[REDACTED]

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is a transcript of  
a 06/03/2010 radio interview of U. S. Representative Sue Myrick  
(NC-9); the transcript was prepared by FBI [REDACTED] PAS [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] based upon her review of a publically available pod-  
cast of the interview.

(S) [REDACTED]  
WARNING: (S/NE) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

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To: Counterintelligence From: Charlotte  
Re: ~~(U)~~ [redacted] 06/10/2010

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Details: ~~(S)~~ On 06/03/2010 at approximately 5:29 p.m., U.S. Representative (Rep.) Sue Myrick (NC-9), white female, DPOB [redacted] was a guest on the Tara Servatius Show, which airs weekdays from 3:00pm-6:00pm on news-talk radio station WBT. [redacted]

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~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Khan is the creator of the first US-based, English language, pro-jihad magazine, known as Jihad Recollections. Investigation has shown Khan becoming increasingly religious and radical over time. In addition, investigation has shown that Khan has become a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad. [redacted]

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Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr, and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that Khan is involved with AQAP and actively planning attacks against the U.S.

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To: Counterintelligence From: Charlotte  
Re: (X) [redacted] 06/10/2010

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(U) The Molly Grantham referred to in the radio interview is a WBTB (CBS) anchor who did a three-part series on Khan in July 2008, that included an interview of Rep. Myrick.

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To: Counterintelligence From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/10/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

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Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

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Read and clear.

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WBT Talk Radio, 1110am  
June 3, 2010, 5:29pm

**Tara Servatius:** Sue Myrick glad to have you on the show.

**Rep. Sue Myrick:** Hi, good to be here.

**Tara:** I would ask you this, this yahoo the Somali al-Qaida associated terrorist we pulled off the flight over the weekend, a resident alien here in the United States of America. Before he got his terrorist chops, he was trying to get his citizenship. What do you say to all that?

**Myrick:** It's not unusual Tara, this is one of the biggest problems we've got today. People talk about so called homegrown terrorism. It really is a bigger issue than anyone wants to admit. Anybody who has - is either a resident alien as you said, somebody who has citizenship or somebody who has the ability to go back and forth, somebody who has the ability to move around our country freely, that is the problem because we don't know who they are or where they are. You know we do have some good methods we use through our intelligence sources of course but if they don't show up on that radar screen we honestly don't know how to find them. And that's what so scary to me. And you know they outsmart us every time. Every time we come up with something that is supposed to be a deterrent they find a way around it.

**Tara:** sponsoring a bill

**Myrick:** Well, there's two different bills. One of them would take the citizenship away from an American citizen who is aiding and abetting a terrorist, in other words someone who is helping them, or recruiting them, or training them or in some way associated that they are making their job easier. The second one is to take it away if you are a declared terrorist. You know, Tara it used to be that if you went against your country you were considered a traitor. And anymore you know it's oh well you know why should we take their citizenship away? Well hey, if you don't like America go someplace else.

**Tara:** So how would we take their citizenship away according to the bill, how would that work?

**Myrick:** Well, basically the way the bill is stated is they are actually um, they would have of course have their right to be heard in court and all of that. So they would have to be tried and sentenced on either of the charges before they would lose their citizenship. They would just their citizenship as part of their sentencing, after their sentenced I should say.

**Tara:** Why do you think this is so controversial, do you think?

**Myrick:** Because people say if you're an American citizen you have a right to freedom speech, you have a right to you know all the liberties that we know in our country. You know, I agree with that, I'm certainly not out to take anyone's citizenship away. But when you are a declared or known or sentenced terrorist who has done an act or tried to do an act where you want to blow up Americans or destroy our country in some which is totally against our constitution, why should you have any rights?

**Tara:** you know that's what I'm saying too. Do you think this is going to get anywhere Sue Myrick?

**Myrick:** well you know its, I think got a lot more traction since we've had so many problems. There have been fifteen, well maybe more than that now, but at least 15 attempted attacks on our country in a year and three months. And that's no small amount.

I mean that's very serious. When you look at it that way this is something that is become a bigger problem than somebody invading us, if you get what I mean. So you know, I don't know at this point, I can just tell you the whole issue of immigration, safe borders secure borders is gaining momentum all the time. With the Arizona bill of course that put attention back on it. And um, I know there are people who say well we don't have to have a safe border. My whole mission from day one has been our whole existence as a federal government is supposed to be for the security of our citizens, national security and that's what it's about. And until we secure that border, and know who is here, you know people can't just arbitrarily come over whenever they want. And by the way they are recruiting people from all nationalities Tara, to come across our border. I mean there is no stigma to whoever it is that they're recruiting. They are recruiting anybody. And I will tell you, we also have a resolution saying Anwar al-Alawki should lose his citizenship because he is the key ring leader in Yemen of course right now. Internationally as far as recruiting terrorists, and he does it in a way so it supposedly he stays kind of above the law. But I'll tell you who is a close second to him and doing the same thing is good old Samir Khan. You remember him? He started in his parents' basement in Charlotte.

**Tara:** Yeah!

**Myrick:** Well he's in Yemen and he is very high on the radar list. He's doing the same thing al-Alawki is doing.

**Tara:** I did not know that. We'll have to let Molly Grantham over at WBTV know about that, that he's...

**Myrick:** Please do. Because Molly worked on that several years ago when we tried to stop him when he started in his parent's basement. We tried everything to stop him. He would move his servers, he know exactly what he could do and how he could do it so we couldn't touch him in affect because he was an American citizen. And now look at where he is now.

**Tara:** Yep, in Yemen. Let's hope that he doesn't come back through Mexico, that seems to be the hot thing to do these days.



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/28/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

Attn:

SA

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From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

(S) Case ID #: (U)

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Title: (S) (X)

(X)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

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(S) Synopsis: (S)

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Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615

Declassify On: 06/28/2035

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Administrative: (U) SA is the assigned  
Contact/Handling Agent for the session listed above conducted

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/28/2010

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(S) (U) A CD labeled 06022010 [REDACTED] reflecting the session has been submitted to ELSUR.

Details:

(U) CASE BACKGROUND

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(U) SUBJECT BACKGROUND

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[REDACTED] Investigation has shown KHAN becoming increasingly religious and radical over time. In addition, investigation has shown that KHAN has become a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad. KHAN has been in nefarious contact with dozens of terrorism subjects both inside and outside of the US. Individuals close to KHAN have expressed concern that KHAN may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, KHAN traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hijra. As of January 2010, intelligence suggests that KHAN is involved with AQAP and actively planning attacks against the US.

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/28/2010

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(U) ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

(U) (S) None for this session.

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U)  06/28/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/28/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/28/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/28/2010

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

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Set Lead 2: (Info)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/30/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Charlotte

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From: Charlotte

Contact: SOS

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/30/2010

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Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS / PRODUCTION  
COUNTER TERRORISM

(U) ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)



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Synopsis: (S//~~NF~~) [REDACTED]

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Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350630

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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Administrative: (S) [redacted]

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Details: (S//~~NF~~) [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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[NOTE: Sourcing for all identifiers can be found throughout the analysis below.]

BACKGROUND

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
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted], 06/30/2010

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
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


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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) 06/30/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010


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
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
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


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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/30/2010

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

ONLINE ACTIVITY

~~(S//NF)~~

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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#### ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 06/30/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

[redacted] Please advise writer of  
open cases or assessments.

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Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

Read and clear.

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Set Lead 4: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

For your concurrence, please review the  
recommendation [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

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Set Lead 5: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 06/30/2010

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(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

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(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 08-18-2017

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[REDACTED] (FBI)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2010 2:19 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: request

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RECORD

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Historically speaking [REDACTED] was correct as usual. We had an individual here in [REDACTED] by the name of [REDACTED] who provided "forensic linguistic" and "authorial attribution" services on FBI cases in the past but [REDACTED] has since retired from the bu. We no longer have this expertise within our unit nor the FBI at large. Recently the

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] expert that  
would tackle this issue for you.

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(S) [REDACTED]  
Sorry but the bu does not have an expert in this area at the present time.

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[REDACTED]  
-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2010 11:24 AM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Cc: [REDACTED]

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Subject: request

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RECORD

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[REDACTED]  
(S) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
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(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/20/2010

To: Charlotte

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From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

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Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(U) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(S) (U) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(U) [REDACTED] (Pending)

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(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

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(U) Synopsis: (S) To document interview with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] on 07/19/2010.

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(S) (U) Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301  
Declassify On: 07/20/2035

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Details: (S) [REDACTED]

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(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/20/2010

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(S) (S//NF) [redacted] The timing of the interview was based on the fact that mainstream and local media outlets began reporting, on 07/18/2010, that Khan was significantly involved with AQAP's "Inspire" magazine and [redacted]'s assessment that with each passing day the probability of success for an interview diminished. [redacted] prior to the interview suggested that [redacted] are aware of the current news stories.

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(U) (S) Prior to the interview, coordination with FBI Charlotte's Media Rep, FBI [redacted] and CTD [redacted] occurred and appropriate approvals were obtained from FBI Charlotte executive management. A voicemail was left for the Assistant United States Attorney working this case.

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(U) On 07/19/2010, SA [redacted] SA [redacted] TFO [redacted] SOS [redacted] and writer, in two separate cars, traveled to [redacted] At approximately 7:45 pm, SA [redacted] and writer knocked on the door and no one answered. Based on the premise that [redacted] may be staying with [redacted] it was decided that investigators would travel to [redacted] located at [redacted] SA [redacted] and TFO [redacted] remained in the [redacted] neighborhood to see if anyone arrived at the residence. SA [redacted] SOS [redacted] and writer conducted a drive-by of [redacted] The drive-by showed lights were on, but no vehicles were in the driveway. After appropriate coordination, it was decided that a knock-and-talk would be attempted. SA [redacted] SOS [redacted] and writer approached the door at approximately 9:00 pm.

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(U) An [redacted] dressed in [redacted] answered the door and was identified as [redacted] Writer showed FBI credentials and asked to speak to [redacted] Writer was advised that [redacted] does not live at this address and that [redacted] were possibly out of town. [redacted] advised that neither [redacted] were at the house and she did not know where they were. Upon leaving the house, it was determined that other lights came on and the likelihood existed that someone else was at this residence. Investigators again knocked on the door, spoke to [redacted] and asked how to contact [redacted] said she would attempt to call but wanted to know what this was about. She was advised this was about the current situation as reported by the media. [redacted] left investigators on the front porch and went inside the house to call. While she was gone, investigators noticed a male silhouette looking through a window on the second floor.

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/20/2010

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(U) When [redacted] returned, she advised she could not reach [redacted] due to the fact that it is prayer time. When asked if anyone else was in the house, she answered in the affirmative and said it was [redacted]. Investigators thanked [redacted] apologized for interrupting prayer, and advised that this matter is important enough for the FBI to be out at this late hour. Investigators noted that both interactions with [redacted] were cordial and non-confrontational.

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(U) It was determined that one final approach of [redacted] residence would be attempted. At approximately 9:30 pm, SA [redacted] SOS [redacted] and writer approached the residence and noted that numerous lights were on and window shades had been adjusted from the previous visit. Upon knocking on the door, [redacted] came to a window by the door and requested to know who was there. Writer advised [redacted] of writer's identity and showed FBI credentials. [redacted] advised she could not talk to the FBI without an attorney. Writer advised that she is not in trouble and she may want to hear what the FBI has to say because it is about [redacted].

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(U) [redacted] opened the door and stepped onto the front porch. Writer asked [redacted] if she remembered writer from a previous visit in January and [redacted] answered in the affirmative. [redacted] asked if the investigators knocked on the door earlier in the evening, to which we replied in the affirmative. [redacted] mentioned that she thought investigators were the press and did not appreciate someone looking through the window by the front door. Writer apologized and advised that investigators were simply trying to see if anyone was home. The remainder of the interview occurred on the front porch.

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(U) Investigators asked if [redacted] were home and available and [redacted] advised neither were available. [redacted] further stated that [redacted] was away and would not be home for "a day or two." Investigators advised the reason for the visit was obvious - that Khan is currently a top story on numerous national news channels.

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(U) [redacted] was asked if she was aware of the news to which she replied in the affirmative. [redacted] was advised that the FBI wants to know what is going on and [redacted]. When asked if she knows any way to get in contact with Samir, she replied, "no clue."

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[redacted]

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(U) [redacted] said she cannot answer questions without a lawyer. She was advised that she is not under investigation and that the FBI is interested in getting to the truth about what is going on. She was advised that she did not have to talk to the FBI and was free to end the interview at any time. [redacted] did not conclude the interview.

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 07/20/2010

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(U) When asked if she had seen the magazine on which the news reported, she replied that she had only seen the front cover from the news stories. Writer temporarily provided [REDACTED] with a copy of the magazine to look at. When asked if she was familiar with another magazine known as "Jihad Recollections," [REDACTED] replied in the negative. Writer showed [REDACTED] a copy of the September 2009 issue of "Jihad Recollections." When asked if she could confirm, as the media had reported, that Khan was involved with "Jihad Recollections," [REDACTED] replied in the negative. When asked if she was familiar with "Al Fursan Media," a name that was written on the cover of "Jihad Recollections," [REDACTED] replied in the negative.

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(U) [REDACTED] stated that two days ago a reporter from the Daily News knocked on her door and advised her that he wanted to talk about Samir. [REDACTED] told him to leave but the next day she saw the Daily News published an article on the Internet about Samir. She also saw a story on CNN this morning. When asked her thoughts about the news stories, she stated that she does not believe them, they are lies, and that the FBI can look at Wikipedia to see that this is a mockery. When asked if she has been in contact with Samir about this, she advised she will not answer that question without a lawyer present. The general fact that [REDACTED] Samir was discussed. The general fact that [REDACTED] has not had regular contact with Samir for weeks or months, despite the fact that [REDACTED] would not provide details about the contact, was discussed.

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(U) [REDACTED] was advised that this type of situation does not happen every day - that [REDACTED] who she has not been in contact with in weeks or months, but with whom she [REDACTED] appears in the headline of national news stories. [REDACTED] confirmed that she has seen the news but does not believe the media because it has not told the truth. [REDACTED] stated that she does not know anything, her lawyer knows what she knows, and the only new information is that a reporter stopped by the house two days ago.

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(U) When asked if Samir was planning to return to the US, [REDACTED] stated that his ticket is valid until October of this year. When asked again about contact with Samir to see what his plans are, she again said she does not want to comment on contact with Samir without a lawyer present. She stated that all she knows is that Samir went to Sanaa, Yemen, she wishes she knew where he is in Yemen now, and she prays all the time for Samir - as well as [REDACTED]. She said she "honestly doesn't know" anything else and acknowledged that it has been a long time since she and Samir were in contact. When asked why she has mentioned having a lawyer with her, she said because that is what she has been advised for her own protection. When asked if the family and the lawyer are working to bring Samir back home, [REDACTED] stated that they have not spoken about this. When asked how she thought this situation was going to be resolved, she stated she did not know.

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/20/2010

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(U) [redacted] stated that a top-level FBI official informed the news media about Samir and the FBI should put a stop to these stories. [redacted] asked who is leaking this information and putting it into the media. Investigators advised that we would also like to know those answers. [redacted] stated that we should be investigating that leak rather than talking to her.

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(U) Writer then asked [redacted] if she would read an article from the magazine "Inspire" and she agreed. Writer directed [redacted] to p. 45 of the magazine and asked that she read the section entitled, "Language Barrier." Upon finishing the article, writer asked if she was familiar with the individual mentioned in the article who traveled to Afghanistan. Writer stated that it is not believed to be Samir, but an individual Samir knows. [redacted] answered in the negative.

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(U) When asked if she was aware if Samir uses another name online, she stated that she has no clue.

(U) When asked if she was aware of Samir's blog [redacted] answered in the affirmative and stated that he does not have one any longer. When asked her opinion of the blog when he had it, she stated that she did not like it. [redacted] was advised that Samir's actions have brought much attention upon the family - from the media and from the FBI. [redacted] was advised that the only times the FBI has spoken to her were when Samir's actions caused a concern for his safety. The first time the FBI spoke to [redacted] was after the media reported about his blog in 2007. The second time was after the FBI learned Samir traveled to a dangerous country, Yemen. The third time is after the news media reports that Samir is responsible for writing for a terrorist group. [redacted] agreed that the FBI has never accused Samir of breaking the law. [redacted] stated that so many people write "these things" that she does not understand why the focus is on one person, Samir. She also stated that the FBI should investigate the individual who put fliers in neighbors mailboxes a long time ago that were critical of Samir. When asked who did this, [redacted] stated that she had already reported that someone known as "Bad Dog" did this. Writer explained that this situation should be reviewed, but informed her that such freedom of speech and dissemination of that speech is the exact freedom that was extended to Samir while he was in the US.

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(U) [redacted] was advised that Samir is in a dangerous place with few options available - those options are to stay in an unsafe place or come home. [redacted] agreed that Samir was in a dangerous place. [redacted] was advised that the FBI does not want her to one day regret that she could have helped bring Samir home, in coordination with the FBI, but did not do so.

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/20/2010

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(U) [redacted] asked how could she help the FBI and acknowledged that discussing how to get a message to him/communicate with him would be very helpful. [redacted] was advised that not all of Samir's troubles would go away if he were to return home - the FBI would definitely need to talk to him - but being in the US is safer for him than being in Yemen.

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(U) [redacted] advised that Samir is not a criminal. [redacted] acknowledged that the FBI is concerned by the latest media reports and that the FBI wants to know what is going on. [redacted] acknowledged that if Samir is arrested in Yemen, he will not be afforded the same rights that he has in the US and this concerns her. [redacted] acknowledged that Samir, due to his known worldview, may have "fallen into the wrong crowd" and she is concerned. [redacted] again stated that she really does not know anything other than he went to Yemen to teach English, they heard from him in December (2009), have not heard from him recently, and are concerned.

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(U) [redacted] began telling investigators about Samir's access to the Internet, but [redacted] was interrupted when the home phone rang. After returning from taking the call, [redacted]'s demeanor was noticeably different and she was less talkative. When asked to continue, she stated that in December Samir advised that he did not have access to email.

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(U) Prior to the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] was given a piece of paper with the first name of all investigators as well as writer's direct desk phone number. She was asked to provide this number to her lawyer and to [redacted]. She asked that if the FBI wants to talk to her again, please contact her lawyer.

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(U) The interview concluded at approximately 10:30 pm.

(U) Interviewers assessed that the interview was cordial and rapport was good.

(U) (S) On 07/20/2010, SA [redacted] previous Samir Khan case agent, called writer and advised that [redacted] left her a voicemail on her cellphone on 07/19/2010 at approximately 8:15 pm. [redacted] stated he is in Detroit but was going to call 911 to help [redacted]

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b7C

(U) On 07/20/2010, after coordinating with writer, SA [redacted] attempted to contact [redacted] but had to leave a message. SA [redacted] advised [redacted] that she was out of town, had spoken with writer, and that writer had spoken with [redacted]. SA [redacted] wished [redacted] well, advised him that [redacted] has writer's phone number, and advised that writer was available to assist.

b6  
b7C

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/22/2010

To: Charlotte

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b7C  
b7E

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

(S) (X) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

(S) (X) [REDACTED]

(Pending)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) Title: (X)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Synopsis: (U) To document recent contact with Samir Khan's attorney,

b6  
b7C

(S)

(U)

Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301  
Declassify On: 07/22/2035

b7E

Details: (U) At 11:10 am, 7/21/2010, writer received a voicemail on writer's office phone. "Hi [REDACTED] this is [REDACTED] I represent Samir Khan. I've been his attorney since 2007. If I can speak to you it would be great." He then gave contact numbers for his cell [REDACTED] and office [REDACTED] and provided the spelling of his first and last name.

b6  
b7C

(U) At 2:50 pm, 7/22/2010, writer received another voicemail. "Hi this is [REDACTED] on Samir Khan, give me a call, [REDACTED] It is about quarter to three on Thursday. Thanks."

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~~SECRET~~

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/22/2010

b3  
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(U) At 3:02 pm, 7/22/2010 writer left a message with [redacted]'s secretary at [redacted] and advised that writer was returning [redacted]'s phone calls.

b6  
b7C

(U) At 3:07 pm, 7/22/2010, writer received a telephone call from [redacted]. After he advised who he was, writer apologized for not returning his call right away and stated writer was out of the office yesterday and in meetings today. Writer asked [redacted] what writer could do for him. [redacted] advised that he wanted writer to know he is representing Samir and has been since 2007. [redacted] said, "I am basically letting you know I exist." He said he knows writer spoke to [redacted] and she mentioned him [redacted]. He said he is going to see [redacted] next week in Charlotte and wanted to meet with writer. Writer asked if he would want to meet writer by himself or with [redacted] accompanying him and he replied that he will talk to them about that. [redacted] said [redacted] is in Detroit and [redacted] is in Charlotte and [redacted] will be home this weekend. [redacted] will call writer and "see where they are at" concerning talking to writer. [redacted] then asked what writer would want to talk about with them and writer explained that the FBI is simply following up on the media stories and doing our due diligence. [redacted] asked if writer wanted to talk to the [redacted] about Samir's whereabouts or what he is doing, although they may not know, and writer replied yes, we would be interested in discussing such matters. [redacted] then stated that he is planning to travel to Charlotte to visit with [redacted] next Tuesday and Wednesday. Writer told [redacted] that he had writer's phone number and he could call writer when he is ready to talk to writer. Writer told him that writer would be out of the office Tuesday but will check voicemail. It was discussed that if we meet it will likely be on Wednesday. [redacted] then asked if writer could "put it out to the Legat world" that Samir has an attorney. He continued, saying that the Legat in Yemen may come in contact with Samir and he [redacted] has gone through this before with other clients who have been questioned overseas. Writer confirmed that [redacted] represents Samir and [redacted] replied in the affirmative. It was agreed that [redacted] will call writer next week. The call ended.

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b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~



[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 4:29 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted]

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Subject: Samir Khan's legal representation

~~SECRET~~  
RECORD [redacted]

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I am the case agent for Samir Khan, [redacted] Based on recent media attention that has focused on Khan and his ties to AQAP and "Inspire" magazine, [redacted] conducted an interview of [redacted] on 07/19/2010. After the interview, I was contacted by a defense attorney. [redacted]

b3  
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[redacted] he advised that he represents Samir Khan and he wished for me to advise Legat SY of this fact. DOJ advised that I contact you and officially let you know that Khan is represented by legal counsel.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

SA [redacted]  
FBI [redacted]

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DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350728  
~~SECRET~~

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b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/02/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

From: Charlotte

Contact: SSA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(S)

Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

Synopsis: (S//NF)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350802~~

Reference:

(U)  
(U)  
(U)

Administrative: (S)

(S) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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(S)

Details: (S//~~NF~~) [redacted] Per referenced communication [redacted]  
[redacted], and a [redacted] held on 27 July 2010 with [redacted]

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(S)

(case initiation, [redacted] or source potential).

(S)

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(S//~~NF~~)

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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~~(S//NF)~~

~~(S//NF)~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~




To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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b7E


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(S)




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~~(S//NF)~~



~~(S//NF)~~



(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]


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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [Redacted] 08/02/2010

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(S)



(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 08/02/2010

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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b7C

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)


~~SECRET//NOFORN/FISA~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 08/02/2010

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted], 08/02/2010

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


[Redacted]

b1  
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [Redacted] 08/02/2010

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[Redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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b7C

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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b7C

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

b3  
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(S)

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b7C

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/02/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(S) For [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] For information only.

b7E

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

(S) ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 08/03/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

UC  
SSA  
SSA  
SOS

Attn: [redacted]

SSA  
SOS

Attn: [redacted]

SSA  
SA

International Operations

Attn: [redacted]

UC  
SSA  
SSA  
FOS

Attn: LEGAT [redacted]

ALAT [redacted]

Attn: SSA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Charlotte

From: [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #:

(S)  
(S)  
(S)

Title:

(S)

(U) (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

b6  
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b7E

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b7E

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b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFOR~~

To:

From:

Re: (S)

08/03/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

b7E

Synopsis: (S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U)

~~Derived from : FBI NSISCG-20090615~~

~~Declassify On: 20350803~~

Reference:

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Administrative:

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U)

Details: (S//NF)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U)

(S//NF) FBIHQ provided [redacted] the following predication  
for their request:

(S)

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b7E

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFOR~~



b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

To: Miami From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/03/2010

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b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S//NF)

Miami Field Office

1.

(S//NF) (U)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Summary: (S//NF)

Recommended Action: (S//NF)

End of FBIHQ predication

(S//NF)

b1  
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b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/03/2010

b1  
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b7E

(S)

b1  
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b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S/NE)

(S/NE)

(S)

(U) On 7/30/2010, writer attempted to [redacted]  
[redacted] The site was found to be no  
longer in operation.

b7E

(U) On 7/30/2010, writer attempted to locate [redacted] via  
Facebook. There was one hit on the name [redacted]  
but only limited information was visible. [redacted]'s page included  
a profile photo of a male apparently at a protest of some sort,  
who appears to be angrily protesting (based on the look on his  
face and his raised arm). [redacted] was a member of the group Latino  
Islam and commented on two photos on another members page. His  
comments indicated that he had been in the Dominican Republic in  
or about January 2010 for about 15 days and that he intended to  
return in June. There was no indication on [redacted]'s page as to  
where he resides.

b6  
b7C

(U) On 7/30/2010, writer searched Lexis to determine whether  
[redacted] resided in Florida, with negative results. Search of Lexis  
revealed no one with the surname [redacted] in Florida.

b6  
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/03/2010

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b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) On 8/3/2010, writer conducted [redacted] search on [redacted] obtaining no additional informational.

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b7E

(S) ~~(S)~~ Writer notes that the predication provided by FBIHQ fails to reach the level needed for initiation of a predicated investigation. Specifically, the predication provided is wholly first amendment information, which according to DIOG cannot be the sole source of predication. Moreover, the information is stale, having occurred in April 2007. Miami did utilize open sources and FBI databases in an attempt to obtain further information to complement the predication provided by FBIHQ, but such attempt met with negative results. [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(U) Lead is covered at [redacted]

b7E

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/03/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Information)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) For information. Read and clear.

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/02/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

A/UC  
IA

Attn: SA

Attn:

SA

Attn: SA

Attn:

SSA  
TFO  
SA

Attn:

SSA  
SIA  
SIA  
IA  
SOS  
IA  
SOS  
SA

Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(S)  
(X)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)

(S) ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

# FILE

b6  
b7C  
  
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b7E

b6  
b7C  
b7E

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b7C

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b7E

b3  
b7E  
V0

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

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b7E

(S)

(S)  
(U)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) Title: (S) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS / PRODUCTION  
COUNTERTERRORISM

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) (S) THREAT ASSESSMENTS

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) (S)

(U) (S) ANWAR NASSER AULAQI  
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Derived From : Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: 20350727

Administrative: (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Enclosure(s): (S)

[REDACTED]

Details: (S)

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

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b3  
b7E

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

[REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/02/2010

To: Charlotte

b6  
b7C  
b7EFrom: Charlotte  
[REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S) Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(U) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(S) (U) [REDACTED] (Pending)  
(S) (U) [REDACTED] (Pending)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Synopsis: (U) Document subject interview, memorialized in an FD 302 to the case file.

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350802

Details: (U) On 07/28/2010, [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED]. The results of this interview are memorialized in an unclassified FD 302 in the above mentioned case files.

b6  
b7C~~SECRET~~b3  
b7E



~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

(S) Type: INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: (X) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and Clear

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/02/2010

To: Charlotte

b6  
b7C

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

(S) Case ID #:	(U)	(Pending)
	(U)	(Pending)
(S)	(U)	(Pending)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Synopsis: (U) Document subject interview, memorialized in an FD302 to the case file.

~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350802~~

Details: (U) On 07/30/2010 [redacted] was interviewed at the [redacted]. The results of this interview are memorialized in an unclassified FD302 in the above case files.

b6  
b7C~~SECRET~~b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

(S) Type: INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and Clear

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 08-02-2017

b6  
b7C  
b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

[redacted] (FBI)

From: [redacted] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, August 05, 2010 12:47 PM  
To: [redacted]

Cc:  
Subject:

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
RECORD [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S) [redacted]

DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20350805  
SECRET//NOFORN

*[Handwritten signature]*

b3  
b7E

(S) ~~SECRET~~ /ORCON/NOFORN

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/04/2010


To: Charlotte

Attn: SA  
IA  
SOS

Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA  
SOS



Attn: SA

Attn:

SSA

Attn: SA

IA

From: Charlotte

Contact: IA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U)

(U)

(U)

(S)

(S)

Title: (U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/PRODUCTION  
COUNTERTERRORISM

(U)

~~(S)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S) ~~SECRET~~ /ORCON/NOFORN

*[Handwritten signature]*

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/04/2010

(U) ~~(S)~~

ANWAR NASSER AULAQI  
IT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Synopsis: (S//~~NF~~)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350804~~

(U)

b7E

Administrative: (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Details: (S//~~NF~~)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)



(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 08/04/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) The first article, "A Q & A with Naeem Muhammad Khan," begins by stating, "Torontonion Naeem Muhammad Khan openly supports the Taliban and calls Osama bin Laden a hero." The article is structured as a back-and-forth interview between the journalist and Naeem Muhammad Khan; the journalist asks Naeem Muhammad Khan about his statements of supporting the mujahideen and the Taliban, belief that Osama bin Laden had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks, calling Osama bin Laden a "hero" and "champion of Islam," intolerance of Muslims whose beliefs are more moderate than his, and overall rejection of democracy.

(S)

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Throughout the interview, Naeem Muhammad Khan defends the Taliban's actions in Afghanistan as self-defense in a "baseless" war and states clearly that he has no tolerance for those who "want to change Islam to make look more acceptable to the West," adding that the punishment for apostasy in an Islamic state is death. Naeem Muhammad Khan ends the interview by stating that he only moved to Canada with his parents because he was not self-sufficient enough to stay in Pakistan and that he, as well as many other Muslims, is "willing to migrate ASAP to an Islamic state as soon as it emerges." [ANALYST NOTE: While stating that he rejects "democracy and all other forms of governance except Islam," [REDACTED] acknowledges that at least in the West he can discuss his views openly; the irony that [REDACTED] enjoys the privileges of democracy while simultaneously claiming to reject them is not lost upon him as he states within the interview that one of the reasons he admires Osama bin Laden is that bin Laden "left all the immense comforts and luxuries of life to take up a cause." These statements suggest the possibility that [REDACTED] would move to participate in extremist activities.]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) The second article, "A Home-Grown 'Champion of Islam'" is written as an editorial rebuttal to the interview in "A Q & A with Naeem Muhammad Khan." While Naeem Muhammad Khan's statements and beliefs are called "odious" and "half-baked," sources within the article state that Naeem Muhammad Khan "is an Islamist, not a terrorist" and is "neither an inciter or a facilitator. He is just badly informed and misled." [ANALYST NOTE: The journalist writing the article (the same one who conducted the interview) and his sources assess that while [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

(S)

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~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E

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(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/04/2010

[REDACTED] is guilty of making disturbing statements, he is not a threat.]

b6  
b7C

(S//NF)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Other Communications/Research Findings

(S//NF) Internet searches for [REDACTED] and his known email addresses [REDACTED] produced several results that were able to confirm findings through FBI resources. Over 14,000 hits were produced by searching the name [REDACTED] "most of them related to the National Post news articles. [ANALYST NOTE: Most of these results were articles and blog posts from April and May 2008 that were highly critical of [REDACTED] and his statements and likely caused him to consider doing another interview to appear more moderate. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b1  
b3  
b7E

(U//~~FOUO~~) At least one open-source news site has connected an image that [REDACTED] used at one time as a Facebook profile picture (as discussed in the National Post articles), a picture of an AK-47 on a black flag with the slogan "Support Our Troops" underneath, with the recently arrested [REDACTED] AKA [REDACTED] [ANALYST NOTE: There is no other evidence of any substantial connection between [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Most other Google search results referenced posts and statements made by and to [REDACTED] on Facebook.

b6  
b7C

(S//NF)

(S)

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~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

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b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/04/2010

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) Google and Facebook searches reveal that a Facebook user identified as [REDACTED] participated in inflammatory discussions and authored at least one extremist post related to Islam on the social networking site. [REDACTED]

b1  
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b6  
b7C

(S)

[REDACTED] A post authored by the user identified as [REDACTED] and titled "Anyone Who Doesn't Pray Should Be Killed" was posted on Facebook around February 2008 and prompted several responses, primarily those refuting the statements made. [ANALYST NOTE: An analysis of the content, tone, and style of the available statements from the post and responses suggest the author is the same [REDACTED] discussed here.. However, the original content of the post in its entirety, along with the responses to those who criticized it, appear to have been deleted by Facebook. A post on Facebook made by [REDACTED] on 04/23/2009, using the profile [REDACTED], stated that [REDACTED] had been "unjustly banned" from Facebook, which likely accounts for the deleted messages that are referenced and copied by other users but not seen in original format. A post was made on 07/24/2009 by the confirmed Facebook profile of [REDACTED], suggesting he created a new Facebook profile not long after he was allegedly banned.]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 05/03/2007, the user of the email [REDACTED] posted a response on the message board for a "political\_analysts" Yahoo! group in a discussion titled

(S)

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~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/04/2010

[redacted] s Belief About Allah." In the message, the user identifies himself as a [redacted] "[ANALYST NOTE: This statement is consistent with the information revealed about [redacted] in the National Post articles and verifies that he is the likely author of the message. Open-source research reveals that the Taliban shares ideologies with [redacted] [redacted] beliefs:]

b6  
b7C

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 09/29/2009, a forum post on [redacted] identifies [redacted] telephone number [redacted], as a contact person for volunteering for work at an Islamic information/materials stall in Toronto giving out DVDs, Qurans, and pamphlets. [redacted]

b1  
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b6  
b7C

(S)

~~(U//FOUO)~~

b1  
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b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFOR~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/04/2010

(U//~~FOUO~~) Overall Assessment and Recommendations

(S//~~NOFORN~~)

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFOR~~

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFOR~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/04/2010

b3  
b7E


~~(S//NF)~~



~~(S//NF)~~



~~(S//NF)~~



b1  
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b7E  
b6  
b7C

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/04/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 5: (Action)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~ORCON/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/04/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E  
b6  
b7C

Set Lead 6: (Info)

[redacted]

AT

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~/ORCON/NOFORN~~

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 245

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Page 220 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 225 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 237 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 238 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 239 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 240 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 241 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;  
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Page 243 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 244 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 249 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 250 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;  
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Page 257 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 258 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 265 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 266 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 267 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
Page 268 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;  
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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/10/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted] *cm*b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]

Contact: IOA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *SVB/Plg*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [redacted]

ld *ld*

(U) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

b3  
b7E(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
IT - AL QAEDA;  
OO: CE.

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

~~Derived From: Multiple Sources  
See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.  
Declassify On: 20350106~~b1  
b3

(S) Classification Authority Reference: (S) "FBI NSISCG 03012008"

b3  
b7E

(U) Reference: (S) [redacted]

Enclosure(s): (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

Details: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: [redacted]  
(U) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/10/2010

b3  
b7E

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]

(U) Re: (S) [REDACTED] 08/10/2010

b3  
b7E

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

Type [REDACTED]

ITU: [REDACTED] (S)

Claimed By: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
(U) Re: (S) [REDACTED] 08/10/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

Charlotte

AT Charlotte, NC

(U) [REDACTED] investigation is complete at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

♦♦

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 08/10/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Charlotte

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Contact: IA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7EApproved By: [REDACTED] *GA/af*

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

: kgs *kgs*

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIREDb1  
b3  
b6  
b7C

Synopsis: (S//NF) [REDACTED]

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350810~~

(U) [REDACTED]

Reference: (S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

Administrative: (S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)b1  
b3  
b7E

b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/10/2010

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U)

b3  
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ **Details:** By way of background. SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN, a USPER and the subject of FBI Charlotte [redacted] is a self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi and a promoter of the Salafi-Jihadist ideology.

b3  
b7E

(S//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
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(U) In summary, KHAN's Salafi-Jihadi ideology envisages a global jihad against non-Muslims that will lead to the reestablishment of the Caliphate. The Caliphate encompasses all

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/10/2010

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

Muslim nations (the Ummah) joined into one political entity ruled by a Caliph (successor--God's Shadow on Earth) under a system of Shariah Law. The army of the Caliphate will be comprised of the Mujahideen who will eventually conquer all the nations of the world.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]  
[redacted]

b3  
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b7A  
b7C  
b7E

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S//NF) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

### Key Findings

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/10/2010

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E



b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C


**Recommendation**

(S) Any further intelligence or investigative action deemed appropriate is left to the discretion of [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



**FBI Intelligence**



(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/10/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted]  
read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) For information only. Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/05/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]

Contact: IOA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

:bfc

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20090615~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350805~~

(U) [redacted]

b7E

Reference: (U) [redacted]

Details: (S) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C

(S) Lead [redacted] is considered covered.

~~SECRET~~

b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (U) [REDACTED], 08/05/2010

b7E

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1  
Type: [REDACTED] (S)  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/05/2010

b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) For information only.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-04-2017

b6  
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/29/2010

On 07/28/2010, at approximately 1000 hrs, [redacted] was interviewed by [redacted] and FBI Special Agent [redacted] was interviewed at his residence located at [redacted] Apt. [redacted] Charlotte, North Carolina. [redacted] is further identified with DOB [redacted] (new phone number); [redacted] (old phone number). [redacted] works for [redacted] at the [redacted] at Charlotte [redacted] where he is a student obtaining a [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

After being provided the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] advised he has heard about SAMIR KHAN from the mosque he attends for prayer, which is the Islamic Society of Greater Charlotte (ISGC) located at 7025 Plaza Road, Charlotte, North Carolina. [redacted] stated he hears SAMIR KHAN's name mentioned frequently and thinks he use to attend the ISGC for prayer. [redacted] mentioned that he has never met SAMIR KHAN in person but has seen his photo before on the news.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised he may have exchanged greetings with SAMIR KHAN but he does not remember sitting down with him to have a conversation. [redacted] mentioned that he only has a couple of friends and named [redacted] as one such friend.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] stated that when he has heard SAMIR KHAN's name being mentioned, people say that he is in "trouble". [redacted] advised that he has no idea what they mean when they say "trouble" and he does not ask.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] further mentioned that he heard SAMIR KHAN was in jail here (Charlotte) waiting for court and has heard others mention he was in trouble for no reason.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised he did not know that SAMIR KHAN was overseas and has never seen or heard about the magazine "Inspire".

b6  
b7C

07/28/2010 Charlotte, NC

Invest

(S) File #

Date dictated 07/29/2010

by

and

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is  
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

b1  
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(S)

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 07/28/2010, Page 2

b6  
b7C

When Agent [REDACTED] showed [REDACTED] a copy of page 45 from "Inspire" magazine, [REDACTED] stated he does not know who the friend that went to Afghanistan to fight jihad, as described in the "Language Barrier" article, might be. [REDACTED] stated he does not know who any of SAMIR KHAN's friends or associates are and in the three years that he has been attending ISGC he has not heard any talk about anyone going to Afghanistan to fight jihad.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] advised that he has never met and does not know [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised he knows [REDACTED] stating he is a very nice person whom he has borrowed money from. [REDACTED] explained he was in some [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] 5 to 6 months ago. [REDACTED] stated he will begin [REDACTED] this October.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] advised he does not know much about [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated he did not know that SAMIR KHAN [REDACTED] until the interviewing agents told him this information. [REDACTED] stated he did know that [REDACTED] years of age, but does not know him.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] mentioned that he use to [REDACTED] at the Islamic Center of Charlotte (ICC) located at 1700 Progress Ln, Charlotte, North Carolina. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] in the last 7 to 8 months because he is too busy and also there was a [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

While at the ICC [REDACTED] advised he heard people talking about [REDACTED] and something about her court dates.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] advised that he could not remember any of the students' names, who had [REDACTED] except one that was called [REDACTED] stated he is not good at remembering names.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] advised that he was [REDACTED] (name not mentioned) who [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] currently lives with one male roommate who is from [REDACTED] by the name of [REDACTED] (DOB [REDACTED]) advised he has another roommate moving in, starting on August 10th, who is from [REDACTED] but he cannot remember this person's name. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

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(S)

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/28/2010, Page 3

b6  
b7C

[redacted] could only remember that this would be the new roommate's first time coming to the United States.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] stated he had a previous roommate by the name of [redacted] who was also from [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he has not been to Egypt in three years because he has been so busy.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised he is friends with [redacted] [redacted] has known [redacted] for 3 years. [redacted] stated [redacted] is a very peaceful person but if you see him you may think he is fanatical because he has a beard and wears the traditional Muslim dress. [redacted] stated that [redacted] told him he was thinking about getting married.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] met [redacted] when they worked together at the [redacted] [redacted] knows [redacted] has a younger brother [redacted] who got in trouble with [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised that in the last 3 months he learned about [redacted] father because [redacted] told him he was trying to visit [redacted]. At that time [redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] does not know what kind of relationship [redacted] has with his father.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] stated no one at the ICC or ISGC has ever talked to him about violent jihad, not even [redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/29/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Charlotte

[REDACTED]  
Contact: [REDACTED]Approved By: [REDACTED] *LG*Drafted By: [REDACTED] *jcc jc*

Case ID #:

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(U)  
(U)  
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b7Eb1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

Title:

~~(S)~~

(S)

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b6  
b7C  
b7ESAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST - INSPIRED

(S)

b1  
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b6  
b7C  
b7E

Synopsis: (U) Summary of interview with [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C~~SECRET~~b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte Attn: From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 07/29/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350729~~

Details: (U) On 07/28/2010 at approximately 1000 hrs, [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed by [redacted] and FBI  
Special Agent [redacted] was interviewed at his  
residence located at [redacted] Apt. [redacted] Charlotte, North  
Carolina. [redacted] is further identified with DOB [redacted]  
[redacted] (new phone number); [redacted] (old phone number).

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(X) The results of the interview are documented in an  
FD-302 located within the following case files: [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7A  
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(S)

(S)

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To: Charlotte

Attn:

From: Charlotte

Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 07/29/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

**Accomplishment Information:**

Number: 1

Type: INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT (CONTACT & ESPIONAGE)

ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW

Claimed By:

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad: [REDACTED]

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b7E

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~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-04-2017b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISEDate of transcription 07/29/2010

On 07/28/2010, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] and TFA [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] in the parking lot at his residence, [REDACTED] Apartment [REDACTED] Charlotte, NC. After being provided with the identities of the interviewing agents, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] is planning to move to [REDACTED] Charlotte, NC, in the next couple weeks. [REDACTED] has attended the [REDACTED] at Charlotte [REDACTED] and lived in the [REDACTED] area for the past four years. During 2006 and 2007, [REDACTED] did not have a car while attending [REDACTED] has only traveled out of the [REDACTED] area on two (2) occasions. The first occasion was to meet a female for [REDACTED], however, the [REDACTED] The second occasion was when [REDACTED] traveled with an unidentified friend to Michigan.

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[REDACTED] typically attends prayer at the Islamic Center of Charlotte (ICC) and the Plaza Masjid. [REDACTED] has attended prayer at [REDACTED] Muslim Students Association (MSA) in the past, however, [REDACTED] has not returned because the MSA is not organized. [REDACTED] SAMIR KHAN and [REDACTED] met SAMIR KHAN at the Plaza Masjid.

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According to statements made from SAMIR KHAN to [REDACTED] SAMIR KHAN traveled to Yemen to learn Arabic and study Islam, in particular fiqh, which is Islamic jurisprudence. SAMIR KHAN looked for a scholarship to Yemen. [REDACTED] spoke with SAMIR KHAN prior to SAMIR KHAN traveling from the United States to Yemen. SAMIR KHAN did not make any statements concerning violent jihad.

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Most people in the Charlotte Muslim community do not have contact with SAMIR KHAN while he is in Yemen. [REDACTED] does not believe that SAMIR KHAN contacts his family very frequently due to the poor Internet connections in Yemen. [REDACTED] believes that SAMIR KHAN initiates the calls or email contacts with his family. After SAMIR KHAN had gone to Yemen for approximately one month, [REDACTED] SAMIR KHAN's [REDACTED] that SAMIR KHAN was okay and that SAMIR KHAN was studying.

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b7CInvestigation on 07/28/2010 at Charlotte, North CarolinaFile [REDACTED] Date dictated [REDACTED] (S)  
by SA [REDACTED] RZC  
TF [REDACTED] KCb1  
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 07/28/2010 , Page 2

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[REDACTED] does not believe the newspaper reports that SAMIR KHAN is recruiting for Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). [REDACTED] doubts that SAMIR KHAN would participate in jihad. [REDACTED] believes that the media is exaggerating the information about SAMIR KHAN. [REDACTED] provided one example in which the media reported that SAMIR KHAN was using his computer in the basement of SAMIR KHAN's house, however, [REDACTED] is aware that SAMIR KHAN's house does not have a basement. [REDACTED] also does not believe that SAMIR KHAN is responsible for the Al-Qa'ida magazine "Inspire" because Internet access is very bad in Yemen. [REDACTED] was not aware of the "Inspire" magazine until Egyptian media reported about the magazine being the first Al-Qa'ida publication in English. [REDACTED] was aware that SAMIR KHAN published four (4) issues of "Jihad Recollections." [REDACTED] was living in Egypt when SAMIR KHAN appeared on Fox News and on YouTube.

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[REDACTED] was shown page 45 of the "Inspire" magazine and asked if he was aware of anyone in the Muslim community who went to jihad in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone in the community who went to Afghanistan for jihad. In addition, [REDACTED] noted that the Charlotte Muslim community is very small, and if someone went to Afghanistan for jihad, the community would be aware of this individual. The interviewing agents asked [REDACTED] if [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of the magazine. [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] when he first met SAMIR KHAN around the middle of 2007. [REDACTED] is aware that [REDACTED] traveled overseas with [REDACTED] [REDACTED], however, [REDACTED] did not know where [REDACTED] traveled. [REDACTED] has personally talked with [REDACTED] who admitted that he had "troubles" with the FBI. [REDACTED] did not ask [REDACTED] any details concerning these troubles. Some people in the Charlotte Muslim community were trying to avoid [REDACTED] either because he traveled with [REDACTED] or because the FBI had talked to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not have [REDACTED] telephone number. [REDACTED] is aware that [REDACTED] works for approximately [REDACTED] [REDACTED] last contact with [REDACTED] was approximately two to four weeks ago.

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b7C

[REDACTED] recalled the first time he met SAMIR KHAN and [REDACTED] was at two community outreach meetings with a local church around the middle of 2007. The purpose of these meetings was to correct the church's information concerning Islam. [REDACTED] identified [REDACTED] as a Plaza Masjid attendee who also attended these meetings.

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 07/28/2010, Page 3

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\_\_\_\_\_ believes that SAMIR KHAN and \_\_\_\_\_ share the same world views. \_\_\_\_\_ are friends of \_\_\_\_\_ however, \_\_\_\_\_ noted that \_\_\_\_\_ is closer to \_\_\_\_\_ than \_\_\_\_\_ is to \_\_\_\_\_.

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\_\_\_\_\_ frequently travels back and forth to Jacksonville, FL. \_\_\_\_\_ will sometimes stay in Jacksonville for as long as one month. While in Jacksonville, \_\_\_\_\_ helps unidentified Bosnian friends.

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\_\_\_\_\_ described himself and SAMIR KHAN's family as "conservative." \_\_\_\_\_ met SAMIR KHAN \_\_\_\_\_ after knowing SAMIR KHAN for a few months. \_\_\_\_\_ is known in the community as a "good man." SAMIR KHAN \_\_\_\_\_.

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\_\_\_\_\_ The only contact that \_\_\_\_\_ had with \_\_\_\_\_ was during prayer at the masjid. \_\_\_\_\_ has never heard \_\_\_\_\_ make any comments about violent jihad. \_\_\_\_\_ doubts that \_\_\_\_\_ wants to participate in jihad. \_\_\_\_\_ believes that \_\_\_\_\_ only wants to finish school at \_\_\_\_\_ noted that \_\_\_\_\_ has two years of study left at \_\_\_\_\_ has not personally contacted \_\_\_\_\_ since SAMIR KHAN went to Yemen. \_\_\_\_\_ periodically makes contact with \_\_\_\_\_ on Facebook. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that he last made contact with \_\_\_\_\_ on Facebook either this week or last week.

At the conclusion of the interview, \_\_\_\_\_ advised that his \_\_\_\_\_.

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~~SECRET~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/29/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte  
[REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

rec R3C

Case ID #:

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(U)  
(U)  
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(U)  
(U)  
(U)[REDACTED]

(S)

② R3C

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b7ETitle: ~~(S)~~SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED[REDACTED]

(S)

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Synopsis: (U) To document interview of [REDACTED] on 07/28/2010.

~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301~~~~SECRET~~b3  
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b7E[REDACTED][REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/29/2010

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~~Declassify On: 20350729~~

Details: (U) On 07/28/2010, Special Agent (SA) [redacted]  
[redacted] and TFA [redacted] interviewed [redacted], DOB  
[redacted], telephone number [redacted], in the parking lot at  
his residence, [redacted] Apartment [redacted] Charlotte, NC.  
The interview is documented in an FD-302 to each of the captioned  
cases.

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/29/2010

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Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1  
Type: INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT (CONTACT & ESPIONAGE)  
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad [REDACTED]

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-04-2017

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/11/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted] *23*

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From: [redacted]

Contact: IOA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *adm*

Drafted By: [redacted]:jcp *JUP*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

✓ Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

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Synopsis: (S) [redacted] (S)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615~~  
~~Declassify On: 08/11/2010~~

(U) [redacted]

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Reference: (U) [redacted]

Details: (S) [redacted] (S)

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(S) [redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

*23*  
*KS*

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To: Charlotte

From:

04/07/2010

Re: (U)

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Leads

contained

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in [redacted] are considered covered.

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To: Charlotte

From:

Re: (U)

04/07/2010

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Accomplishment Information:

Number: 2

Type:

ITU:

Claimed By:

SSN:

Name:

Squad:

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To: Charlotte

From:

Re: (U)

04/07/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) For informational purposes only.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/27/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

Counterterrorism

SSA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Contact: SOS [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *OK*

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

lel

Case ID #: (U)

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[REDACTED]

(S)

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(U) Title: ~~(S)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

[REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

(S)

Synopsis: (U)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350727~~

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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[REDACTED] *KLS/108*

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 07/27/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) ~~(S)~~ For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]  
(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] For information only.

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Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]  
(U) ~~(S)~~ For information only.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-04-2017b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISEDate of transcription 07/29/2010

On 7/28/2010 at approximately 10:30 am Writer interviewed [REDACTED] at the Starbucks coffee shop located at 9211 North Tryon Street, Charlotte, North Carolina, also present during the interview was SA [REDACTED] of the Federal Air Marshal Service.

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[REDACTED] was asked about the recent news accounts in reference to SAMIR KHAN activities in Yemen. When [REDACTED] was asked if he had heard about the news accounts, he said that the first time he heard of the news accounts on July 22, 2010, when he returned from [REDACTED] after visiting [REDACTED]. He stated that he didn't trust the news, because the news gave false reports in reference to his [REDACTED].

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He said that the [REDACTED] KHAN was at KHAN's [REDACTED].

He said [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Other than [REDACTED] he said that he only had a casual relationship with KHAN and rarely had contact with KHAN outside the Islamic Community Center (ICC). [REDACTED] said that he didn't have a close relationship with KHAN. He said KHAN began to give radical speeches at the mosque located on the Plaza, located in Charlotte, NC. [REDACTED] stated that people at the mosque tried to talk to KHAN, but KHAN became more radical. Writer asked [REDACTED] what he thought KHAN's true intention were for traveling to Yemen? [REDACTED] stated that he was told that KHAN [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] said that he didn't think that KHAN would come back to the United States. [REDACTED] said that he hasn't had any cell phone, email or any other contact with KHAN's since KHAN left the United States. [REDACTED] said that KHAN never talked to him about committing jihad and hadn't talked to him about knowing anyone who had committed jihad. [REDACTED] went on to say that jihad is in the Koran and that jihad in the Koran is "the struggle" and some Muslims twist the word jihad to fit what they are trying to accomplish. [REDACTED] said that what KHAN is doing in Yemen is [REDACTED]

Investigation on 07/28/2010 at 9211 North Tryon St

File # [REDACTED] (S) Date dictated 07/29/2010

by [REDACTED] *[Signature]*~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 07/28/2010 , Page 2

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When [redacted] was asked if he knew [redacted] SAMIR KHAN), he stated that he knew the [redacted] (noted above) and seeing them at the mosque. He did say on [redacted] SAMIR KHAN) [redacted] SAMIR KHAN [redacted] (since leaving the United States) and [redacted] [redacted] said that he didn't know if [redacted] had communicated with KHAN since leaving the US, and didn't know if he had planned on visiting KHAN in Yemen.

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Writer asked [redacted] if he had seen the magazine "Inspire" and KHAN's contribution to the magazine? [redacted] stated that he hadn't seen the magazine. Writer showed [redacted] the article referring to "Language Barrier". Writer told [redacted] that it had been reported to the FBI that when KHAN wrote that section of the article that he was referring to [redacted] Writer asked [redacted] did he know [redacted] said that he had met [redacted] at the mosque, and that he had a casual relationship with [redacted] said that [redacted] constantly talked politics. He said that he knows that [redacted] [redacted] When asked if he knew of [redacted] travels overseas in 2006-2007, [redacted] stated no. When asked what kind of relationship [redacted] and KHAN have, he stated "you would have to ask them." [redacted] said the he talked to [redacted] and KHAN at the mosque it was more of a social atmosphere between prayers.

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Writer asked [redacted] that if he knew of a terrorist attack involving Americans or American interest would he inform the FBI of the impending attack? [redacted] stated that he would, because Muslims could be hurt in the attack. Writer then asked [redacted] if you knew that no Muslims would be hurt in the attack would you still inform the FBI? [redacted] would not answer the question. Interview ended at approximately 11:30 am.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-05-2017

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/30/2010

[REDACTED] arabic female, DOB [REDACTED]  
was advised of the identities of the interviewing SA and IA and  
of the nature of the inquiry. She was interviewed at her  
residence, [REDACTED] and in  
the presence of her [REDACTED] (DOB  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (DOB [REDACTED]  
provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] advised that she has known SAMIR KHAN (S.  
KHAN) for [REDACTED] having first met at The Plaza Mosque.  
She stated that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that she and S. KHAN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] She recalled that they had [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] S. KHAN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] as compared  
to (what is considered normal) in the U.S. [REDACTED] stated that  
S. KHAN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that S. KHAN told her that he was  
[REDACTED] however, he did not tell her  
where or with whom. She stated that he was [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] but, she recalled him saying [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] explained that since his departure, [REDACTED] S. KHAN  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that she was familiar with S. KHAN's  
blog, "Inshallahshaheed", that she had looked at it, without  
reading very much and that she had not posted anything on it.  
She advised that she was not familiar with other writings  
attributed to S. KHAN, including Inspire and Jihad Reflections.

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[REDACTED] denied knowing very much about S. KHAN's  
"world view", advising that he [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7C

Investigation on 07/29/10 at Charlotte, NC

File #

[REDACTED] (S)

Date dictated 07/30/10

by

SA [REDACTED]

IA [REDACTED]

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is

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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/29/10, Page 2

[redacted] She could not provide any specific examples. b6 b7C

[redacted] explained her definition of "jihad", simply as "a struggle", further describing it as an inner spiritual struggle, to attain faith. She advised that one's personal jihad, could be violent at times. [redacted] stated that pursuant to Muslim belief, the actions of suicide bombers are not acceptable, because they result in the death(s) of the bomber and possibly other innocent people, i.e. - civilians. She did not believe that S. KHAN [redacted]

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[redacted] reiterated that she did not know anyone whom S. KHAN had been in contact with and/or met with regarding his travel to Yemen. She denied having any knowledge that he had been in contact with or had planned to meet with (ANWAR) AULAQI.

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b7C

[redacted] stated that she did not know anyone named [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] advised that she does not [redacted] S. KHAN's [redacted], however, when specifically asked about [redacted] She stated [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] stated that she [redacted] [redacted] She advised that she was not aware of [redacted] "world view" or his views on jihad. [redacted] stated that in [redacted]

S. KHAN.

[redacted] advised that she was not aware of anyone else in the community, who could be contacted by the FBI, to learn more about S. KHAN and his current whereabouts.

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/02/2010

To: Charlotte

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

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Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] rpl R12

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (S)  
(U) [REDACTED]  
~~(U)~~ [REDACTED] (S)  
~~(U)~~ [REDACTED]

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Title: (S) [REDACTED] (S)

~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST - INSPIRED

(S) [REDACTED] (S)

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(S) [REDACTED] (S)

Synopsis: (U) To report results of investigation.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350802~~

(U) [REDACTED]

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b7E



~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: (U) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

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Details: (U) On 07/29/10, SA [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] at her residence, [REDACTED]. Also present during the interview, were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The results of [REDACTED] interview were reported in a separate FD-302 and documented in each of the above captioned files. Information provided by [REDACTED] is reported below:

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(U) [REDACTED] (DOB: [REDACTED], advised that he didn't believe that Samir Khan was the type of person to participate in violent jihad, because he was "too timid". Also, he theorized, if Khan was going to engage in jihad, why didn't he go to Pakistan, instead of Yemen. [REDACTED] stated that he was familiar with [REDACTED] and also knew him [REDACTED]. He advised that he met [REDACTED] at the mosque and stated that he didn't know much about [REDACTED] and hadn't seen him in about a year. [REDACTED] explained [REDACTED] to [REDACTED].

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(U) [REDACTED] advised that he was going to the [REDACTED] and that subsequent to graduation, in 2012, he planned to work in the Charlotte area. During the interview, [REDACTED] and their [REDACTED] were nearby, in the dining area.

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(U) [REDACTED] (DOB: [REDACTED], when advised of the nature of the interview (of [REDACTED], stated that, this is a media driven issue and that it is a rehash of old news reports. He agreed (with [REDACTED] that suicide bombers are acting against the teachings of the Koran, because it is not proper to kill yourself, or innocent civilians. [REDACTED] stated that he did not know [REDACTED] however, he knew of an individual named [REDACTED]. He denied knowing anything else about [REDACTED].

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b7C

(U) [REDACTED] advised that he was attending [REDACTED] and that he was majoring in [REDACTED]. He inquired as to whether the FBI had any jobs for a person of his training, to which he was told, yes and advised to look at the FBI website.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/02/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: Squad [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *LS*Drafted By: [REDACTED] *rp1 RP2*Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ (U) [REDACTED] (S)  
~~(U)~~ (U) [REDACTED] (S)  
~~(U)~~ (U) [REDACTED] (S)

Title: (S) [REDACTED] (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN;  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST - INSPIRED

(S) [REDACTED] (S)

(S) [REDACTED] (S)

**Synopsis:** (U) To report Statistical Accomplishment:  
Interview of Subject.~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350802~~**Details:** (U) On 07/29/10 SA [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED]  
interviewed [REDACTED] at her residence, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Also present during the  
interview, were [REDACTED]  
and [REDACTED]~~SECRET~~b6  
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~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 08/02/2010

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(X) A copy of the FD-302 memorializing the  
interview has been uploaded into the following case files:

(S) [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (X) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

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**Accomplishment Information:**

Number: 1

Type: INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT (CONTACT & ESPIONAGE)

ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW

Claimed By: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

Name: [REDACTED]

Squad: [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: (X) [REDACTED] 08/02/2010

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 04-05-2017 BY [REDACTED] NSICG

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**Charlotte FBI - DZ****From:** [REDACTED]**To:** [REDACTED]**Sent:** Monday, August 16, 2010 5:23 PM**Attach:** [REDACTED] ren letters.pdf**Subject:** [REDACTED] Samir Kahn letters of representation and invocation of rights

Please find attached letters of representation for both [REDACTED] Samir Kahn. In addition an invocation of rights for both. If you could please provide me with a physical address I can mail originals for your files. Thank you.

[REDACTED]  
Wahid Vizcaino LLP  
3191 Coral Way Suite 406  
Miami, FL 33145

8/17

email from [REDACTED] attorney

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**WAHID VIZCAINO, L.L.P.**

3191 Coral Way Suite 406  
Miami, FL 33145  
Phone : 305-444-4302  
Fax : 305-444-4302

August 16, 2010

Re: **Name: Samir Zafar Khan**  
Passport number: 301708539  
Date of birth: 25 December 1985  
Place of birth: Saudi Arabia, **U.S. citizen**  
Date of issue of Passport: 29 May 2002  
Date of expiration of Passport: 28 May 2012

Dear Agent [REDACTED]

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I, Samir Zafar Khan, D.O.B.: 25 December 1985, a United States Citizen, hereby invoke and exercise my right to counsel, pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 9, 12, and 16, of the Florida Constitution and the case law thereunder. I desire to have my attorney [REDACTED] Esquire, present before and during any questioning of, and /or conversation with me by any police official and/or agents thereof, and prosecutor and/or agents thereof, any judicial officer and/or any agents thereof. I hereby announce that I desire my attorney to be present before anybody talks to me about any matters relating to this case or any criminal charges pending or contemplated. This notice is not intended to be, and in fact is not, an admission of guilt or criminal liability and should not be interpreted to give rise to any inference of guilt.

Furthermore, I hereby state that at no time in the future do I or will I waive (i.e. give up) my right to have my attorney present at all times prior to anyone trying to secure from me a waiver of any of any constitutional and statutory rights. The same, and its agents, are hereby placed on notice that this invocation supersedes any prior waivers of the foregoing rights to counsel that IL might have given.

Notice is hereby given by me and my undersigned attorney that should any governmental official, and/or agent thereof, fail to respect and honor this notice and invocation of rights, the undersigned will litigate and seek sanctions and damages for said violations of constitutional and statutory rights.

Furthermore, I hereby authorize [REDACTED] Esquire, to consult with any and all agents of the State as he deems necessary and waive my right to be present an any pre-trial conference pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(3).

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I certify that a copy of this letter was faxed and e-mailed to The U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen, on July 28, 2010.

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WAHID VIZCAINO, L.L.P.

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3191 Coral Way Suite 406  
Miami, FL 33145  
Phone : 305-444-4302  
Fax : 305-444-4302

August 16, 2010

Re: Name: [REDACTED]  
Date of birth: [REDACTED]  
Place of birth: [REDACTED] U.S. citizen

b6  
b7C

Dear Agent [REDACTED]

I, [REDACTED] D.O.B. [REDACTED], a United States Citizen, hereby invoke and exercise my right to counsel, pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 9, 12, and 16, of the Florida Constitution and the case law thereunder. I desire to have my attorney, [REDACTED], Esquire, present before and during any questioning of, and /or conversation with me by any police official and/or agents thereof, and prosecutor and/or agents thereof, any judicial officer and/or any agents thereof. I hereby announce that I desire my attorney to be present before anybody talks to me about any matters relating to this case or any criminal charges pending or contemplated. This notice is not intended to be, and in fact is not, an admission of guilt or criminal liability and should not be interpreted to give rise to any inference of guilt.

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Furthermore, I hereby state that at no time in the future do I or will I waive (i.e. give up) my right to have my attorney present at all times prior to anyone trying to secure from me a waiver of any of any constitutional and statutory rights. The same, and its agents, are hereby placed on notice that this invocation supersedes any prior waivers of the foregoing rights to counsel that I might have given.

Notice is hereby given by me and my undersigned attorney that should any governmental official, and/or agent thereof, fail to respect and honor this notice and invocation of rights, the undersigned will litigate and seek sanctions and damages for said violations of constitutional and statutory rights.

Furthermore, I hereby authorize [REDACTED] Esquire, to consult with any and all agents of the State as he deems necessary and waive my right to be present at any pre-trial conference pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(3).

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[REDACTED]

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# WAHID VIZCAINO, L.L.P.

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MIAMI

August 16, 2010  
Via E-mail and U.S. Mail

Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted]

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
Name: Samir Zafar Khan  
Passport number: 301708539  
Date of birth: 25 December 1985  
Place of birth: Saudi Arabia, U.S. citizen  
Date of issue of Passport: 29 May 2002  
Date of expiration of Passport: 28 May 2012

Dear Agent [redacted]

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My name is [redacted] and [redacted] Samir Khan. Please see attached Invocation of Right to Counsel and of Miranda Rights [redacted] Samir Kahn. It is the intention [redacted] that this apply not only to United States law enforcement but also to any [redacted] that maybe working in cooperation with United States authorities or independently. The United States Embassy must take steps to notify [redacted] if they are to come in contact with Samir Khan they must immediately notify the embassy or its consulates.

Additionally, be advised that this correspondence is also has been sent via facsimile to the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen. If you have any questions, please contact us at the number below.



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KBW/ym  
Enclosure

3191 Coral Way, Suite 406, Miami, FL 33145  
Phone: (305)444-4303 • Fax: (305)444-4302

WAHID VIZCAINO, L.L.P.

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MIAMI

August 16, 2010  
Via E-mail and U.S. Mail

Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted]

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Name: [redacted]  
Date of birth: [redacted]

Dear Agent [redacted]

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My name is [redacted] and [redacted]. Please see  
attached Invocation of Right to Counsel and of Miranda Rights for [redacted]. It is the  
intention of [redacted] that this apply to United States law enforcement



KBW/ym  
Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-05-2017

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/05/2010

On [redacted] Reporting Agent and [redacted] (SA) [redacted] conducted an interview of [redacted] at the [redacted] located at [redacted] [redacted] was greeted by Reporting Agent in the lobby of the building and was then accompanied to the conference room where he was introduced to SA [redacted]

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Reporting Agent explained that he knew that [redacted]

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Investigation on [redacted] at [redacted]

(S) File [redacted] [redacted] stated NA

by SA [redacted]  
DS [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-05-2017

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of transcription

On

(SA)

[redacted], conducted an interview of [redacted] at  
the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department University Substation  
located at 8401 University Executive Park Drive, Suite 120,  
Charlotte, NC.

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8/10/2010

CMPD University Substation

Investigation on

File #

Date dictated

NA

by

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the  
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/10/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn:

SA

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

jrs

Case ID #: (S)

(U) (S)

Title:

(S)

(S)

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis:

(S)

(S)

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350810

(U) Reference:

(S)

Details:

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 08/10/2010

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 08/10/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-12-2017

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of transcription 08/02/2010

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
social security account number [redacted] residence address of  
[redacted] Charlotte, North Carolina 28269, was  
interviewed on July 30, 2010, in the passenger waiting area of gate  
A1, at the Charlotte Douglass International Airport in Charlotte,  
North Carolina. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided  
the following information:

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[redacted] stated that he was aware of recent media events  
regarding [redacted] SAMIR KHAN. [redacted] was shown a printed copy of  
a NYDaily News and a Charlotte Observer article containing  
information regarding [redacted] stated that while aware  
of SAMIR being in the news he had not read either of the articles.

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[redacted] advised that he had heard of Al-Fursan Media and  
confirmed that they had published Jihad Recollections. [redacted] stated  
that SAMIR had written Jihad Recollections. [redacted] stated that he  
did not know anyone who had contributed to this magazine. When  
asked if he had written for the magazine, [redacted] stated that he had  
not and that SAMIR knew he was not a writer.

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[redacted] stated that SAMIR discussed his plan to travel to  
Yemen with him. [redacted] stated that he believed SAMIR was traveling  
to Yemen to teach at a University and to learn Islam. [redacted] was  
surprised when SAMIR later quit his job at the University. [redacted]  
believes SAMIR left his job at the University [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that the last time he heard from SAMIR was by  
[redacted] advised that he has not contacted  
SAMIR. [redacted] SAMIR.

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[redacted] was shown a printed copy of Inspire Magazine, which  
he stated that he had not read. When asked if Samir could have  
used his knowledge from Jihad Recollections to create Inspire, [redacted]  
described SAMIR as being not violent. He stated that he did not  
believe that SAMIR would have written Inspire Magazine because he  
did not know how to make bombs.

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Investigation on 07/30/2010 at Charlotte, North Carolina

File [redacted] 08/02/2010  
by SA [redacted] [redacted]

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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/30/2010, Page 2

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[redacted] stated that SAMIR had never indicated a desire to participate in violent jihad. When asked his own opinion of Jihad, [redacted] advised that he conducted his own research on the issue and chose to come to his own conclusions.

[redacted] stated that he had known [redacted] a.k.a. [redacted] for the past four or five years. He described the nature of their relationship as [redacted] SAMIR's.

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[redacted] was asked to read an article titled "Language Barrier" taken from Inspire Magazine. [redacted] stated that he did not believe the article could have been about [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that SAMIR had informed him of [redacted] travel to Pakistan. [redacted] was unable to provide details of the travel and stated that SAMIR had only informed him that he had departed and returned. [redacted] was unaware of any injuries [redacted] sustained while overseas.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-12-2017

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/30/2010

[REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] social security account number, [REDACTED], residence address of [REDACTED] Charlotte, North Carolina 28213, was interviewed in the hallway outside the above address. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

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[REDACTED] stated that he first met SAMIR KHAN in 2008 at the Plaza Mosque in Charlotte, North Carolina. [REDACTED] recalled KHAN being in a history class at the mosque before KHAN was kicked out. [REDACTED] stated he believed most people at the mosque did not have a positive opinion of KHAN.

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[REDACTED] had read the recent Charlotte Observer article regarding KHAN and had no opinion as to the truthfulness of this reporting. [REDACTED] advised he did not believe everything that was said in the media.

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[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] KHAN after KHAN left for YEMEN. He could not recall specifics from [REDACTED] KHAN's [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was unsure if KHAN was still in Sanaa, Yemen. He stated that KHAN [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He did not know where KHAN had traveled to.

[REDACTED] KHAN [REDACTED] but stated that he [REDACTED] KHAN's [REDACTED]

Prior to leaving KHAN informed [REDACTED] that he was planning on teaching at a university in Yemen. [REDACTED] knew that someone had helped KHAN [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had heard of Inspire magazine from the news, but had not read it. [REDACTED] had heard of Al-Fursan media(ph) and recalled that KHAN had created it. [REDACTED] stated that KHAN had [REDACTED]

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Investigation on 07/28/2010 at Charlotte, North Carolina

File # [REDACTED] Date dictated 07/30/2010

by SA [REDACTED] rrck  
SA [REDACTED] JNZ

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[REDACTED] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 07/28/2010, Page 2

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created Jihad Recollections. At the request of KHAN, [REDACTED] Jihad Recollections [REDACTED] (ph). KHAN requested [REDACTED] Jihad Recollections. [REDACTED] stated that he believed KHAN had the necessary skills and writing ability to have created Inspire magazine, but had no way of knowing if he had actually written it.

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[REDACTED] described KHAN as someone who had a lot of energy. He believed KHAN's on-line blog was a way for him to get this energy out. He described KHAN's activities as a way to get information out that the media was withholding. [REDACTED] did not feel that KHAN was against the American people, but he had issues with the United States Government and their foreign policy. [REDACTED] was not sure if the United States should be concerned about KHAN being in Yemen. [REDACTED] stated, KHAN was an outspoken, but not violent person in the past, although people can change. He explained that KHAN was afraid of bugs and that he could not see someone who was afraid of bugs hurting another person.

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[REDACTED] stated KHAN had previously listened to lectures by ANWAR AULAQI and was not surprised by media reports indicating KHAN may have been working with AULAQI in Yemen.

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[REDACTED] was unsure of the nature of KHAN's association with [REDACTED]. He did not believe that the two were "buddy buddies." [REDACTED] explained that he has known [REDACTED] since 2008. He sees him occasionally and described their relationship as friendly, however they do not hang out all of the time. He believed [REDACTED] job required him to work with boats and travel frequently. [REDACTED] travels for work approximately every other month. [REDACTED] last saw [REDACTED] approximately four weeks ago.

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[REDACTED] was asked to read an article titled "Language Barrier", within Inspire Magazine. [REDACTED] said that he would have been surprised if [REDACTED] had written the article however, he did not know if the article was about [REDACTED]. He stated he understood how [REDACTED] could have felt as described in the article if he did not have the ability to speak the local language while in a foreign country.

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[REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] had informed him that he had talked with the FBI in the past but would not elaborate. [REDACTED] felt that [REDACTED] was "defensive" to white people due to

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[redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/28/2010, Page 3

the historical oppression of African Americans. [redacted] stated that he felt [redacted] still held resentment towards whites even after he became a Muslim. [redacted] stated his belief that many African Americans seem this way.

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[redacted] had previously informed [redacted] that he had traveled to Pakistan with his family. [redacted] believed that [redacted] had gone to learn about Islam. [redacted] had never informed [redacted] of any injuries he sustained while overseas. He explained that not many people outside of the mosque know [redacted] and that if we wanted to talk to anyone else that may know him we should talk to the administration at the Plaza Mosque.

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[redacted] stated he believed [redacted] has a desire to return to the United Kingdom. He stated that [redacted] is not happy in the United States and is angry about not having a passport which interferes with his work. [redacted] has never talked to [redacted] about returning to Pakistan. It is [redacted] belief that [redacted] has no desire to become a freedom fighter in a foreign country.

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[redacted] explained that he knew [redacted] SAMIR KHAN's [redacted] When asked if [redacted] is like [redacted] stated his belief that [redacted] is confused right now in that he hears arguments from both sides. [redacted] explained that [redacted] KHAN took opposite sides of the argument and [redacted] was caught [redacted] He believes [redacted] may not agree with US. foreign policy, but does not believe he would act out over it. [redacted] stated [redacted] follows the advice of [redacted] more then that of [redacted]

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[redacted] had not been in contact with [redacted] for a couple of months. He stated that he had not discussed KHAN's travel to Yemen with [redacted] much. He provided that both [redacted] were worried about KHAN.

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[redacted] stated that [redacted] has never informed [redacted] about a desire to travel to visit KHAN, nor his desire to travel overseas.

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[redacted] advised he had come to the United States in approximately 1998 and had a strong desire to return home to [redacted] which he described as "home sweet home" [redacted] stated an interest in teaching upon his return to [redacted] [redacted] was not able to provide a planned departure date.

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

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[Redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 07/28/2010, Page 4

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/09/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA  
SOS

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From: Charlotte [REDACTED]

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Approved By: [REDACTED] (KS)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

:dps

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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Title: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

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Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED] (S)

~~Derived from: FBI NSISCG-20080615~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350506~~

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Administrative: (U) The following reporting was obtained from  
liaison contact [REDACTED] on 08/09/2010, and will be submitted to  
the [REDACTED] for review and dissemination as deemed appropriate.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 08/09/2010

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~ On 08/09/2010 [redacted]

[redacted] contacted the reporting agent to provide information [redacted] (S)

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(U) [redacted] also provided information on a new development possibly relating to Al-Malahim Media Al-Qa'ida's media arm in the Arab Pinsula [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) b1  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

b1  
b3

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 08/09/2010

[redacted] (S) b1  
b3

~~(S)~~/~~(S)~~

[redacted] (S) b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] 08/09/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] : Provided for immediate dissemination to  
USIC partners with responsibility for AQAP and Yemen.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**FD-71**  
Revised  
7-21-2009

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
**COMPLAINT FORM**

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b7C

**ADMINISTRATION**

Classification Level:  
**UNCLASSIFIED** ☐ FISA Derived

**It is noted that the individuals and groups identified during the assessment do not warrant further FBI investigation at this time.**

<b>RECEIVED BY</b>		Status:	Priority:
Name: [redacted] (CE) (FBI)	Enter as much of the name as known and click <b>Search</b> .	<b>None</b>	<b>Routine</b>
Email: [redacted]		Incident Type:	Receipt Method:
		<b>Other</b>	<b>In Person</b>
		Received On:	Last Updated:
		<b>8/7/2010</b>	<b>8/7/2010</b>

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b7E

Originator Type: <b>Internal</b>	Originating Agency: <b>FBI</b>	Originator Telephone: [redacted]
Responsible Office: <b>Charlotte</b>	RA: [redacted]	Responsible Squad (ACS Designation): [redacted]

<b>RESPONSIBLE INVESTIGATOR</b>		<b>RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR</b>	
Name: [redacted] (CE) (F...)	Enter as much of the name as known and click <b>Search</b> .	Name: [redacted] (CE) (FBI)	Enter as much of the name as known and click <b>Search</b> .
Email: [redacted]		Email: [redacted]	

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**SUMMARY**

Synopsis:  
To report information provided by complainant regarding his suspicion of his past working relationship with Samir Khan, and present working relationship with [redacted]

☐ Sensitive Investigative Matter

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Facts of Incident:  
[redacted] Ave., Charlotte, NC 28205, tel. # [redacted] advised that he is currently employed as [redacted] by Street Soccer USA. Mr. [redacted] has been hired [redacted] According to Mr. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] and Ms. [redacted] President Obama.

Mr. [redacted] finds it strange that in 2009 he worked with Samir Khan, an Al-Qaeda news editor, at NCO Financial, and now working with individuals with close relations to the President. Mr. [redacted] also claims that his residence has been broken into twice. Mr. [redacted] does not know what to make of his experience, but wanted to report the information to the FBI.

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<b>Occurrence(s):</b>		<b>Time:</b>	
From:	To:	Duration:	Duration Units:

**COMPLAINANT**

Name: [redacted]	<input type="checkbox"/> Protect Source	Date of Complaint: <b>8/6/2010</b>	Time of Complaint:
Address: [redacted] Ave, Charlotte, NC 28205		Telephone: [redacted]	
Date of Birth:	Email Address:		
Gender: <b>Male (M)</b>	Complaint Received By: [redacted]		

b6  
b7C

**SUBJECT**

Last Name or Organization Name:	First Name:	Middle Initial:	Telephone Number Text:
Social Security Number:	Date of Birth:	Place of Birth:	
Gender:	Build:	Complexion:	
Hair Color:	Eye Color:	Feet:	Inches:
Weight:	Height:		

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*[Handwritten signature]*

Accent:		Race:		Driver's License Number:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Public Figure(Politician, Celebrity, Community Leader, etc.)			US Person <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Unknown		
Description (dress, mannerisms, or statements made):					
Address:					
Other Names:					
Other Addresses:					
<b>Scar(s)/Tattoo(s):</b>					
Scar/Tattoo Description:					
<b>Associate(s):</b>					
<b>Weapon(s):</b>					
Weapon Description:					
<b>Vehicle(s):</b>					
<b>INVESTIGATIVE METHODS</b>					
<b>FINDINGS</b>					
Recommended Classification:      Recommended Alpha:					
<input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate to FIG					
<input type="checkbox"/> Disseminate to Others					
Recommended Action:					
Date:					
Assessment Findings:					
Federal Violation:					
<b>SUPERVISOR REVIEW</b>					
<b>Responsible Supervisor:</b>					
<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></div> (CE) (FBI)					
<b>REVIEWS</b>					
Period Start Date:	Period End Date:	Days:	Supervisor Decision:	<input type="checkbox"/> Add Comments	
<b>8/23/2010</b>	<b>9/22/2010</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>No Assessment, Upload to 0 or Case File</b>		
Author:					
<b>SHELDON KRISTEN L</b>					
Division:	Classification:	Alpha:	CPI Code:	File Number:	Case ID:
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px;"></div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px;"></div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 20px;"></div>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 60px; height: 1.2em; display: inline-block;"></div> Sub File	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 120px; height: 1.2em; display: inline-block;"></div>
<b>ATTACHMENTS</b>					

b3  
b6  
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📎 File Attachment

Attachment Description:

--

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/22/2010

To: Operational Technology

Attn: [redacted]

b3  
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b7E

Charlotte

Attn: [redacted]

From: Charlotte

Squad [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

dwz [initials]

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

(Pending)

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

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b7E

(S)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISGC, 20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 08/22/2035~~

(U) [redacted]

b7E

Details: (S) [redacted] Samir Khan is a 24 year-old, self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi who, from late 2005 until late 2009, administered a fundamentalist Islamic, pro-jihad, online blog that gained international attention. On his online blog, as well as on several other online forums with similar content, Khan expressed a radical Islamic worldview. Investigation has shown Khan becoming increasingly religious and radical over time. In addition, investigation has shown that Khan has become a radicalizing influence on others, possibly motivating/recruiting them for jihad. Khan is the creator of the first US-based, English language, pro-jihad magazine, known as "Jihad Recollections." [redacted]

b1  
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Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b3  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/22/2010

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becoming a martyr. In October 2009 Khan traveled to Yemen  
apparently to make hiira. [redacted] (S)

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In January 2010, intelligence suggested that Khan became involved with AQAP and was actively planning attacks against the US. In July 2010, AQAP released an online, English language magazine known as "Inspire" that contains advice on making a bomb and preparing for jihad. Intelligence suggests that Khan is a major contributor to "Inspire." Based on knowledge of Khan's skills, network, and mindset, FBI Charlotte concludes that Khan's roles in AQAP are that of a propagandist, recruiter, operational planner, and potential martyr.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/22/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT [redacted]

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Set Lead 2: (Action)

AT [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/19/2010

To:

Counterterrorism  
Charlotte

Attn:

SA

Attn:

Attn:

SA

Attn:

SA

Attn:

SA

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Washington Field

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

M: kmg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Case ID #:

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(U) (S)  
(S)  
(S)  
(U) (S)

(S)

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b7A  
b7E

Title: (U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

(S)

(S)

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*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]*



~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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b7E

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted] (S)

(U) Re: (S) [redacted]

08/19/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) (S) Read and clear

Set Lead 2: (Info)

[redacted]

(U) (S) Read and clear

Set Lead 3: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE

(U) (S) Read and clear

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[redacted]

(U) (S) Read and clear

◆◆

231kmg01.ec

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b6  
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Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 08/23/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

TA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

From: Charlotte

Squad [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

Drafted By: [redacted]

:dwz

Case ID #: (S)

(U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)

[redacted] (S)

b1  
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b7A  
b7E

(U) Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

[redacted] (S)

Synopsis: (S) To cover lead from [redacted]

b1  
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b7E

(S)

Derived From : FBI NSISGC, 20080301  
Declassify On: 08/23/2035

Reference: (U)

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

(U)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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b7E

[redacted] 3

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For action as deemed appropriate by [redacted]

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of [redacted]

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of [redacted]

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-12-2017

b6  
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/29/2010

[REDACTED] dob: [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] BOOST MOBILE: 616 West Roosevelt Boulevard,  
Monroe, NC 28110. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED]  
provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he was aware that there had been a  
protest at the ISGC mosque. He was told that people came to protest  
to "save america and kill our god". He knew the police were called  
and he stated these things are not good, luckily there was no  
violence.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] advised the last time he had spoken to SAMIR KAHN  
was towards the end of 2009. He stated that he had not seen the  
latest news reports about KHAN. [REDACTED] described his relationship  
with KHAN as a person he has spoken to at prayer. He is not a close  
friend of his. On occasion [REDACTED] had asked KHAN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that he does not  
believe KHAN speaks fluent arabic, and that he only knows words  
that are common in Islamic greetings and prayer. [REDACTED] was not  
aware of KHAN'S world views as the two of them never discussed  
anything "deep", only everyday friendly conversation. [REDACTED]  
described KHAN and his family as very quite and soft spoken.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was not aware of why KHAN left to go to Yemen. He stated  
that he was only aware of KHAN'S blog. [REDACTED] discussed KHAN'S  
blog with him and told him that [REDACTED]  
KHAN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that ignorance has led to violence and the  
Muslim community holds the answer to better educate the followers  
of Islam. [REDACTED] stated that when a person enters America on a  
Visa from another country, by accepting the Visa that person is  
making a contract for safety, and under the laws of Islam must not  
do violence.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he does know [REDACTED] SAMIR'S  
[REDACTED] He stated that he is [REDACTED] He has  
not had a real conversation with [REDACTED] other than greetings.

b6  
b7C

7/28/2010 Monroe, North Carolina

Investigation on

(S)

File #

Date dictated

7/29/2010

by

SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

(S) b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 7/28/2010, Page 2 b6  
b7C

[redacted] was shown a copy of INSPIRE magazine and he stated he had not read it before. He read the article on homemade bomb making and stated that it was "stupid". He stated that ignorance of our own cause creates these problems. He stated that if an individual knows someone is doing something wrong the individual has a duty under Islam to try and correct it. However, after bringing the problem to his attention and discussing it, the individual has to take a step back and not be over-bearing. b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised that he had not read any of Khan's writings and was only aware of the one blog on the internet which Khan maintained. [redacted] read the article "What To Expect In Jihad," but did not recognize the writing style or the subject of the article. [redacted] did not recognize the name [redacted] article. b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised that he knew an individual by the name [redacted]. He stated that [redacted]. He was not sure what [redacted] did on the ship.

[redacted] stated that he heard that [redacted] lived in the Middle East at one time, he thinks in Pakistan. He stated that he has not heard any other talk and is not aware of any [redacted] associates. He stated that [redacted] told him that he wrestled at one time and that he wanted to train with [redacted] in Ju-Jitsu. [redacted] stated that he hasn't seen him since May 2010. b6  
b7C

[redacted] Progress mosque [redacted] He, on occasion, will attend the Plaza mosque if he is unable to attend at the Progress location. b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-12-2017

b6  
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/29/2010

[REDACTED] dob: [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] BOOST MOBILE: 616 West Roosevelt Boulevard,  
Monroe, NC 28110. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED]  
provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he was aware that there had been a  
protest at the ISGC mosque. He was told that people came to protest  
to "save america and kill our god". He knew the police were called  
and he stated these things are not good, luckily there was no  
violence.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] advised the last time he had spoken to SAMIR KAHN  
was towards the end of 2009. He stated that he had not seen the  
latest news reports about KHAN. [REDACTED] described his relationship  
with KHAN as a person he has spoken to at prayer. He is not a close  
friend of his. On occasion [REDACTED] had asked KHAN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that he does not  
believe KHAN speaks fluent arabic, and that he only knows words  
that are common in Islamic greetings and prayer. [REDACTED] was not  
aware of KHAN'S world views as the two of them never discussed  
anything "deep", only everyday friendly conversation. [REDACTED]  
described KHAN and his family as very quite and soft spoken.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was not aware of why KHAN left to go to Yemen. He stated  
that he was only aware of KHAN'S blog. [REDACTED] discussed KHAN'S  
blog with him and told him that [REDACTED]  
KHAN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that ignorance has led to violence and the  
Muslim community holds the answer to better educate the followers  
of Islam. [REDACTED] stated that when a person enters America on a  
Visa from another country, by accepting the Visa that person is  
making a contract for safety, and under the laws of Islam must not  
do violence.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he does know [REDACTED] SAMIR'S  
[REDACTED] He stated that he is [REDACTED] He has  
not had a real conversation with [REDACTED] other than greetings.

b6  
b7C

7/28/2010 Monroe, North Carolina

Investigation on

File #

SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

Date dictated

7/29/2010

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property  
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/29/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]  
SA  
SA

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: Charlotte [redacted]

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Drafted By: [redacted]

mjd

Case ID #:

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(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT- GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

[redacted] (S)  
(S)  
(S)

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Synopsis: (U) Interview of subject [redacted]

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b7C

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources~~

~~Declassify On: 20350729~~

Enclosures: One FD-302 to be submitted to the above case files.

Details: (U) On 07/28/2010, SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]  
[redacted] interviewed [redacted]. The results of this  
interview have been documented in a FD-302 and placed into the  
above captioned files.

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~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/29/2010

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b7E

**Accomplishment Information:**

Number: 1  
Type: INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT (CONTACT & ESPIONAGE)  
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 07/29/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ READ AND CLEAR

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN  
DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII  
THOMAS R. CARPER, DELAWARE  
MARK L. PRYOR, ARKANSAS  
MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA  
CLAIRE McCASKILL, MISSOURI  
JON TESTER, MONTANA  
ROLAND W. BURRIS, ILLINOIS  
MICHAEL F. BENNETT, COLORADO

SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
TOM COBURN, OKLAHOMA  
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA  
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, OHIO  
JOHN ENSIGN, NEVADA  
LINDSEY GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA  
ROBERT F. BENNETT, UTAH

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
BRANDON L. MILHORN, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON  
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

July 29, 2010

The Honorable Janet Napolitano  
Secretary of Homeland Security  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
3801 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20528

The Honorable Robert S. Mueller III  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
J. Edgar Hoover Building  
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Dear Madam Secretary and Director Mueller:

For the past four years, the Committee has investigated the terrorist threat to the homeland posed by violent Islamist extremism. We have held over a dozen hearings and released a staff report in May 2008 entitled *Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat*. The Committee's report addressed the role the Internet plays in recruitment and radicalization. Since that report, al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates have become even more adept at using the Internet to target English-speaking individuals, including those within the United States.

Earlier this month, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a new magazine on the Internet entitled "Inspire." This magazine is unlike any other publication previously released by al Qaeda and its affiliates. It is a glossy English language magazine and specifically targets English-speaking individuals for radicalization and recruitment, encourages them to travel overseas to join terrorist groups, and instructs them on such things as "how to build a bomb in the kitchen of your mom." It represents a significant and worrying increase in the quality and accessibility of violent Islamist extremist propaganda.

Recent news reports have cited unnamed law enforcement officials who believe the author behind "Inspire" is Samir Khan, a 24-year old U.S. citizen from North Carolina. News reports also state that Khan left the U.S. for Yemen in October 2009 and is believed to be hiding with Anwar al-Awlaki, whose writings have played a significant role in promoting violent Islamist extremism to a western audience and radicalizing individuals associated with numerous terrorist plots.



Hon. Janet Napolitano  
Hon. Robert Mueller  
July 29, 2010  
Page 2

According to NCTC Director Michael Leiter, al-Awlaki played a "direct operational role" in the failed AQAP-led attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009. Al-Awlaki also inspired a number of other recent plots and attempted attacks, including the "Toronto 18" plot in 2006 and the plot to attack Fort Dix, New Jersey, in 2007.

As part of our review of the use of technology for radicalization and recruitment, the Committee has for several years carefully observed the rise of al Qaeda propaganda in English. Chief among those propagandists was Khan who, through his widely publicized blog, translated al Qaeda videos and lectures to English, posted videos of U.S. soldiers killed in war zones, and encouraged others to travel overseas to conduct violent jihad. In 2007, Khan was the subject of a *New York Times* piece entitled, "An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers." That article quoted Khan stating that his favorite online video was a suicide bomber attack on an American outpost. "It was something that brought great happiness to me... Whatever happens to their sons and daughters is none of my concern. They are people of the hellfire and I have no concern for them." The article also described Khan's blog as a "Western relay station" for al Qaeda. In 2009, Khan released an online magazine that is similar to "Inspire", entitled *Jihad Recollections*, which was a watershed moment in violent Islamist extremist propaganda because of its unique focus on English-speaking audiences.

News that Khan may have travelled to Yemen and is collaborating with al-Awlaki is of great concern to us. The combination of Khan's technological knowledge and al-Awlaki's charisma may encourage youth from the United States and other English-speaking countries to embrace this violent ideology – and ultimately fuel further attacks on the homeland.

As part of the Committee's oversight responsibilities, we ask that you provide answers to the following questions. The response may be classified to the extent required consistent with information provided and can be provided in writing or by way of a briefing to the staff of the Committee.

- Does Khan currently reside outside the United States? If so, where, on what date did he depart from the U.S., and by what means and route?
- Was Khan the subject of a full investigation, preliminary investigation, or assessment at the time of his alleged departure? Was Khan the subject of previous full investigations, preliminary investigations, or assessments? If so, when were those full investigations, preliminary investigations, or assessments opened and closed?


Hon. Janet Napolitano  
Hon. Robert Mueller  
July 29, 2010  
Page 3

- Was Khan listed on the Terrorist Screening Database and any of its subset lists, including the No-Fly and Selectee lists, at the time of his alleged departure? If so, was Khan 'secondary screened' at the time of his alleged departure?
- If Khan is currently residing outside the United States, did the FBI have information that may have allowed any law enforcement agency to prevent him from leaving the country or detain him?
- If Khan is currently residing outside the United States and traveled by air to leave the country, were DHS and/or the FBI aware that he had purchased a plane ticket? Were they aware of his entire itinerary? If so, at what point in time were they aware?
- If Khan is currently residing outside the United States, and traveled by air to leave the country, and DHS and/or the FBI were aware that he was planning to leave, was an affirmative decision made to allow Khan to board a plane and depart the United States? If so, why was that decision made and which federal agencies were involved in making it?
- What is the FBI and DHS perspective on the threat posed by "Inspire" generally and Khan, specifically?

Sincerely,



Joseph I. Lieberman  
Chairman



Susan M. Collins  
Ranking Member

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 08/18/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Charlotte

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Contact: IA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

kas [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(U)

(S)

b1  
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b7A  
b7E

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350818~~

(U) [REDACTED]

Reference: (S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

Administrative: (S) [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
b7E~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)b1  
b3  
b7Eb3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/18/2010

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b7A  
b7E

[redacted]

(S) b1  
b3  
b7E

(U)

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

[redacted]

b3  
b7E

(U) **Details:** (S) By way of background, SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN, a USPER and the subject of FBI Charlotte [redacted] is a self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi and a promoter of the Salafi-Jihadist ideology.

(S) [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

(U) In summary, KHAN's Salafi-Jihadi ideology envisages a global jihad against non-Muslims that will lead to the reestablishment of the Caliphate. The Caliphate encompasses all Muslim nations (the Ummah) joined into one political entity ruled

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/18/2010

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by a Caliph (successor--God's Shadow on Earth) under a system of Shariah Law. The army of the Caliphate will consist of the Mujahideen who will eventually conquer all the nations of the world.

(U) ~~(S)~~/~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] [redacted]

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[redacted]

~~(S)~~/~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

b1  
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(S)

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/18/2010

b1  
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### Recommendation

(U) Any further intelligence or investigative action deemed appropriate is left to the discretion of [redacted]. It is recommended that a [redacted] and a [redacted] [redacted] so a complete assessment can be conducted.

b7E

### FBI Intelligence

[Large redacted area]

×

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(S)

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/18/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

**Accomplishment Information:**

Number: 1  
Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Number: 1  
Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[REDACTED]  
(FBI)

b6  
b7C

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2010 2:43 PM  
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Subject: RE: IP Addresses

b6  
b7C  
b7E

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

Hi [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

I searched our new [REDACTED] and I wasn't able to find any references. Is there a case open regarding Samir Khan's blog? Perhaps the respective case agent can [REDACTED]

Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks  
[REDACTED]

Note: [REDACTED] will have a more comprehensive dataset since we just look at the NJ domain; please submit any request to them via the link below to their website:  
[REDACTED]

(U) (S) All [REDACTED] results are for lead purposes only and are intended solely for the background information of the recipients. The information may not be disseminated to any other agency or used as the basis for any United States legal process.

[REDACTED]  
Intelligence Analyst [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Cell [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2010 9:45 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Subject: RE: IP Addresses

b6  
b7C  
b7E

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[REDACTED]  
I was wondering if the agents found anything on the below IP addresses.

Thanks,  
[REDACTED]

*Very respectfully,*

[redacted]  
*Intelligence Analyst*

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
(Office)  
(Cell)  
(Fax)

*Unclass Email:* [redacted]  
[redacted]

**From:** [redacted] (FBI)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 28, 2010 8:46 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (FBI)  
**Subject:** RE: IP Addresses

b6  
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**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Hi [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

See below for the contact and registration information for your IP's. based on a reverse-ip look-up through the [redacted]  
[redacted] The agent can use [redacted]

Intelligence Analyst, [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Cell: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, July 27, 2010 11:11 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Subject: IP Addresses

b6  
b7C  
b7E

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**  
**NON-RECORD**

[REDACTED]

*Can you check some IP addresses for me?*

[REDACTED]

*These IP addresses have been in contact with Samir Khan's blog.*

*Very respectfully,*

[REDACTED]

*Intelligence Analyst*

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED]

(Office)

(Cell)

(Fax)

Unclass Email: [REDACTED]

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

(S)

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 08/18/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Charlotte

Attn:

SSA  
SA

From:

Contact: IA

Approved By:

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7A  
b7C  
b7E

Drafted By:

: kgs

Case ID #: (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~

Title: (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIREDSynopsis: ~~(S)~~/~~(U)~~b1  
b3  
b7E~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350818~~

(U)

Reference: (S)

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Administrative: (S)

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b7E~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

(S)

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/18/2010

b1  
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b7A  
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Muslim nations (the Ummah) joined into one political entity ruled by a Caliph (successor--God's Shadow on Earth) under a system of Shariah Law. The army of the Caliphate will be comprised of the Mujahideen who will eventually conquer all the nations of the world.

(U)

~~(S)~~/~~(NF)~~ [redacted]

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~~(S)~~/~~(NF)~~ [redacted]

(S)

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b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/18/2010

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b7E

**Recommendation**

(U) Any further intelligence or investigative action deemed appropriate is left to the discretion of [redacted]. It is recommended that a [redacted] and a [redacted] [redacted] so a detailed assessment can be conducted.

b7E

**FBI Intelligence**

[redacted]

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(S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 08/23/2010

To:

Attn:

FE

Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

From: Charlotte

Squad

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

:dwz

Case ID #: (U)

Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S)

Request FBI conduct a exam for captioned investigation.

(S)

Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301

Declassify On: 08/23/2035

(U)

Details:

BACKGROUND

(S) For the information of FBI captioned subject Samir Khan is a 24 year-old, self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

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[redacted] (S)  
Individuals close to Khan have expressed concern that Khan may become a martyr and he himself has indicated an interest in becoming a martyr. In October 2009, Khan traveled to Yemen, apparently to make hiira. [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

In January 2010, intelligence suggested that Khan became involved with AQAP and was actively planning attacks against the US. In July 2010, AQAP released an online, English language magazine known as "Inspire" that contains advice on making a bomb and preparing for jihad. Intelligence suggests that Khan is a major contributor to "Inspire." Based on knowledge of Khan's skills, network, and mindset, FBI Charlotte concludes that Khan's roles in AQAP are that of a propagandist, recruiter, operational planner, and potential martyr.

(U) (S) For further case information, please visit the case [redacted]  
[redacted]

b7E

CURRENT SITUATION

(U) (S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

b7D  
b7E

(U) (S) A draft criminal complaint is currently being written to charge Khan for violations of US terrorism statutes. Scientific proof of Khan's involvement in "Inspire" magazine would be significant in helping to charge Khan.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

REQUEST

(U)

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(U) Any assistance the FBI [redacted] can provide  
would be greatly appreciated.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

[redacted]

b7E

(S) [redacted] Writer requests FBI [redacted] perform a priority  
[redacted] as detailed in above communication.  
For any questions or clarifications, please contact SA [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
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Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) For information.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1  
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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/25/2010

To:

[Redacted]

Attn:

SA  
SA  
IA

[Redacted]

Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA  
SOS

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Charlotte

Attn:

SSA  
IA  
SA  
SA

[Redacted]

*my*

From:

[Redacted]

Contact:

[Redacted]

b6  
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b7E

Approved By:

[Redacted]

*DS*  
*JLT*

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

:jlt

Case ID #:

(U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

(S)

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Title: (S)

[Redacted]

(S)

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b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ (S)

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b7E

*KLS/My*

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
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b7E

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 08/25/2010

SAMIR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMISM INSPIRED

[redacted]

(S)

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b7E

Synopsis: ~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

(S)  
(S)

~~Derived From : Multiple Sources~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350825~~

Administrative: ~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

(S)

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Enclosure(s): (U) Documents supporting this EC.

Details: ~~(S//NF)~~

[redacted]

(S)

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/25/2010

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b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

(U) CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE

(S) Charlotte subject [redacted] ~~(S)~~ Section containing information on Samir Khan [redacted] Read and (S) clear.

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♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/09/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

IA

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

Attn:

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Attn:

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Attn: SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Intelligence Directorate

[Redacted]

✓Charlotte

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From:

[Redacted]

Contact:

[Redacted]

b3  
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b7C  
b7A  
b7E

Approved By:

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

Case ID #:

(S)

(S)

(U)

(U)

(U)

Title:

(S)

CHANGED

(U)

[Redacted]

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(U)

(S)

CHANGED

[Redacted]

(U)

(S)

SUBSCRIBER TO EMAIL

(USPER)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten initials and marks]*

[Redacted]

b3  
b7E



~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(U) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/09/2010

b3  
b7E

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

(U) (S) [redacted]

Synopsis: (U) To document interview which resulted in identification of captioned subject, and change case titles to reflect this new information.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350809~~

Previous Title: (U) Title marked "Changed" to reflect subject of two Columbia investigations being identified. Title previously carried as "UNSUB(S)".

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for [redacted] is FD-941, Consent to Search Computer(s). Enclosed for Charlotte, [redacted] [redacted] is FD-302, interview of captioned subject.

b7E

(U) Details: (S) On 8/04/2010, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Case Agent, and Special Agent (SA) [redacted] from [redacted] conducted an interview with [redacted] at his residence, [redacted] Rock Hill, SC 29730. The purpose of this interview was to determine if [redacted] was [redacted] [redacted] bearing the subscriber name [redacted], and/or if he was associated with another unknown subject who utilizes the e-mail address [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted]

b6  
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(U) Agents had previously requested subscriber records for [redacted] and e-mail address listed above, which yielded information regarding Internet Protocol (IP) addresses used to create and access the [redacted] and e-mail accounts. A subsequent request for subscriber information to the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), of IP addresses previously obtained, yielded information that the accounts were accessed from a subscriber account belonging to [redacted] mother, at the residential address listed above.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/09/2010

b3  
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(U) The interviewing agents arrived at the residence at approximately 11:30 AM and were met at the door by [redacted]. After identifying themselves to [redacted] the agents asked her if she had a computer in the home. [redacted] advised that she did, and that the computer was in her son's bedroom and that he was the one "who uses it". The agents asked [redacted] if her son was at home and she stated that he was in his bedroom. [redacted] went to her son's room and called him to come out of his bedroom and meet the agents. [redacted] then came out of his bedroom and greeted the agents.

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(U) [redacted]

b6  
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(U) [redacted]

b6  
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(U) [redacted] is a black male, DOB: [redacted] SSAN. [redacted] and resides with his mother at [redacted] Rock Hill, SC 29730. [redacted] has a South Carolina Driver's License Number: [redacted], which indicates his height as 5'11, and his weight as 138. [redacted] stated that his home telephone number was [redacted] and his cell telephone number was [redacted] (a check of [redacted] was negative for this number). [redacted] stated that he was not currently a student and that he was unemployed.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

(U) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/09/2010

(U) (S) The interview revealed that [redacted]  
[redacted], previously unknown subjects in two [redacted] investigations  
[redacted] also admitted to  
visiting [redacted]

b3  
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(U) (S) Because both [redacted] cases are similar, and the  
subject of both cases has been identified as [redacted]  
[redacted] intends to request closure of [redacted] by  
separate communication, and continue investigation/evaluation for  
source potential under [redacted]

b3  
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Descriptive Data:

(U) Main Subject

Name -

Last: [redacted]

First: [redacted]

Middle: [redacted]

Race:

B

Sex:

M

DOB: [redacted]

DLN: [redacted]

(South Carolina)

SOC: [redacted]

Alias(es) -

Last: [redacted]

First: [redacted]

Last: [redacted]

First: [redacted]

Middle: [redacted]

Address(es) -

House #: [redacted]

Street Name: [redacted]

City: [redacted]

Rock Hill

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(U) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/09/2010

b3  
b7E

State: SC  
Postal Code: 29730  
Country: United States  
Phone #: (Home) [redacted]  
Phone #: (Cell) [redacted]

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(U) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/09/2010

b3  
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted] will be submitted via e-mail to the  
[redacted] mailbox at [redacted] to add the subject of this case to  
the [redacted] and appropriate supported  
systems.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b7E

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(U) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/09/2010

Set Lead 6: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 7: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]: Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 8: (Info)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 9: (Info)

[redacted]  
AT [redacted]

(U) [redacted]: Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 10: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) (S) Read and clear.

Set Lead 11: (Info)

[redacted]  
AT [redacted]

b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 08/09/2010

b3  
b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 12: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and Clear.

Set Lead 13: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear.

Set Lead 14: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/06/2010

[REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED]  
social security account number [REDACTED], was interviewed at his  
residence, [REDACTED] Rock Hill, South Carolina.  
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and  
the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following  
information.

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C  
b7Eb6  
b7C  
b7Eb6  
b7C  
b7EInvestigation on 08/04/2010 at Rock Hill, SCFile # [REDACTED] Date dictated August 6, 2010by TFO [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E



[Redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [Redacted], On 08/04/2010, Page 2

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[Redacted]

[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/04/2010, Page 3

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

The agents asked [redacted] if he considered himself Muslim.  
[redacted] stated that he was interested in Islam, but had not

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 08/04/2010 , Page 4

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] converted. His description of the Islam religion was that it was a "brotherhood" that he felt like he could "fit in" and be a part of. He stated that he had not had any personal contact with anyone regarding Islam, but gained what he knew of the religion from the Internet. [REDACTED] stated that he disagrees with US troops fighting in the Middle East, and "wished" that the fighting there would end. [REDACTED] also explicitly stated that he did not support violence against anyone.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] advised he has not visited a mosque, nor knows any Muslims in the area. [REDACTED] advised that he would notify agents if [REDACTED]

b6  
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b7E

[REDACTED] presented himself as extremely shy/introverted. He spoke in a very low tone. He stated that he spends all his time in his bedroom on the computer "surfing the internet". He could not recall any outside or social activities that he regularly participates in, or name any friends that he "hangs out with". His description of family members/activities indicated that he does not have a close family relationship. [REDACTED] stated he dropped out of high school and later completed his GED, however, he demonstrated well above average computer skills/knowledge. He was very polite, cooperative, and appeared to be surprised that he was possibly doing something wrong.

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/24/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

Charlotte

From: Charlotte

Squad [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

dwz [signature]

Case ID #: (U)

(U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)

(S)

(U) Title: (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Synopsis: (S)

(S)

(S)

b1  
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b7E

(S)

Derived From: FBI NSISGC, 20080301  
Declassify On: 08/24/2035

(U)

b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/24/2010

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of [redacted]

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) For information of [redacted]

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) For Information.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/23/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Charlotte

SA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Contact: IA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By: [REDACTED] *af/ave*

Drafted By: [REDACTED] *ags*  
*gs*

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED] (S)  
(S)  
(U)

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S) [REDACTED] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

(U) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS/ PRODUCTION  
COUNTER TERRORISM

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

*(S)*

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted], 08/23/2010

b1  
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b7E

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b7C  
b7E

(S)

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350823~~

Administrative: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S)

Details: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

The Charlotte Field [redacted]  
[redacted] was requested to conduct detailed analysis [redacted]

(S)

X

b1  
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b6  
b7C  
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

b1  
b3  
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted] For your concurrence,  
please review the Charlotte recommendation for the initiation of  
a [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

Set Lead 5: (Action)

[redacted]  
~~(S)~~ [redacted] The Charlotte [redacted] recommends you  
consider with [redacted] concurrence the opening of a [redacted]  
[redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-12-2017

b6  
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of transcription [redacted]

On [redacted]

(SA) [redacted]

[redacted] conducted an  
interview of [redacted] at his residence located at [redacted]  
[redacted] invited the Agents into his residence after  
being told the nature of their visit.

b6  
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b7E

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b6  
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b7D

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b6  
b7C  
b7D

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b7C  
b7D  
b7E

Invest [redacted]

File # [redacted]

SA [redacted]

by [redacted]

(S)

Date dictated NA

~~SECRET~~

b3  
b6  
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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/11/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]  
SSA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Attn: [REDACTED]

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]  
IA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]  
To: [REDACTED]  
To: [REDACTED]  
To: [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]  
Attn: SSA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]  
Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte Division

Contact: SOS [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
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Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] alc

Case ID #: (U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)  
(U)

[REDACTED] (S)  
(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

[REDACTED]

b3  
b7E

(CS)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte Division

Re: (S) [redacted] (Pending) (U) [redacted]

08/11/2010

(U) [redacted]

Title: (S) [redacted] (S)

(U)

(S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(U)

(S)

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~

~~Declassify On: 20350811~~

Enclosure: (S) [redacted] (S)

Administrative: (S) [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
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b7E

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte Division

(S) Re: (U) [redacted] (U) [redacted]  
08/11/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and take action as deemed appropriate.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

[redacted]

b7E

AT [redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

To: Charlotte From: Charlotte Division

(S) Re: (S) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

08/11/2010

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

[Redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 6: (Info)

[Redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

(S)

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/09/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA  
SOS

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To: Charlotte

Attn:

SA  
IA  
SOS

To:

Attn:

SA  
SA

To:

Attn:

SA  
SA

From: Charlotte

Contact: SOS

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By:

Drafted By:

: alc

Case ID #:

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(U)  
(U)  
(U)

(S)

(S)

b6  
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b7E

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT- GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

(S)

(U) ~~(S)~~

(U) ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/09/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/10/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SSA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
IA [REDACTED]  
SOS [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

To: [REDACTED]

Attn: SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Contact: SOS [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

alc

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(U)  
(U)  
(U)

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7A  
b7E

(U) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT- GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S)

(S)

(S)

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b7E

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

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Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/10/2010

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/23/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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SSA [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Attn: SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

Attn: SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

Attn: SA [redacted]

Charlotte

From: Charlotte [redacted]

Squad [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

b1  
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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 08/23/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Information)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]  
(U) [redacted]

Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 2: (Information)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]  
(U) [redacted]

Read and clear.

b7D

Set Lead 3: (Information)

[redacted]  
(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Information)

[redacted]  
(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 5: (Information)

[redacted]  
(U) Read and clear.

b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 08/23/2010

Set Lead 6: (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Information)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 9: (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 10 (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

b1  
b3  
b7E

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

Set Lead 11 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 12 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 13 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 14 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 1193607-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 217

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Page 9 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;  
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(S)

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/23/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

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SSA

SSA

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Attn:

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From: Charlotte

Squad

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/23/2010

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(S)

(U)

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SAMIR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMISM INSPIRED

~~(S)~~

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b1  
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ANWAR NASSER AULAQI  
CT - SUNNI EXTREMISM - MIDDLE EAST

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/23/2010

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Synopsis:

~~(S//NF)~~ Request [redacted]

(S)

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Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301  
Declassify On: 20350823

(U)

b7E

Administrative:

WARNING:

~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
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(S)

~~(S//NF)~~ The information contained in this Electronic Communication is for INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ONLY. As a result, by agreement between the FBI [redacted] no information provided [redacted] in this report may be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding.

(S)

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(S) Reference:

Details:

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

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To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

(S) (U) [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7D  
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Information)

COUNTERTERRORISM

[redacted]

(U) [redacted]: Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Information)

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 4: (Information)

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 5: (Information)

[redacted]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

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(S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

(S)

b1  
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b7E

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte

(S) Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

Set Lead 6: (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 7: (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) [redacted] Read and clear.

Set Lead 8: (Information)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 9: (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 10 (Information)

[redacted]

b7E

(U) Read and clear.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

b1  
b3  
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 08/23/2010

Set Lead 11 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 12 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 13 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 14 (Information)



b7E

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

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b1  
b3  
b7E



~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-13-2017

b6  
b7C

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/11/2010

On Wednesday, August 11, 2010 at approximately 12:45 pm  
[REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] at the Charlotte Mecklenburg  
Police Department University Substation located at 8401 University  
Executive Park Drive, Ste. 120, Charlotte, North Carolina. Agents  
[REDACTED] identified themselves to [REDACTED] as  
[REDACTED] Federal Bureau of  
Investigation [REDACTED] Observing the interview  
were [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[REDACTED] advised the agents he last spoke to [REDACTED]  
yesterday, [REDACTED] and later  
met with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D  
b7E

[REDACTED] that FBI Agents came to  
talk to him about Samir Khan and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

Investigation on 08/11/2010 at Charlotte, NC

File #

(S) Date dictated 08/12/2010

by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

b1  
b3  
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b7C  
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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency, it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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b7E

[redacted] (S)

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 08/11/2010 , Page 2

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] was asked why he thought [redacted] went to Afghanistan and [redacted] stated "to do terrorist thing". [redacted] was asked how he knew that since he stated earlier that he did not know [redacted] and he stated that was his opinion. [redacted] was asked why anyone would travel from the United States to Afghanistan and he stated it was all for bad. [redacted] stated in his opinion that [redacted] committed a "terrorist treason" while in Afghanistan.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was confronted with the fact that he attends the same mosque as Samir Khan and [redacted] and it would be hard to believe that he has never seen or talked with either man. [redacted] stated we could look at the video from the mosque and it would not show that he has ever talked with either man. [redacted] was asked why, after finding out that [redacted] had traveled to Afghanistan and in his opinion had committed a "terrorist treason" why he did not try to find out who [redacted] was so that he would not associate with him by mistake. [redacted] stated that was not his business and again stated that he did not know [redacted] or Samir Khan, he had never heard the name [redacted] and he has never met with nor talked with either men. [redacted] continued by saying [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] advised that he might be able to recognize [redacted] if he was shown a picture of him. [redacted] stated that after what [redacted] he assumed that [redacted] might have done something with terrorists and that's why his passport was taken.

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] stated he did not tell anybody about the information he learned from [redacted] regarding Samir Khan or [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] was told the importance of being truthful and [redacted] again stated he has never met Samir Khan or [redacted] or at least he does not remember meeting with either of them, talking to either of them or sitting with either of them. [redacted] has never contacted Samir Khan or [redacted] for help. [redacted] further explained that he has never had any email [redacted] contact with Samir Khan or [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

b1  
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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 08/11/2010, Page 3

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] from the Plaza mosque. [redacted] met [redacted] approximately six or seven months after he started attending the mosque for prayer when [redacted] approached him and [redacted]  
[redacted] advised he called [redacted] at his residence on [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] advised that after the FBI conducted the interviews people were talking on [redacted] about Samir Khan and [redacted] and about being questioned by the FBI.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] explained that he would go to the Plaza mosque with [redacted] [redacted] stated he has been attending both the Plaza mosque and the Islamic Center of Charlotte (ICC) for three years.

b6  
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b7D

[redacted] advised that he does not know [redacted] from Ohio but stated that he knows [redacted]

b6  
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b7D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] advised [redacted] does not believe in killing Americans, that it is criminal and a violation of the religion. [redacted] stated he feels the same way.

b6  
b7C  
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b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that once he finishes his [redacted] he would like to try to get a [redacted] at [redacted] or Western Michigan and if he does not accomplish that, then he will return to Egypt.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised that he was married on [redacted] here in Charlotte, North Carolina. He has been [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b7C

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[redacted]

(S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/11/2010, Page 4

[redacted] Prior to this marriage, [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] lived in Detroit, MI for four months from May, 2008 to August 26, 2008. [redacted] was in Detroit working on a summer internship [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] While staying in Detroit, [redacted] Days Inn.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] arrived in the United States on [redacted] of [redacted]

[redacted] remembers that he recently went to [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

[redacted] provided the following names of people he knew at the ICC: [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] provided the following names of people he knew at the Plaza Mosque; [redacted] and [redacted] advised he [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised the last time he sat down and talked to [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] had two cellular telephones with him during the interview, [redacted] asked for and was given permission to look at the contacts in [redacted] cell phone that he had purchased approximately three weeks earlier. [redacted] noted [redacted] was listed in his contacts. [redacted] was asked why he would have [redacted] Samir Khan, in his contacts if he last talked to him between 7 and 9 months ago, and had no reason to ever call him in the future? [redacted] stated he must have transferred the number from his other phone and it was pointed out to him that he would have to type in the contacts on his own and it did not make sense that he would take the time to do that unless he intended on contacting him in the future. [redacted] was reminded that [redacted] is the

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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/11/2010, Page 5

b6  
b7C

[redacted] Samir Khan who has been the subject of local news reporting recently detailing his move to Yemen and his association with Anwar Al Awlaki a known terrorist. [redacted] stated he keeps up with the news but has not seen any news reports on Samir Khan. [redacted] further stated that he did not know [redacted] Samir Khan until he was told this information during the interview 2-3 weeks ago with the FBI.

b6  
b7C

Special Agent (SA) [redacted] entered the interview room and advised [redacted] that he was [redacted] his Egyptian Visa has been revoked. [redacted] advised this was the first that he has heard this information stating that the Egyptian government has not notified him of his visa status. [redacted] was shown a photograph of [redacted] by SA [redacted] and [redacted] advised that he may have seen the person in the photograph before but did not know who he was and he had never met or talked with him. SA [redacted] further questioned [redacted] regarding his association with Samir Khan and [redacted] and [redacted] provided the same information to SA [redacted] as he did to [redacted]

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At approximately 9:30 am on August 12, 2010, [redacted] called SA [redacted] stating that he remembered this morning that he may have seen the guy in the photograph at one of [redacted] Arabic classes, 8 or 9 months ago. [redacted] remembers there being an African American male [redacted] and when he was leaving the class the African American male asked [redacted] which [redacted] accepted. [redacted] advised the African American male was possibly driving a minivan and said that he lived near the University area at Mallard Creek. The African American male told [redacted] that he lives in a townhouse with his wife and they have a spare bedroom that they are looking to rent out, if he knew anybody. [redacted] stated he is only 40-50% sure that the African American male he remembers being [redacted] was the one in the photograph. [redacted] further stated that the African American male only showed up to [redacted]

b6  
b7C

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/09/2010

To:

[Redacted]

Charlotte

SSA  
SA  
SA  
SA  
SA  
SA  
SA  
SA

[Redacted] *my*

From:

[Redacted]

Contact: SA

[Redacted]

Approved By:

[Redacted] *DS*

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

:lec

Case ID #:

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

[Redacted] (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

[Redacted] (S)

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

Title:

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

[Redacted] (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

SAMIR ZAFAR KAHN  
GLOBAL EXTREMISM INSPIRED

~~(S)~~//~~(NF)~~

[Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

*RLS/My*

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
Re: (S//NF) [redacted] 08/09/2010

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b7E

(S//NF)

[redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

(S//NF)

[redacted]

(S)

(S//NF)

(S)

(S//NF)

(S)

Synopsis: (U) To document interview of captioned subject and claim statistical accomplishment.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350809~~

(U) Details: (S//NF) [redacted] (S)  
[redacted] was interviewed on July 28, 2010 in Charlotte, North Carolina.

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[redacted] (S)  
[redacted]  
located at [redacted], Apt [redacted], Charlotte, North Carolina, regarding the recent media attention of CE subject Samir Kahn, Kahn's involvement with Inspire magazine and each of the subject's personal associations with Kahn.

(X) At approximately 9:10AM on the above-referenced date, interviewing agents [redacted] and [redacted], of the FBI, advised [redacted] of their identities and the nature of the interview. The following information was provided by [redacted] during the interview [redacted] (S)

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b6  
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(U) [redacted] advised he did not have a cellular telephone number or an actual cellular telephone and that he could be contacted via email at [redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised he speaks English poorly and understands English even worse. He speaks Bosnian, which is his native language. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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b7C  
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] 08/09/2010

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b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] stated he has been living at the apartment with [redacted] and [redacted] but the three of them were moving out soon. [redacted] plans to move to Jacksonville, Florida in order to get his CDL driver's permit so he can begin to work as a truck driver. [redacted] advised he is currently unemployed but that he is going to Jacksonville, Florida to the Swift Trucking Company driving school. He said Swift was going to help to finance his driving school cost, which he stated was approximately \$3,900.

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(U) [redacted] told interviewing agents he previously worked at Washington Mutual, but while working there he sustained a back injury. He said he believed he injured his back due to sitting for long periods of time and then reaching for files. He informed Washington Mutual is no longer compensating him, although he did receive Workers Compensation for a period of 6 months after the injury.

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted] advised he is living in the United States under I94 Visa status. He originally came to the United States because he "had some problems in Bosnia", then went to Croatia before finally traveling to the US.

b6  
b7C

(U) [redacted] was questioned regarding how he met Samir Khan, subject of [redacted] [redacted] informed he first came to Charlotte, North Carolina in 2008 after meeting [redacted] He first met [redacted] through his cousin, [redacted] in Atlanta around this same time. Once he had come to Charlotte in 2008 he began attending the Mosque which is where he met Samir.

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(U) Interviewing agents asked [redacted] whether he associated with Samir Khan outside of the Mosque. Initially, [redacted] stated he did not associate with Samir Khan outside of the mosque, but he then admitted that they did attend lunches together outside the Mosque. [redacted] advised there were two types of prayers he attended, daily and weekly, and after some of these prayers he and a group of Mosque members would go out to lunch. [redacted] advised Samir Khan was one of these people.

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(U) [redacted] was asked whether Samir Khan had ever been in the apartment he shared with [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [REDACTED] From: [REDACTED]  
(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] 08/09/2010

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initially indicated Samir Khan had never been in the apartment. When asked again, [REDACTED] advised Samir Khan had been at the apartment "a couple of times." [REDACTED] was asked if he and Samir Khan had ever traveled together or went on a trip together, which [REDACTED] denied. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
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(U) [REDACTED] advised the last time he saw Samir Khan was sometime in late 2009, just before [REDACTED] went to Jacksonville, Florida to renew his CDL permit (he advised it expires every six months). [REDACTED] stated it was near the time of Thanksgiving and recalled running out of gas on Interstate 95 heading towards Jacksonville, Florida.

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b7C

(U) [REDACTED] was asked, to his knowledge, why Samir Khan left the United States. [REDACTED] stated he was told by [REDACTED] that Samir was going to Yemen to be a teacher at the University. He was asked whether he believed that reason, and [REDACTED] advised he did. [REDACTED] said, "Samir told me that he was going to University and that he had a friend that got him papers that got him to the University." [REDACTED] could not identify the name of this friend or describe further.

b6  
b7C

(U) [REDACTED] was asked to describe Samir Khan's belief system or world view. He stated that for all the years he knew Samir Khan, he had much difficulty in understanding him due to the speed in which Samir Khan spoke and [REDACTED] difficulty with the English language. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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b7C  
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[REDACTED] later stated Samir Khan had a "hardline" world view, but did not elaborate further.

(U) [REDACTED] was asked whether he had plans to stay in the United States. He stated he wished to stay in the United States because it was a "good opportunity" but even if he wanted to travel to Bosnia he couldn't until his paperwork was fixed. He informed his father had become ill and died suddenly some time ago but he couldn't travel there after he died because he would not be allowed to come back. He stated his refugee travel documentation needs to be fixed. [REDACTED] advised he wishes he could travel though as he has [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [REDACTED] From: [REDACTED]  
(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] 08/09/2010

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(U) [REDACTED] was asked whether he had read the articles published in the past week or so by the New York Daily News or the Charlotte Observer regarding Samir Khan. [REDACTED] stated that he had not. [REDACTED] was given a copy of the New York Daily News article titled "Former New Yorker Samir Khan behind graphics of new Al Qaeda recruiting magazine Inspire".

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[REDACTED] read the article in its entirety and at one point read aloud in English "Inspire" and then asked "What is that?" [REDACTED] advised he had never heard of "Inspire" nor had he ever read it prior to the interview. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] was asked whether he was aware that Samir Khan had a blog and published previous magazines. [REDACTED] stated "they told me Samir had a blog" but he denied ever having seen the blog and stated he had never read it. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised he had a computer with access to the internet but that he used it primarily to read Bosnian news websites. He provided the following websites as the ones that he frequents: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] was given a copy of Inspire magazine. He stated he had seen the cover before and heard about it on some Bosnian news website. He was asked why he earlier told the interviewing agents he had never heard of Inspire. He informed he had meant that he never heard Samir was implicated with Inspire, and that the Bosnian news website had just stated Inspire was the first English al-Qa'ida magazine.

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(U) [REDACTED] was asked whether he believed Samir Khan published Inspire. He stated "I don't know."

b6  
b7C

(U) [REDACTED] was asked to describe who Samir Khan's friends were. In [REDACTED] opinion, Samir Khan did not have many friends, possibly due to his parents. [REDACTED] did not elaborate further. He advised Samir Khan's friends were [REDACTED] me, [REDACTED]. He stated he had another friend who was a black convert to Islam who he believed was named [REDACTED]. He stated there was also a friend named [REDACTED] who he described as a black male. [REDACTED] was asked whether [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

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To: [REDACTED] From: [REDACTED]  
(S) Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] 08/09/2010

[REDACTED] advised he did not know anyone by the name [REDACTED]

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(U) [REDACTED] was asked whether he knew Samir Khan's family. He stated that he met Samir Khan's [REDACTED] at the Mosque and also knew [REDACTED] Samir's [REDACTED] and he is a nice guy. Samir Khan's [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was asked whether he has ever had any telephonic or email contact with either the [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] stated that he had no such contact with them. [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] informed the first time he met [REDACTED] was in 2008. At that time, he thought [REDACTED] was "small and young." He stated that [REDACTED] is in University now. [REDACTED] advised he is friends with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] comes to the apartment sometimes.

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(U) [REDACTED] was asked whether [REDACTED] is like [REDACTED] Samir Khan. [REDACTED] stated he used to see Samir Khan at the Mosque and that "he never thought he was like this" [NFI]. He informed [REDACTED] is like a normal American kid who likes movies and video games. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has never mentioned wanting to travel to meet up with Samir Khan in Yemen.

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(U) [REDACTED] advised he has not spoken to [REDACTED] in two or three months, since the last time he went to Kentucky. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] told agents he goes to Kentucky because there is a large Bosnian community there as well as a trucking company that he may be interested in working for. [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] was asked about his relationship to [REDACTED] He stated that he knows little about [REDACTED] other than he works on a ship for months at a time and then comes home for a few weeks. He stated that [REDACTED] and is married to a Pakistani woman. [REDACTED] was shown the article titled "Language Barrier" on page 45 of Inspire magazine. [REDACTED] read most of the article to himself but briefly read aloud, in English, "A friend of mines who went for jihad in Afghanistan..."

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

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To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(S) Re: (~~S~~/~~MF~~) [redacted] 08/09/2010

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He informed that [redacted] has "back problems" but did not know how he sustained the injury. [redacted] said [redacted] has given him advice on how to stretch his back to alleviate the pain.

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b7C

(U) [redacted] was asked his personal opinion and view of jihad. He gave a long account of the struggles his father and grandfather sustained in Bosnia at the hands of the "communists." When asked whether he believed in defensive jihad he stated "yes."

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b7C

(U) [redacted] was asked whether he personally believed that the United States was his enemy. He stated "No, how can I believe such a thing when you helped us in Bosnia? I would be a hypocrite." [redacted]  
[redacted]

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Interview was concluded at approximately 10:15AM.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [REDACTED] From: [REDACTED]  
Re: ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED] 08/09/2010

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**Accomplishment Information:**

Number: 1  
Type: INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT (CONTACT [REDACTED]) (S)  
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

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b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: [REDACTED] From: [REDACTED]  
(S) Re: (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [REDACTED] 08/09/2010

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE

(U) (~~S~~) For information only. Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-13-2017

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
(CE) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (CE)(FBI)  
Sent: Friday, September 03, 2010 11:55 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)  
Cc: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)  
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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IA [REDACTED]  
Charlotte Division

[REDACTED]  
(O)  
(C)

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten signature]*

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/14/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]  
IA [redacted]  
SOS [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

From: [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *TH*

Drafted By: [redacted]

:dld *W*

*257 dld h upl*

Case ID #: (U) [redacted]

(U) Title: (X) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U) Synopsis: (X) To document an attempt to interview [redacted]  
[redacted] Samir Zafar Khan, subject of the above case.

b6  
b7C

~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350914~~

b3  
b7E

Reference: (U) [redacted]

Details: (U) On 09/13/2010, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contacted [redacted], date of birth [redacted], California Drivers License Number [redacted] at her home address [redacted] Apartment [redacted], San Jose, California. Before locating [redacted] at her home address, Agents determined from Stanford University Staff that [redacted] no longer works at the University.

b6  
b7C

(U) After being advised that the purpose of the interview was simply to discuss matters surrounding the circumstances of [redacted] media attention. [redacted] cordially declined to speak to the Agents without the presence of her legal council.

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~~SECRET~~

To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 09/14/2010

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b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-13-2017

b6  
b7C

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of transcription 08/25/2010

[REDACTED] dob: [REDACTED], was interviewed at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] BOOST MOBILE: 616 West Roosevelt Boulevard,  
Monroe, NC 28110. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED]  
provided the following information:

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b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he has been to the ICC recently and  
has not heard any new information regarding SAMIR KHAN or [REDACTED]  
He stated that he knew KHAN was in the news but that was all he  
knew about the situation. [REDACTED] advised that he was not aware of  
any discussions about KHAN or [REDACTED] at the ICC recently.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he knew an individual by the name  
[REDACTED]. He stated that [REDACTED] is from Egypt, is studying in  
Charlotte and prays at the ICC mosque. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]  
knew KHAN because they prayed at the same mosque. On more than one  
occasion [REDACTED] had seen [REDACTED] and KHAN standing together in a  
group talking with people after prayer at the mosque.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he was not aware of any issues in the  
Charlotte Muslim community related to discrimination. He stated  
that he was focused on RAMADAN and he hadn't had much time to  
discuss outside issues with anyone.

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b7C

8/25/2010 Monroe, North Carolina

Investigation on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_

File # \_\_\_\_\_

Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

8/25/2010

by SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~//~~ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (B,C,D)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 10-04-2018

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/27/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted] A/UC [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]  
IA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Attn: [redacted]  
UC [redacted]  
SSA [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]  
UC [redacted]

Attn: [redacted]

Attn: [redacted] SSA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
IA [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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Charlotte

Attn: Squad [redacted] SSA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

International Operations

Attn: [redacted] SSA [redacted]  
IA [redacted]

From: [redacted]  
Contact: [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]:rgdp

(U) Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (S)  
(U) (S) [redacted]

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b7E

(U) Title: (S) ANWAR NASSAR AULAQI  
CT-SUNNI EXTRMISM - MIDDLE EAST

(U) (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
IT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(S) [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~ORCON~~ [redacted] (S)

FILE

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/15/2010

To: CTD

Attn:

SSA

Attn:

Attn:

Attn: SA

Attn:

Attn:

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[Redacted]

✓ Charlotte

[Redacted]

From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

: mtd

Case ID #:

(U)

(S)

Title:

(S)

(S)

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(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - Global Extremist Inspired

Synopsis:

(S)

[Redacted]

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Derived from: FBI NSISCG-20080301

Declassify On: 09/15/2035

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(U)

Reference:

(S)

(S)

Administrative:

(S)

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FILE

*[Handwritten signature]*

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To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
(S) Re: (X) [REDACTED] 09/15/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) For information only.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTER TERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) For information only.

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Set Lead 3: (Info)

[REDACTED]  
AT [REDACTED]

(U) For information only.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-13-2017

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- 1 -

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/30/2010

[redacted] white male, date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] place of birth Brooklyn, New York, residence [redacted]  
[redacted] Apartment [redacted] Charlotte, North Carolina (NC) 28215, cellular  
telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at his residence by  
[redacted] and SA [redacted] who  
was advised of the identities of [redacted] and SA [redacted] and  
the purpose of the interview, provided the following information:

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[redacted] has not seen and has no knowledge of the latest  
news reports about Samir Khan. [redacted] does not watch and has no  
interest in the news. When advised by the interviewing [redacted] SA that  
it is being reported in the news that Khan is currently in Yemen  
and is reportedly editing an on-line magazine associated with al-  
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Khan had no prior knowledge of  
this, although these reports do not surprise [redacted] based upon what  
Khan has been saying. [redacted] heard that Khan is causing a lot of  
trouble, and [redacted] believes that Khan is bringing a negative  
influence to Islam and that everything Khan says is garbage.

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[redacted] heard from someone, name not recalled, about six  
months ago that Khan had traveled overseas to study. However,  
[redacted] did know the specifics as to which country Khan traveled or  
what he was studying. In anticipation of his travel, Khan was  
selling his car and laptop; so it looked like he was traveling  
overseas to stay.

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[redacted] and Khan are not friends. In fact, [redacted] never  
liked Khan. [redacted] brother, [redacted] and Khan were  
friends; and it was through [redacted] that [redacted] knew Khan. [redacted]  
has only talked to Khan a few times, and whenever they met, Khan  
was with [redacted] never met Khan by himself, and they only  
met at The Plaza Mosque.

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The last time [redacted] talked to Khan was about eight  
months ago at The Plaza Mosque when [redacted] asked Khan if his car  
was for sale. [redacted] and Khan did not discuss why Khan was selling  
the car because their relationship was not the type that Khan would  
share such information with [redacted] Khan wanted about \$8000.00 for  
his 2006 Honda Civic, which was too much money for [redacted] so he

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Investigation on 07/28/2010 at Charlotte, North Carolina

File # [redacted] (S) Date dictated N/A

by [redacted] & SA [redacted]

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1954  
(19)

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[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 07/28/2010, Page 2

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[redacted] did not buy the car. [redacted] advised that it was [redacted] who told [redacted] that the car was for sale.

In all, [redacted] met or talked with Khan about five or six times at The Plaza Mosque. They never met at [redacted] apartment or met with each other socially outside of the mosque.

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Regarding Khan's worldview, Khan talked about violence in the name of Islam; and he talked a lot about politics and about how we have to do this or we have to do that. For example, to get this accomplished, we have to chop someone's hands off. However, when the interviewing [redacted] SA questioned [redacted] further about this statement, [redacted] advised that Khan never made this specific statement; this was just an example of the type of things Khan would say. When the interviewing [redacted] SA asked [redacted] to be more specific about what Khan said, [redacted] was unable to provide specific examples and noted that this was the impression that Khan left with [redacted] based upon what he overheard Khan talk about. [redacted] explained that maybe he overheard Khan talking about such things while [redacted] was in another room at the mosque. The impression that Khan left with [redacted] was violence in the name of Islam because all Khan talked about was violence and jihad and terrorism. However, Khan never tried to recruit [redacted] to his views.

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[redacted] never heard Khan talk about personally engaging in violence or terrorism. To [redacted] Khan was just a talker. [redacted] told [redacted] that Khan had a web site that a lot of people looked at, and about a year ago, [redacted] showed [redacted] the first page of Khan's blog. However, [redacted] has not heard Khan's name in about six to seven months.

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As far as [redacted] knows, Khan did not know anyone who participated in jihad, referring to external, violent jihad, as opposed to internal jihad; and [redacted] believes that anyone who participates in such jihad should be imprisoned.

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The interviewing [redacted] SA provided [redacted] with page forty-five (45) from *Inspire* (Summer 1431|2010) and directed [redacted] attention to the paragraph at the bottom of the page that begins, "A friend of mines..." [redacted] was asked to review the paragraph, after which he was asked if he knew the individual being referred to in the paragraph. [redacted] did not. When the interviewing [redacted] SA noted that the FBI has reason to believe that this is a reference

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[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/28/2010, Page 3

to [redacted] had no idea if this was a reference to [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] has spoken to [redacted] at The Plaza Mosque, and [redacted] knows [redacted] through [redacted] and Khan. According to [redacted] and Khan are buddies. [redacted] has known [redacted] for about six to seven months and has only seen him around the mosque, but they are not friends, although [redacted] may be [redacted] friend. [redacted] has never socialized with [redacted] outside of the mosque.

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Regarding [redacted] awareness of overseas travel by [redacted] in 2006-2007, [redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted] traveled to Afghanistan or Pakistan and was [redacted]

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However, [redacted] does not know why [redacted] traveled overseas or what he was doing overseas, although [redacted] heard from someone else, name not recalled, that [redacted] liked living over there. [redacted] never heard about nor was he aware of any injuries [redacted] sustained while overseas, and other than [redacted] does not know of anyone else who knows about [redacted] overseas travel. [redacted] has never spoken about going overseas again or leaving the US.

[redacted] and Khan appear to be friends, [redacted] at The Plaza Mosque. However, [redacted] does not know if they share the same views. [redacted] did not talk about violence in the name of Islam like Khan, and [redacted] never heard [redacted] express the same views toward jihad as Khan.

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[redacted] did not know [redacted] well enough to know [redacted] other friends and associates. The only friends and associates of [redacted] that [redacted] knew of were Khan and [redacted]

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When asked if he knew Khan's [redacted] thought that Khan's [redacted] was named [redacted] has said hello to [redacted] at The Plaza Mosque. It was about six or seven months ago that [redacted] last saw [redacted] and [redacted] saw [redacted] for the first time about one year ago. [redacted] has said hello to [redacted] about six or seven times and that is the extent of [redacted] relationship with [redacted] does not know if [redacted] shares a similar view with regards to jihad as Khan, and [redacted] has never known [redacted] to express an interest in participating in jihad.

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[redacted]  
Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 07/28/2010, Page 4

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[redacted] has no knowledge of [redacted] being interested in traveling to visit Khan or of [redacted] planning any foreign travel.

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The interviewing [redacted]/SA provided [redacted] with a news article from *The Charlotte Observer* entitled, "Myrick: U.S. failed to halt area jihadist," and allowed [redacted] to read the article. After reading the article, [redacted] noted that this article was not good for the Muslims in Charlotte and that it makes it difficult for someone like [redacted] whose name is [redacted] heard that Khan's [redacted] and others at the mosque had tried to talk to Khan. [redacted] noted that Khan needs to be dealt with.

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Attached herewith and made apart of this report is a photocopy of the above news article.

The interviewing [redacted]/SA commented that [redacted] appeared to have lost quite a bit of weight, and [redacted] confirmed that he had. [redacted] is trying to live a healthy life and has begun exercising, namely jogging, and is eating healthy.

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[redacted] is a student at [redacted] - [redacted] and plans to major in science and math. [redacted] is currently [redacted] on the Internet through such sites as Ebay.

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[redacted] has lived in Charlotte for about one year and moved to Charlotte from Carteret, New Jersey (NJ). [redacted] was born in Brooklyn, New York (NY), but he was raised mostly in New Jersey, although he has lived in other states.


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[redacted] current cell phone number is [redacted] although that number may change. If it does, [redacted] will notify the interviewing [redacted]/SA, whose contact information was provided to [redacted]

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DATE 04-13-2017 BY  

Comments (84) |  Recommend (0)

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## Myrick: U.S. failed to halt area jihadist

**Sources say Charlotte man is editing an online magazine in Yemen that recruits for al-Qaida.**

By Jim Morrill  
jmorrill@charlotteobserver.com  
Posted: Wednesday, Jul. 21, 2010

U.S. Rep. Sue Myrick Tuesday faulted the U.S. intelligence community for failing to see a connection between a terrorist group and a radical Charlotte blogger now believed to edit an al-Qaida magazine in Yemen.

Meanwhile a spokesman for local Muslims said he and others met with Samir Khan at least twice in 2007 in an unsuccessful effort to steer him away from supporting terrorism.

Intelligence sources told national news organizations Monday that they believe Khan is the top editor of "Inspire," an online magazine designed as a recruiting tool for the group al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

Myrick, a Republican member of the House Intelligence Committee, told the Observer she's frustrated.

"It becomes clear to me that he had contacts with al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula while he was in the U.S.," she said. "And if that's the case, the intelligence community should have been able to discover that. And if they knew it and didn't do something, that raises more red flags."

'Rewards from Allah'

Khan, about 24, is a Saudi-born U.S. citizen whose family moved to New York City when he was 7 and to North Carolina in 2004.

He's a former Central Piedmont Community College student who in 2005 started a blog called "Inshallahshaheed," or "a martyr soon if God wills." It was the first of a succession of blogs he edited from the suburban home in northeast Charlotte that he shared with his parents.

According to a 2007 New York Times story, one blog featured "glad tidings" from a North African militant whose group had massacred 31 Algerian troops. Links connected readers to sites where they could get insurgent videos from Iraq.

"I will do my best to speak the truth," he told the Times, "and even if it annoys the disbelievers, the truth must be preached."

A few months later, responding to a letter in the Observer about Muslims' view of women, he wrote his own letter to the editor.

"Muhammad said, 'This world is a prison for the believer and a paradise for the disbeliever,'" he wrote. "Our women who die upon Islam will receive rewards from Allah which no eye has ever seen ... In Paradise, Satan won't exist so evil thoughts won't ever exist."

#### Intervention attempt

Jibril Hough, spokesman for the Islamic Center of Charlotte, said local Muslims grew alarmed at Khan's increasing radicalization. A group of men influential in the Muslim community - including Khan's father - twice met with him at Hough's southwest Charlotte home.

"We were trying to give him good advice, tell him he was going down the wrong road," said Hough. "He didn't listen."

Hough said even an Imam from Raleigh tried to intervene with Khan.

"Our counseling didn't look like it made that great of an impact," Hough said.

Bill Warner is a private detective in Sarasota, Fla., who tracks jihadist web sites. He followed Khan's postings closely. He said he tried unsuccessfully to get authorities to shut them.

"It's unbelievable," said Warner, who was featured in a 2008 WBTV report on Khan. "Now it's going to be a bigger problem. He's going to have a worldwide audience now. ... They had more than one opportunity to shut him down."

FBI spokeswoman Amy Thoreson said although she can't comment on specific cases, blogs are protected by the First Amendment.

"If someone is not acting on something, they're allowed to say it," she said. "The moment people act on something is when it crosses the line."

Khan is believed to have gone to Yemen in 2009.

Myrick argues that his association with al-Qaida didn't happen overnight.

"If you don't have contacts, they don't take strangers into their midst," she said. "This is a closed society. Unless they know you, they don't trust you. Somewhere along the line there were connections."

Jim Morrill: 704-358-5059



Subscribe to The Charlotte Observer.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/26/2010

[REDACTED], a white male; date of birth [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Charlotte, North Carolina; cellular telephone  
number [REDACTED] home telephone number [REDACTED] was  
interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] at Panera  
Bread, 1904 Matthews Township, Charlotte, North Carolina. After  
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the  
nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following  
information:

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[REDACTED] advised that he and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Images for Life. [REDACTED]  
identified [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] stated that both he and his wife have full-time  
employment and [REDACTED] Images for Life [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] provided a business card which has been  
submitted to the file via FD-340.

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[REDACTED] stated that in 2007, he was contacted by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] via telephone regarding her upcoming wedding and the  
possibility of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was introduced to him through his mother-in-  
law's friend [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] attended  
graduate school with [REDACTED] at the time. [REDACTED] stated that he  
met with [REDACTED] two or three times via telephone regarding  
negotiating the service and that he recalled meeting her at least  
once face-to-face, and that he believed that [REDACTED] attended  
that face-to-face meeting as well. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was a young woman approximately [REDACTED] age, and that he  
believed that the two were cousins. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and her husband moved to San Jose, California along with  
[REDACTED] and her husband and that he thought that was interesting.  
[REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] husband ran some form of  
import/export business but he couldn't recall how he came by this  
information.

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[REDACTED] advised that he was contracted to provide [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] for [REDACTED] wedding which occurred  
approximately May 2007, wedding reception which occurred  
approximately June 2007, and that he also provided [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] which occurred in July 2007. [REDACTED] did  
not maintain any record of who attended the wedding, nor did he

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Investigation on 8/25/2010 at Charlotte, North Carolina

File # [REDACTED] Date dictated 8/26/2010

by SA [REDACTED]: cpp

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 8/25/2010 , Page 2

[REDACTED] have any list of individuals that were [REDACTED] for mailing list purposes. [REDACTED] believed that many of the same people attended both the [REDACTED] wedding and reception, as well as the [REDACTED] event. [REDACTED] advised that he believed that some of the people who attended were from New York. He stated that he recalls [REDACTED] stating that she was excited because her "Queen's girls" were coming to the wedding.

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[REDACTED] advised that since he provided the [REDACTED] in 2007, he and his wife became aware of the identity of SAMIR KHAN (S.KHAN) through various news articles. [REDACTED] advised that he contacted the FBI because he felt based upon recent articles regarding S.KHAN in Yemen, that it was important to provide what he had. [REDACTED] advised that he had a DVD-R disk with all the [REDACTED] that he could locate from [REDACTED] reception which was held at the Oasis Shrine Temple in Charlotte, North Carolina. [REDACTED] stated that he also would be providing the interviewing agent with an email which contained hyperlinks to other [REDACTED] that he had for the [REDACTED] wedding and reception, and [REDACTED] he had for [REDACTED] wedding. A copy of the DVD-r disk has been submitted to the file via FD-340.

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[REDACTED] stated that he remembers S.KHAN from [REDACTED] wedding and reception because he [REDACTED] at the Plaza Mosque. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] wedding was held at the Plaza Mosque, and that he and his wife arrived there in order to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that when he and his wife entered the Mosque, he was unaware that they were supposed to take their shoes off. According to [REDACTED] S.KHAN [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] believed that S.KHAN "looked like a terrorist." He described S.KHAN as wearing dark clothes, a knitted "skull cap", and possessing a "scraggly beard." [REDACTED] believed that S.KHAN was not pleased that he and his wife were at the Mosque. According to [REDACTED] S.KHAN rarely smiled except for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that after the events, and while he and his wife were reviewing [REDACTED] for completion, that they commented that S.KHAN "looked like the iconic terrorist that you imagine on the cover of Time Magazine." [REDACTED] further stated that S.KHAN's [REDACTED] and helped to explain why taking off shoes is important to Muslims.

[REDACTED] did not recall the name of [REDACTED] Khan [REDACTED] but described him as approximately [REDACTED] at the time.

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 8/25/2010, Page 3

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He stated that the \_\_\_\_\_ appeared well adjusted and western in his appearance. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he wore a suit and

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According to \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ advised that the first event he \_\_\_\_\_ was \_\_\_\_\_ wedding approximately May 2007. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that at the Mosque, initially the men and women were separated in the gymnasium by a curtain. \_\_\_\_\_ and his

\_\_\_\_\_ Later, according to \_\_\_\_\_, there was a prayer and then all were joined. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that while

\_\_\_\_\_ nothing out of the ordinary occurred to him. He stated that nobody intentionally tried to get out of \_\_\_\_\_ advised

that he \_\_\_\_\_ S.KHAN sitting at a table with other males.

\_\_\_\_\_ advised that he felt "uncomfortable" when around S.KHAN [NFI].

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\_\_\_\_\_ stated that after \_\_\_\_\_ wedding, that he and his wife traveled to \_\_\_\_\_ father's house. \_\_\_\_\_ could not recall \_\_\_\_\_ father's name but described his residence as a big

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\_\_\_\_\_ further described \_\_\_\_\_ father as an older middle eastern male, short and stocky, with a greying beard and wearing traditional clothing. \_\_\_\_\_ advised that

\_\_\_\_\_ because as \_\_\_\_\_ recalls it, the father \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that based upon his observations of the father at the wedding that was held at the Plaza Mosque, that the father \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ did not believe that S.KHAN was at the residence at this time as he did not recall seeing him there. \_\_\_\_\_ advised that he and his wife stayed on the first floor \_\_\_\_\_ people in the living room area of the house.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not see anything out of the ordinary and stated that if you didn't know the \_\_\_\_\_ you would have thought the house belonged to any western family.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not recall how \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, but he believes it was likely a check from her mother.

\_\_\_\_\_ confirmed that he and his wife only \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that there was a videographer who he believed was a vendor at the \_\_\_\_\_ wedding but that he did not recall which professional service. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that the only vendor he recalls from the

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[redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted]

, On 8/25/2010

, Page

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events was Taste of Bombay at [redacted] reception at the Oasis Shrine Temple.

[redacted]

had no other additional information to provide.

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FD-542 (Rev. 03-23-2009)

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/15/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: [redacted] *py*

From: [redacted] *U*

Contact: IOA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted] *dm*

Drafted By: [redacted]

: cea

(U) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(U) Title: (S) SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (S) [redacted] (S)

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20090615  
Declassify On: 20350915

(U) (S) [redacted]

(U) Reference: [redacted]

Details: (S) [redacted] (S)

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(U) To: Charlotte From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted], 09/15/2010

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(U) Lead [redacted] and [redacted] covered.

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To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
(U) Re: (S) [REDACTED], 09/15/2010

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Accomplishment Information:

Number: 2  
Type [REDACTED] (S)  
ITU: [REDACTED]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED]  
Squad: [REDACTED]

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To: Charlotte From: [REDACTED]  
(U) Re: (S) [REDACTED], 09/15/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) Read and clear.

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COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT

# CTC SENTINEL

OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS

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By Philip Mudd

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## About the CTC Sentinel

The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the Center's global network of scholars and practitioners to understand and confront contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

## Evaluating the Al-Qa`ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland

By Philip Mudd



**I**N THE NINE years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the counterterrorism campaign in the United States has changed remarkably. In the initial years after 9/11, the primary counterterrorism concern was the presence of more al-Qa`ida-directed terrorists on U.S. soil. Focus was concentrated on preventing a weapon of mass destruction strike, a second coordinated mass transit attack, or a cell directed against a different infrastructure target. As time passed, the United States was able to avoid another al-Qa`ida-directed attack on U.S. soil as a result of good counterterrorism work, combined with a lack of capacity on the part of al-Qa`ida's central leadership.

Nevertheless, in recent years the United States has faced plots from individuals in Texas, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina and other states. In contrast to the 19 hijackers on 9/11,

however, many of the recent terrorist plotters are U.S.-born Muslims or converts, with few, if any, links to al-Qa`ida's central leadership. Al-Qa`ida's revolutionary message, starting with the group's inception more than two decades ago and manifest in its 1998 *fatwa* against the United States, has clearly reached U.S. shores. Although al-Qa`ida is often viewed strictly operationally, its use of terrorism is only a tactic and the group's primary mission is to inspire a much broader movement of affiliated organizations and like-minded individuals to see the United States as the main target for attack. For al-Qa`ida, the purpose of the 9/11 attacks was not only to cause a massive loss of life, but to show the world that the United States is vulnerable. By revealing U.S. weakness, al-Qa`ida hoped to inspire more attacks, causing the United States to reduce its support for governments across the Islamic world. This reduction

in support would theoretically reduce the capabilities of "corrupt" regimes in Muslim countries and unleash a wave of Islamist revolutions.

This article reviews al-Qa`ida's present threat to the U.S. homeland. It looks at the evolution of the threat from 9/11—including the rise of affiliated organizations and independent actors—and the problems faced by al-Qa`ida's central organization in orchestrating attacks in the United States.

#### Current Threat Pattern

##### Core Threat

Despite rising threats from groups outside al-Qa`ida's core leadership, the risk from al-Qa`ida central persists. The recent case of Najibullah Zazi and his plot against New York City's subway system clearly shows that al-Qa`ida's core leadership, despite substantial losses, remains intent on striking critical infrastructure—especially transportation—in U.S. population centers.<sup>1</sup> Even in the case of centrally directed plots, the threat has morphed. First of all, judging from recent plots, it does not appear that al-Qa`ida is planning attacks as sophisticated as the 9/11 events. Second, in cases where individuals are directly tied to al-Qa`ida's central leadership, they are not typically directed out from the center of action (Pakistan/Afghanistan), but are instead drawn into it. Once they are drawn in, they receive training from al-Qa`ida operatives before being sent on a terrorist operation. Zazi, for example, was a legal resident of the United States, and it was not until 2008 that he conspired with others in New York to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.<sup>2</sup> It was only after he arrived in Pakistan that he came into contact with al-Qa`ida recruiters, who then moved him through training camps.<sup>3</sup> Cases such

as Zazi's—where individuals with no previous contact with al-Qa`ida seek out terrorist operatives on their own accord—show how al-Qa`ida's revolutionary ideology has spread globally.

##### Affiliates

Al-Qa`ida central now has a number of affiliated organizations that maintain links to the core leadership, yet largely operate on their own. These affiliates include al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

**"The rise of the ideologically inspired means that even as the strategic threat from al-Qa`ida declines, the number of people absorbing the ideology has broadened the threat, both operationally and geographically."**

(TTP), among others. A significant question for the counterterrorism community is whether members of the affiliate network will use time and safe havens—in locations such as Yemen, the Horn of Africa, or the Sahel—to generate new plots.

During the past year, the ripple effect of these affiliates' absorption of al-Qa`ida's emphasis on the "far enemy" (the United States) can be seen. First, the case of David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American, reveals an "A-level" plotter who operated in the United States. Headley was involved with plotting attacks for Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LT, or LeT), a South Asian terrorist group that has at least some ties to al-Qa`ida. Headley, who was born in Washington, D.C. and most recently lived in Chicago, was arrested in October 2009 in the

weapons. During the training, al-Qaeda leaders asked Zazi and others to return to the United States and conduct suicide operations. They agreed. Zazi later received additional training from al-Qaeda on constructing the explosives for the planned attacks in the United States."

United States for involvement in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and for plotting against employees of a newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark.<sup>4</sup>

Second, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who studied at a university in London, attempted to detonate explosives on a Northwest Airlines commercial aircraft just outside Detroit on December 25, 2009.<sup>5</sup> Subsequent investigations revealed that al-Qa`ida's Yemen affiliate, AQAP, was behind the plot, showing its intent and capability to direct operations within the United States.<sup>6</sup>

Third, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sponsored Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-American who lived in Connecticut, to undertake an attack in New York City's Times Square on May 1, 2010. In July, video footage emerged of Faisal Shahzad embracing Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of the TTP.<sup>7</sup> Pakistan's interior minister, Rehman Malik, told reporters that Shahzad "visited Pakistan seven times and he met Hakimullah Mehsud and also met other people, those so-called leaders of the Taliban."<sup>8</sup>

These incidents represent three operatives from al-Qa`ida affiliates, none directed by al-Qa`ida's central leadership yet all operating in either the United States or the United Kingdom.

##### Like-Minded

There has also been a surge in the third prong of plotters who represent the spread of al-Qa`ida's ideology from the core group and its affiliates to new recruits who are inspired but not trained by the group. These represent unaffiliated "like-mindeds," individuals or clusters of individuals on U.S. soil. Like-mindeds have played significant roles in the al-Qa`ida revolution elsewhere; the numbers of solitary foreign fighters crossing from Syria into Iraq earlier this decade are evidence, similar to the arrival of foreign fighters in Chechnya, Bosnia, Somalia,

4 Andrew Stern, "David Headley Pleads Guilty in Mumbai Attack, Danish Plot," Reuters, March 19, 2010.

5 "Video Shows Christmas Day Bomber Abdulmutallab," CBS/Associated Press, April 27, 2010.

6 Ibid.

7 "Pakistan Acknowledges Faisal Shahzad Met Taliban Chief," *Dawn*, July 26, 2010.

8 Ibid.

1 For details on the Najibullah Zazi case, see "Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda," press release, U.S. Department of Justice, February 22, 2010.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, "Although Zazi and others initially intended to fight on behalf of the Taliban, they were recruited by al-Qaeda shortly after arriving in Peshawar. Al-Qaeda personnel transported Zazi and others to the Waziristan region of Pakistan and trained them on several different kinds of

and elsewhere. There is now a similar phenomenon of individuals signing up for the cause in Texas (Hosam Smadi), Illinois (Michael Pinton), and New Jersey (the Fort Dix plot).

#### Broadened Threat

The rise of the ideologically inspired means that even as the strategic threat from al-Qa`ida declines—the likelihood of a 9/11-style attack has dropped markedly as a result of security operations worldwide—the number of people absorbing the ideology has broadened the threat, both operationally and geographically. As the core group suffers—and perhaps eventually dies off—the broader movement is alive and well, and the sheer numbers of like-minded suggest that one of the plots in the United States will succeed. Indeed, both the Abdulmutallab and Shahzad plots only failed due to mistakes made creating or detonating the explosive devices.

These affiliates and like-minded are harder to target with classic intelligence techniques than a centrally directed organization, and the geographic breadth and frequency of plots during the past two years are clear indicators of how far the revolutionary message has spread. The sophistication of the attackers will not reach what was witnessed nine years ago, but if the goal of the organization is continued recruitment—proving to potential donors and recruits that “al-Qa`idaism” remains relevant—a strike on the scale of the London transit attack in 2005 would be significant to their cause.

The proven presence of plotters from affiliated groups—LT, AQAP, or the Pakistani Taliban—during the past two years is perhaps the most significant evolution of the threat faced during this period. The Detroit airliner and Times Square attempts represent a rare and significant step by an ideological affiliate of al-Qa`ida to show intent and capability to reach into the United States, the first time an affiliate has succeeded since 9/11. Meanwhile, as LT targeting indicates its slow move into al-Qa`ida's ideological orbit, Headley's ability to operate in the United States underscores that group's capabilities should it decide to attack within U.S. borders.<sup>9</sup>

The emergence of affiliated groups—candidates might extend as far afield as AQIM or Southeast Asian remnants of Jemaah Islamiya—means that security services that might have previously focused on Pakistan's tribal areas as the center of training and plotting for attackers headed to Europe and North America must now assume that these emergent groups are conducting similar training, with a focus on the American heartland. The breadth of sophisticated, resource-intensive intelligence operations will have to grow. Trained operatives from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region will not be the sole, or even primary, source of bombing suspects.

In the midst of global economic pressures, Middle East tensions, Russia's re-emergence, the rise of China and India, and energy debates, the global scope of the al-Qa`ida revolutionary

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creep requires that security services, despite diversions, will have to maintain focus on the jihadist problem. Recent plots have implicated potential terrorists as far afield as North Carolina, New Jersey, Colorado, New York, Missouri, Virginia, Minnesota, Illinois, and Connecticut. All of these plots have involved overseas activities that require the assistance of foreign security services from Western Europe through the Balkans to Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Maintenance of the informal web of security service cooperation is labor intensive, and it grows more difficult as countries turn

group targeted Westerners, a change in the group's previous targeting pattern.

to new problems or threats. It will also remain expensive for the United States to conduct intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and military operations in these countries, as well as to support foreign governments with money, training, technology, and equipment to maintain the counterterrorism fight.

#### Successes

The years of this counterterrorism campaign have clearly improved the security capabilities of the many countries that are working tactical threat problems regularly. Domestic and international operations against terrorists are far more efficient and effective than they were when security services first escalated activities after 9/11. One of the unwritten success stories of the counterterrorism campaign in the United States is the evolution of threat management from inefficient coordination nine years ago to smooth processes today. Time, effort, resources, and practice have combined to make the United States better and safer. The same holds true overseas, from Indonesia to the United Kingdom.

The pace of operations against the central organization has heavily damaged its capability to plan long-term plots from a safe haven. Measuring the impact of every operational takedown is not productive. Yet the accruing numbers of operational players eliminated, coupled with a pace of operations during the past few years that has prevented the group from finding its feet, represents the most significant damage brought to al-Qa`ida to date. Maintaining this pace of operations over subsequent years would eventually cripple the core group.

The ideological missteps of the group and its affiliates since 9/11 have been more notable than its operational setbacks. Jihadists viewed the failures of the 1990s in Algeria and Egypt as the foundation for the evolution in thinking that led al-Qa`ida to argue that until the United States and other powers left the region, regimes would be able to weather the Islamist surge. The post-9/11 attacks, though, have been marked by the same alienation of local populations across the Islamic world that Algeria and Egypt experienced during the strife there. Attacks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and elsewhere resulted in declines in

<sup>9</sup> During LT's attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, the

support for the al-Qa`ida organization, its leadership, and the use of suicide bombing as a tactic.<sup>10</sup>

The organization is aware of its missteps but seems unable to control them. The now well-publicized intercepted exchanges between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi had the second-in-charge of al-Qa`ida warning his affiliate in Iraq to focus away from local casualties, a warning al-Zarqawi ignored.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, in 2008 al-Zawahiri publicly, in an internet session, chose as the first question to answer a request by a writer from Algeria to explain the justification for al-Qa`ida attacks that killed Muslims. Clearly, al-Qa`ida's thinkers, with now 20 years of experience in alienating populations in the countries they recruit and raise funds, understand that indiscriminate killings are undermining the spread of the very revolution they want to propagate. Yet they continue to do just that.

The debate about the killing of innocents has had a ripple effect on propagandists who have influence in the United States. Anwar al-`Awlaqi, the Yemeni-American cleric who has been implicated in a number of recent terrorist plots, supported the killing of military personnel at Fort Hood in 2009, as he did the attempted bombing of an airliner that landed in Detroit.<sup>12</sup> Yet in the latter case, he said that it would have been better had the target been military. Faisal Shahzad, too, obliquely referred to the debate about the killing of innocents in a quote attributed to him after his capture, suggesting that lower-level echelons of the movement are well aware that their killings have raised serious questions among scholars and potential recruits far down the ideological food chain.<sup>13</sup>

#### Current State

Today, the United States is experiencing continued al-Qa`ida plotting, coupled with threats from individuals and affiliated organizations that now target the U.S. homeland. The spread of the al-Qa`ida message in the United States was inevitable, and the range of plotters today matches the expansion of the movement elsewhere in the world, beyond individuals trained in Waziristan.

Yet the corrosive effect of al-Qa`ida's murder of so many innocents, including Muslim civilians, suggests that these plots are emerging even as the movement itself suffers, perhaps irreparably, from its own missteps. The United States will face attacks from affiliates and like-minded—the sheer volume of discrete plots makes a successful strike inevitable—but one strike will not herald the expansion of the movement, nor should it suggest that the counterterrorism campaign is losing ground. If anything, how the U.S. counterterrorism community responds to these strikes will play the most significant role in whether the movement's credibility continues to decline.

Nine years into this campaign, the core organization appears to be struggling; its followers, while dispersed and dangerous, are facing more questions about their tactics. Patience is the key. As the nine year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approaches, the United States is safer and the jihadist ideological wave has crested. Unfortunately, it will be years before those who believe in al-Qa`ida's message finally die off.

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## The Growing Danger from Radical Islamist Groups in the United States

By Paul Cruickshank

HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IS on the rise in the United States. During the last 15 months, there have been 23 cases of Americans and permanent U.S. residents—some 56 individuals in all—implicated in terrorist plots inspired or directed by al-Qa`ida and its affiliates.<sup>1</sup> This article argues that a significant reason behind this surge in incidents is the presence of Islamist groups openly and legally propagating extreme Islamist ideology in the United States.<sup>2</sup>

An emerging network of radical preachers, demagogues, bloggers, and activists are attempting to disseminate extremist ideas among Muslim youth in the United States. Largely excluded from the country's mosques, they spread their message on the streets, outside the mosque, in small gatherings in private residences, on campuses and above all online, taking full advantage of new social media platforms to maximize their reach. They are a loose constellation of individuals, but have a clear center of gravity in two extremist groups that

1 This tally by the author includes all public announcements between May 15, 2009 and August 15, 2010 of terrorism charges filed in the United States or overseas against U.S. citizens and permanent residents. It also includes the case of Samir Khan, a North Carolina resident, who is suspected of having linked up with al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen in October 2009. Khan has not been charged.

2 Groups such as ITS and RM that openly promote a radical ideology are of course just one of the concerns of counterterrorism officials tackling homegrown extremism. Many of those charged with terrorist activity in the United States have stayed clear of groups such as RM and ITS to keep themselves off the radar screens of counterterrorism agencies. Such "off-the-grid" radicals are the ones of most concern to U.S. counterterrorism officials. Young Americans are being exposed to radical messages in a variety of ways. Some have swapped online messages with radical clerics in the Middle East, such as Anwar al-`Awlaqi. Many have accessed radical propaganda directly from a wide variety of anonymously-run pro-al-Qa`ida websites. Much of it is more extreme than any of the postings on the ITS or RM sites. Yet the fact that ITS and RM have proselytized openly has arguably given them more power and reach than those doing so anonymously. Those interacting on social media sites presumably like to know with whom they are talking.

10 For details, see Juliana Menassee Horowitz, "Declining Support for bin Laden and Suicide Bombing," Pew Research Center, September 10, 2009.

11 "Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, July 9, 2005.

12 Patrick Goodenough, "Alleged Fort Hood Gunman a Hero, Says Islamic Cleric With Suspected 9/11 Links," CNSNews.com, November 9, 2009; "Abdulmutallab: Cleric Told Me to Bomb Jet," CBS/Associated Press, February 5, 2010.

13 AOL News, May 17, 2010.

operate freely and openly in New York City.<sup>3</sup>

The groups in question—the Islamic Thinkers Society (ITS) and Revolution Muslim (RM), both affiliated with the British extremist organization al-Muhajiroun—are increasingly appearing in counterterrorism investigations.<sup>4</sup> In June 2010, two New Jersey men linked to the groups were arrested on their way to New York's John F. Kennedy airport, allegedly to fight with the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab.<sup>5</sup> In July, Virginia resident Zachary Chesser, a prolific RM blogger, was arrested for allegedly planning to do the same.<sup>6</sup> Also in July it emerged that Samir Khan, who is from North Carolina and has close links to both groups, was suspected of being the driving force behind a new online English-language terrorism magazine called *Inspire*.<sup>7</sup> In August, yet another link emerged when Shaker Masri, a Chicago resident who claimed to know Chesser, was arrested on his way to allegedly fight jihad in Somalia.<sup>8</sup>

Although the leaders of ITS and RM are not suspected of operational involvement in any terrorist plots, a significant correlation has emerged between participation in the activities of these groups and U.S. homegrown terrorism. Seven of the 23 terrorism cases involving U.S. citizens and residents to emerge in the last 15 months have seen links between the suspects and these radical New York groups, suggesting that ITS and RM have contributed to Americans being radicalized toward violence. No such correlation exists for any other Islamist group openly operating in the

United States. This article will chart how the New York groups emerged, briefly profile their leaders, and explain the danger they now pose.

#### Catching the British Disease

According to U.S. counterterrorism officials, growing numbers of Americans are espousing violent Islamist views.<sup>9</sup> The United States, some analysts believe, is beginning to repeat the experience of the United Kingdom a decade ago.<sup>10</sup> In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a group of radical Islamist clerics—including the quartet of Egyptian cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, Syrian preacher Omar Bakri Mohammed, Jordanian firebrand Abu Qatada, and Jamaican extremist Abdullah al-Faisal—helped radicalize a generation of British youth, creating the largest concentration of pro-al-Qa`ida extremists in the West.<sup>11</sup>

9 For example, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano stated in a December 2009 interview that violent Islamist extremism was assumed to be a growing phenomenon in the United States. See "Napolitano: Homegrown Threats a Reality," CNN, May 14, 2010. Additionally, in a February 2010 interview, Mitch Silber, the NYPD's director of intelligence analysis, stated, "Radicalization is definitely on the rise in the United States." See Paul Cruickshank and Nic Robertson, "Analysis: The Spread of U.S. Homegrown Terrorism," CNN, May 13, 2010. That same month U.S. intelligence agencies said that they were concerned that inspirational supporters of al-Qa`ida, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, "will increasingly motivate individuals toward violent extremism [in the United States]." See Dennis C. Blair, "Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," February 2, 2010. 10 Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism official, July 2010.

11 The differing experiences of Britain and France illustrate the key role played by on-the-ground radicalizers in the emergence of radicalism. While there is arguably a higher level of socio-economic frustration and political-cultural alienation among French Muslims than their UK counterparts, there are lower levels of radicalism in France than across the English Channel, according to European counterterrorism officials. The reason is that there have been fewer radical clerics present to take advantage of such sentiment in France because of a longstanding zero-tolerance attitude by French authorities to such preachers because of the threat of attacks from Algerian terrorist groups. Until the July 7, 2005 London bombings, the United Kingdom by contrast allowed radical preachers to operate relatively freely on their soil, judging that they did not pose a threat to British national security. See Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, "Clerical Error: The Dangers of Tolerance," *The New Republic*, August 8, 2005.

For a variety of factors, such as better integration into mainstream society, American Muslims have been more resistant to such messages.<sup>12</sup> Yet recent polling data and the growing number of terrorism cases in the United States suggest that not all are immune.<sup>13</sup> As in every Western country, individuals who feel alienated and frustrated are more susceptible to radical ideologies. Even though those alienated constitute a smaller minority in the United States than in some European countries, their numbers are not insignificant in a population of more than two million American Muslims.<sup>14</sup> ITS and RM appear to be aggressively targeting this disaffected demographic, contributing toward growing radicalization in the United States.<sup>15</sup>

Most followers of these groups are so-called second and third generation Muslims or converts.<sup>16</sup> As in Europe, some of the children of Muslim immigrants have struggled for identity and purpose in the United States, making them vulnerable to radical preachers. The same has applied with

12 These factors include the high skill level of many Muslim immigrants, their relative economic success, the peaceful form of Islam being preached in nearly all American mosques and the melting pot culture of the United States.

13 "Muslim Americans," Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007. See also Paul Cruickshank, "The Domestic Terror Threat," *Newsweek*, November 20, 2009.

14 There are an estimated 2.4 million Muslims living in the United Kingdom (3.9% of the total population). See Richard Kerbaj, "Muslim Population 'Rising Ten Times Faster than Rest of Society,'" *Times*, January 30, 2009. While there are no official statistics, the Pew organization estimates that there are 2.35 million Muslims living in the United States (0.8% of the total population). See "Muslim Americans." Some studies estimate the U.S. Muslim population to be as high as seven million.

15 This observation is based on the author's own investigations into the activities of ITS and RM, biographical data assembled on their followers, and interviews with U.S. counterterrorism officials. Such groups can provide validation for individuals who have become self-radicalized by exposure to jihadist websites.

16 According to the NYPD, "the Islamic Thinkers Society (ITS) is an organization primarily composed of 2nd and 3rd generation college-age Americans of South Asian and Middle Eastern descent." See Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007. The author has also observed a significant number of converts at rallies organized by ITS and RM, an organization whose two founders were themselves converts.

3 This picture is drawn from personal interviews with U.S. counterterrorism officials between 2009-2010, the author's own investigative reporting, and personal interviews with leading figures within ITS and RM.

4 Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, "NJ. Suspects Attended Protests Organized by Radical Islamic Group," CNN, June 11, 2010.

5 Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, "Arrested Men Attended Protests Organized by Radical Islamic Group," CNN, June 12, 2010.

6 *U.S.A. v. Zachary Adam Chesser*, "Criminal Complaint," Eastern District of Virginia, 2010; Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism official, July 2010.

7 Paul Cruickshank, "US Citizen Believed to be Writing for Pro Al Qaeda Website Source Says," CNN, July 18, 2010.

8 *U.S.A. v. Shaker Masri*, "Criminal Complaint," Northern District of Illinois, 2010.



new converts because of their natural zeal and lack of grounding in the tenets of their religion.<sup>17</sup> The nature of those following groups such as ITS and RM was reflected in a 2007 Pew Research Center poll that found American-born Muslims twice as likely to support al-Qa`ida than those foreign-born.<sup>18</sup> According to Pew, seven percent of U.S.-born Muslims held a "favorable" view of al-Qa`ida in 2007, compared with only three percent of foreign-born Muslims.

#### Al-Muhajiroun America

If the United States is catching this British disease, UK radical preachers helped spread the contagion. In the United Kingdom, one group in particular—al-Muhajiroun, a pro-al-Qa`ida group founded by Omar Bakri Mohammed in 1996—stood out because of the size of its following.<sup>19</sup> In crowded meeting halls across the United Kingdom, Omar Bakri Mohammed and his deputy Anjem Choudary found a formula for attracting hundreds of followers: speak in English with charisma about how the United States and its allies were at war with Islam.<sup>20</sup>

It was an approach the group successfully transplanted to the United States. Until the late 1990s, most pockets of extremism in the United States had been associated with Arabic-speaking clerics such as `Umar `Abd al-Rahman, the "blind shaykh," who in the early 1990s briefly took over the al-Farooq mosque in Brooklyn. The year before 9/11, Choudary traveled to New York and the Midwest to build up al-Muhajiroun's fledgling American wing.<sup>21</sup> In the years that followed, al-Muhajiroun established a significant presence in the New York area, especially in the boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn, helping to make al-Qa`ida's ideology accessible to second generation Muslims and converts who could not speak languages such as Arabic and Urdu. "Ten years ago we were in the early stages, there were not many ideological movements at the time in America as you find in Britain," said Choudary. "They weren't really talking about foreign policy, they weren't really coming out openly, publicly and engaging in ideological and political struggle, whereas I think they are now."<sup>22</sup>

Al-Muhajiroun's New York members held demonstrations and organized speaking events.<sup>23</sup> For some, however, mere protest was not enough. In the United Kingdom and the United States,

al-Muhajiroun followers became wrapped up in counterterrorism investigations. Two of its active members in New York—Syed Hashmi and Mohammed Junaid Babar—were subsequently convicted of aiding al-Qa`ida.<sup>24</sup> After his arrest in 2004, Babar admitted to having met with al-Qa`ida commanders along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and to having organized terrorist training, sponsored by al-Qa`ida, for a group of one-time British al-Muhajiroun followers in Pakistan.<sup>25</sup> He was also connected to a number of British militants spread across Pakistan, including a cluster of al-Muhajiroun followers in Lahore, who helped facilitate travel to the region for aspiring jihadists from the United Kingdom.<sup>26</sup> Two British suicide bombers who attacked a Tel Aviv nightclub in April 2003 were also followers of the group.<sup>27</sup>

#### The Islamic Thinkers Society

In August 2004, al-Muhajiroun followers in New York launched a new organization called the Islamic Thinkers Society.<sup>28</sup> After Bakri Mohammed

17 For example, John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban," became radicalized soon after converting to Islam. Others that followed the same trajectory include Richard Reid, the so-called "Shoe Bomber," London subway bomber Germaine Lindsay, American al-Qa`ida operative Bryant Neal Vinas, and American al-Qa`ida spokesman Adam Gadahn.

18 "Muslim Americans."

19 Al-Muhajiroun, which has operated under a variety of different names in the United Kingdom such as al-Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect, most recently operated under the name Islam4UK before reverting back to its original name after Islam4UK was banned in January under counterterrorism laws. For background on al-Muhajiroun, see Dominic Casciani, "Profile: Islam4UK," BBC, January 5, 2010.

20 Al-Muhajiroun instructs followers to live their lives according to fundamentalist Salafist principles, completely rejecting Western values. It has also openly championed the al-Qa`ida terrorist organization and Usama bin Ladin, depicting them as waging a legitimate jihad against an oppressive West. The organization, however, has constructed a novel theological construct to oppose attacks by Western Muslims inside their own countries. They argue that citizenship creates a "covenant of security" preventing such attacks. Several plots in the United Kingdom, however, have been linked to one-time members of al-Muhajiroun.

21 The radical Islamist group Hizb al-Tahrir had by the end of the 1990s also established a presence in the United States, and today has a significant following, particularly in the Midwest, New York, and California. Most observers regard it as significantly less radical than al-Muhajiroun. Hizb al-Tahrir has stated it opposes al-Qa`ida terrorism and violence at this time. See personal interview, senior Hizb al-Tahrir representative, London, January 2005. See also Madeleine Gruen, "Hizb ut Tahrir's Activities in the United States," *Terrorism Monitor* 5:16 (2007).

22 Nic Robertson, CNN interview with Anjem Choudary, London, November 2009. Segments of the interview aired on "Anderson Cooper 360" on November 11, 2009 as part of a series of reports on homegrown terrorism this author helped set up and produce.

23 In May 2002, for example, al-Muhajiroun organized a meeting at Brooklyn College in which they showed videos of atrocities they claimed had been committed against Muslims around the world. "America is directly involved in exterminating Muslims," one of its members, Syed Hashmi, subsequently convicted of aiding al-Qa`ida, declared at the meeting. "America is the biggest terrorist threat in the world." For details, see Michael Elliott et al., "Al Qaeda Now," *Time Magazine*, June 3, 2002.

24 Anemona Hartocollis and Al Baker, "U.S. Citizen is Accused of Helping Al Qaeda," *New York Times*, June 8, 2006.

25 In April 2010, Syed Hashmi pleaded guilty in a New York court to aiding al-Qa`ida. In the summer of 2006, he was arrested boarding a flight at Heathrow Airport transporting all-weather equipment for the terrorist group in Pakistan and was subsequently extradited to the United States. See Kiran Khalid, "U.S. Citizen Gets 15 Year Sentence for Helping Al Qaeda," CNN, June 10, 2010. A second New York al-Muhajiroun follower—Mohammed Junaid Babar—pleaded guilty in 2004 to providing material support to al-Qa`ida. The previous year Babar had organized a training camp for a group of young British militants in Pakistan plotting to blow up targets in London with fertilizer bombs. The terrorist cell, whose plans were foiled by the British police investigation "Operation Crevise," were themselves one-time followers of al-Muhajiroun in the United Kingdom. See Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, "Al Qaeda on Thames," *Washington Post*, April 30, 2007. Al-Muhajiroun's deputy leader Choudary knew both Hashmi and Babar, getting to know the latter on one of his trips to New York. This is based on personal interview, Anjem Choudary, October 2009.

26 See Paul Cruickshank, "The Militant Pipeline between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West," New America Foundation, February 2010; Dominic Casciani, "Path to Extremism: How it Started," BBC, May 3, 2007.

27 Bergen and Cruickshank, "Clerical Error: The Dangers of Tolerance."

28 Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism official, September 2009. In its first posting on its website, the

temporarily instructed followers to cease using the name al-Muhajiroun in 2004,<sup>29</sup> ITS became the main standard bearer for the group's ideology in the United States.<sup>30</sup>

Although ITS claims on their website that "our struggle is always intellectual & political non-violent means," counterterrorism officials have taken a more sanguine view. "In a sense they are almost bug lights for aspiring jihadists," New York Police Department (NYPD) Director of Intelligence Analysis Mitch Silber told CNN in an interview earlier this year. "They've got an anti-Western, anti-democratic, anti-U.S., pro Al Qaeda message."<sup>31</sup> While the group has few full-time members, and its rallies are sometimes sparsely attended, its YouTube channel and Facebook page have around 200 subscribers each. The number of people viewing these sites is likely significantly larger since many presumably browse the content anonymously.<sup>32</sup>

Unlike their counterparts in the United Kingdom, most of the leaders of ITS have been careful not to reveal their real names, often using aliases in interviews.<sup>33</sup> Yet one figure within the

group announced: "Our *da'wah* (preaching) activities takes place mainly in the streets of Times Square and Jackson Heights, NYC where we give out leaflets and hold posters/banners covering all types of issues relating from spiritual, social, economical, to political issues. Our objective is to bring back the apparatus that was destroyed in 1924 i.e. Khilafah [caliphate]."

29 Bakri Mohammed claimed to be disbanding al-Muhajiroun because the existence of specific groups could create factionalism at a time when all Muslims needed to resist "evil forces" in the West. See Faisal al-Yafai, "Monitored Islamist Group Shuts Down," *Guardian*, October 13, 2004.

30 The ITS praised al-Muhajiroun leader Omar Bakri Mohammed in postings on its website. Al-Muhajiroun deputy leader Anjem Choudary stated that the two groups are closely affiliated. See personal interview, Anjem Choudary, October 2009.

31 Cruickshank and Robertson, "Analysis: The Spread of U.S. Homegrown Terrorism."

32 As of August 2010, the ITS YouTube site had 178 subscribers and its Facebook page had 232 members.

33 In May 2010, two of the "administrators" listed on ITS' Facebook page were Abu Mujaddid and Muhammed Nussrah. Mujaddid is the name adopted by the group's spokesman, who the author interviewed for CNN after an ITS protest outside the Israeli Consulate in New York in April 2010, at which Mujaddid was the main speaker. See Cruickshank and Robertson, "Analysis: The Spread

group—Yusef al-Khattab, a Jewish convert to Islam from New Jersey—built up a considerable public profile. Al-Khattab converted to Islam in 1999 while living in an Israeli settlement in Palestine after becoming disillusioned with Orthodox Jewish teachings.<sup>34</sup> Al-Khattab, according to his own account, moved back to the United States from the Middle East in 2006 and thereafter split his time between Morocco, where his wife and children lived, and New York City.<sup>35</sup> According to U.S. counterterrorism officials, by 2007 al-Khattab had established himself as the front man of ITS.<sup>36</sup>

A number of individuals in his U.S. circle were subsequently implicated in terrorism cases. By al-Khattab's own account, he struck friendships with two Americans who were later charged with terrorism offenses. One was Tarek Mehanna, a Boston resident charged in 2009 with plotting to blow up shopping malls in the United States,<sup>37</sup> and the other was Mehanna's associate Daniel Maldonado, a Texas resident who was convicted in 2007 of training with a Somali militant group.<sup>38</sup> Al-Khattab also met with Bryant Neal Vinas, a Long Island Catholic convert to Islam, shortly before Vinas left the United States in September 2007 to wage jihad against U.S. troops in Afghanistan.<sup>39</sup> Vinas subsequently joined al-Qa'ida and

of U.S. Homegrown Terrorism." In press reports, Nussrah has been identified as a Brooklyn resident, but it is unclear if that is his real name. See Tarek el-Tablawy, "Woman Leads Muslim Prayer Service in NYC," Associated Press, March 19, 2005. For a report on the early activity of ITS, see Andrea Elliott, "Queens Muslim Group Says it Opposes Violence, and America," *New York Times*, June 22, 2005.

34 Yusef al-Khattab, "The Journey of the Al Khattab Family to Islam," [www.yousefalkhattab.com](http://www.yousefalkhattab.com), undated.

35 Ibid.

36 Cruickshank and Lister, "Arrested Men Attended Protests Organized by Radical Islamic Group."

37 Ibid. Mehanna has not entered a plea.

38 Drew Griffin, Kathleen Johnston, and Paul Cruickshank, "Peaceful Preaching Inside, Violent Message Outside a New York Mosque," CNN, November 5, 2009. Maldonado had joined forces with Alabama resident Omar Hammami in trying to connect with jihadists in Somalia. Hammami is believed to be still at large fighting with the group in Somalia. See Andrea Elliott, "The Jihadist Next Door," *New York Times*, January 27, 2010.

39 Michael Powell, "U.S. Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners," *New York Times*, July 23, 2009.

helped the terrorist group plot an attack against the Long Island Railroad in New York.<sup>40</sup> Al-Khattab has stated that he had no idea of Vinas' plans.<sup>41</sup> In the years before setting off for jihad, Vinas associated with ITS circles in New York City, attending several meetings held by the group; counterterrorism officials say this contributed to his radicalization.<sup>42</sup> Yet at a certain point, according to U.S. counterterrorism officials, Vinas became frustrated that the group was "all talk and no action," indicating that the leadership of the ITS stopped short of directly calling on followers to fight jihad.<sup>43</sup> He was far from the only example of an individual following such a trajectory, say those officials.<sup>44</sup>

Despite his frustrations, it was within his circle of friends at ITS that Vinas found the connections needed to join up with militants in Pakistan. Two of his friends within the ITS in New York had advance knowledge of his plans, according to officials.<sup>45</sup> One of them, Ahmer Qayyum, coordinated his own travel plans with Vinas and arrived shortly after him in Lahore. Once there, Qayyum helped Vinas connect with jihadists targeting U.S. troops in Afghanistan, according to counterterrorism officials.<sup>46</sup>

#### Revolution Muslim

In 2008, Yusef al-Khattab co-founded RM with Younes Abdullah Muhammad, a convert and one-time member of ITS with a degree in international affairs from Columbia University.<sup>47</sup> RM was

40 Ibid.

41 Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson and Ken Shiffman, "The Radicalization of an All-American Kid," CNN, May 15, 2010.

42 Ibid.; "American Al Qaeda," CNN documentary, May 15, 2010.

43 Ibid.

44 In an interview with CNN for the CNN documentary "American Al Qaeda," NYPD Director of Intelligence Analysis Mitch Silber stated "the pattern that we see is a lot of these individuals that are attracted to the bug light at a certain point realize that these groups are just talkers. They're not going to do more than just demonstrate. They're not going to do more than just put out extreme statements. And those who are serious about the jihad will leave these groups." See also Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, "Alleged American Jihadists: Connecting the Dots," CNN, August 2, 2010.

45 Cruickshank, Robertson and Shiffman.

46 Ibid.

47 Personal interviews, Yusef al-Khattab and Younes

more provocative and extreme than ITS, delighting in confronting mainstream Muslims outside mosques<sup>48</sup> and courting controversy in the national media.<sup>49</sup> While the ITS propagates the ideology of Omar Bakri Mohammed, the spiritual guide of RM is Jamaican cleric Abdullah al-Faisal, many of whose speeches are posted on the RM YouTube channel.<sup>50</sup> RM has also endorsed and posted many of the writings of American-Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi on its site.

Like the ITS, the number of fully committed RM members is small, perhaps consisting of a dozen regulars who consistently show up to events. Most of RM's activities are conducted online, taking full advantage of the growing power of social media. The group maintains a website and blog that they claim receives more than 1,500 hits a day, mostly from Americans.<sup>51</sup> Additionally, they hold regular question-and-answer sessions with

followers over the interactive online communication site PalTalk. They also operate a YouTube channel with almost 1,000 subscribers, on which they post videos and interact online with followers. Many subscribers maintain their own elaborate YouTube channels, creating an interlocking online universe of radical sites. According to terrorism expert Marc Sageman, a former scholar in residence at the NYPD, the interactive nature of such sites is a more important driver of radicalization than just watching jihadist videos: "It's really discussing their [the videos] significance with your friends, that in a sense drives the point home, as opposed to just watching them."<sup>52</sup> One of the followers of RM's YouTube channel was a recent convert to Islam from Pennsylvania, Colleen LaRose, who subscribed to the channel under the avatar "Jihad Jane."<sup>53</sup> In March 2010, LaRose was charged with plotting to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist due to the latter's depictions of the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>54</sup>

In November 2009, al-Khattab left the United States for Morocco, and in January 2010 al-Khattab announced that he had quit RM.<sup>55</sup> In an interview with the author, he complained that Younes Muhammad was taking the group in a more radical direction than had been the case when he was leading it.<sup>56</sup> "RM at that time was NOT Salafi Jihadi and that was not the platform I wanted," al-Khattab subsequently claimed in an online posting.<sup>57</sup> Younes Muhammad now leads the group.

#### Links to Recent Terrorism Cases

In March 2009, ITS and RM participated in an anti-war rally in front of the White House. Among their ranks were two individuals who would soon be arrested and charged with planning to join the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab. One was Mohammed Alessa, a New Jersey resident who together with associate Carlos Almonte was arrested on his way to JFK airport in June 2010. According to counterterrorism officials, during the previous two years Alessa and Almonte had attended a number of rallies organized by ITS and RM.<sup>58</sup> The other was Zachary Chesser, a Virginia resident who converted to Islam in 2008, quickly became radicalized, and took an increasingly lead role in the online activities of RM.<sup>59</sup> A few weeks after the rally in Washington, Chesser posted a warning that the creators of the South Park television show risked being assassinated for their portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad in a bear suit, a warning that was widely viewed as a threat. In July, Chesser was arrested after he revealed to an FBI agent his intention to fight in Somalia.<sup>60</sup>

Chesser's arrest prompted an extraordinary online clash between RM's two founders. In a series of postings on an online Islamic forum in late July, al-Khattab appeared to imply that his former colleague Younes Abdullah Muhammad had encouraged Chesser to leave to fight jihad.<sup>61</sup> "The purpose [of my post] was to clearly state that Muslim brothers should stay away from my former group and any group that shares the same theology," al-Khattab stated. "I would retire and go on with your life Younus, leave the *fatawa* and life planning to the Ulemah [sic] before you destroy yourself and others."<sup>62</sup> In a response on the same forum, Younes Abdullah Muhammad lashed out against his former friend. "Essentially you are trying to play a role in my arrest as an incitor [sic],"

Abdullah Muhammad, New York, October 2009.

48 On many Fridays, members of the group would stand outside mosques after prayers and chastise Muslims for not supporting jihad. "We call you to reject the enemies of Islam and to rally around those who are waging jihad... many of you stay silent sitting here, enjoying the life and the pleasures of this world while your brothers and sisters are slaughtered and attacked in Muslim lands," Younes Abdullah Muhammad exclaimed outside a Manhattan mosque in September 2009.

49 In an interview with CNN in October 2009, al-Khattab and Muhammad made no secret of their radical views. "I love him [Usama bin Ladin] like I can't begin to tell you," said al-Khattab, while Younes Abdullah Muhammad stated that U.S. foreign policy justified attacks on Americans, including 9/11. They denied they encouraged individuals to travel to fight jihad overseas and stated they opposed attacks on U.S. soil. Within hours of the Fort Hood shooting in November 2009, however, a posting appeared under al-Khattab's name on the RM website labeling shooter Nidal Hassan "an Officer and a Gentleman." See the documentary "Homegrown Terror," CNN, December 12, 2009, which the author part-produced. Al-Khattab later stated on his blog that he supported that attack because it was a military target. See Yousef al-Khattab, "Why I Left Revolution Muslim," [www.yousefalkhattab.com](http://www.yousefalkhattab.com), June 13, 2010.

50 Al-Faisal, one of the UK clerics who helped radicalize a generation of British youth, was banned from the United Kingdom after the July 7, 2005 London bombings. Al-Faisal's sermons had radicalized Germaine Lindsay, one of the suicide bombers in the attack. RM leader Muhammad claims he is a close acquaintance of al-Faisal's. See "Profile: Germaine Lindsay," BBC, May 11, 2006.

51 Personal interviews, Yousef al-Khattab and Younes Abdullah Muhammad, New York, October 2009.

52 Nic Robertson, "Terrorists Use YouTube," CNN, December 22, 2009. The report was produced by this author.

53 Cruickshank and Lister, "Arrested Men Attended Protests Organized by Radical Islamic Group."

54 Ibid.

55 With Muhammad away on a trip to Saudi Arabia, al-Khattab left a young protégé, Abdullah as Sayf Jones, a convert to Islam from Florida, in charge of the group. This did not please Muhammad who, according to al-Khattab's account, took back control of the group on his return and forced Jones out. See Al-Khattab, "Why I Left Revolution Muslim." See also "Background: Revolution Muslim - Abdullah as Sayf Jones," Anti-Defamation League, June 30, 2010.

56 Personal interview, Yousef al-Khattab, February 2010.

57 Al-Khattab posted this as part of an exchange on the Islamic Awakening Forum between July 23-July 25, 2010 under the heading "Feds Arrest Man Behind 'South Park' Threats."

58 Personal interviews, U.S. counterterrorism officials, July 2010.

59 *U.S.A. v. Zachary Adam Chesser*; Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism official, July 2010.

60 Cruickshank and Lister, "Alleged American Jihadists: Connecting the Dots."

61 The exchange took place on the Islamic Awakening Forum between July 23-July 25, 2010 under the heading "Feds Arrest Man Behind 'South Park' Threats."

62 Ibid.

Muhammad said. "I emailed you and explained that you had no evidence that I have ever incited or told people to commit acts of violence."<sup>63</sup> Muhammad claimed that Chesser had actually grown frustrated with the relative moderation of the group's platform:

Truth be told, I had many conversations with Abu Talha [Chesser] about the platform for spreading Islam. He felt that some of what I was saying was passive to a degree and moved on. I have not been in contact with him for several months and he has not been participating on RM since the South Park Affair, yet you insinuate that I am recorded inciting the brother.<sup>64</sup>

Another American linked to ITS and RM implicated in terrorism this summer was Samir Khan, a radical blogger previously resident in North Carolina but now believed to be in Yemen. In July 2010, it emerged that he was the suspected driving force behind *Inspire* magazine, a new online publication by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula that included do-it-yourself bomb-making instructions, threats against U.S. citizens and a clarion call for volunteers for jihad.<sup>65</sup> According to counterterrorism officials, Khan first became radicalized while he was living in New York, during which time he attended several ITS meetings.<sup>66</sup> Khan, according to the officials, also had links to the leaders of RM.<sup>67</sup> Illustrating the web of links between radical extremists across the United States, in September 2009 Khan introduced Zachary Chesser as a new contributor to Jihad Recollections, one of the blogs he authored in North Carolina.<sup>68</sup>

In early August 2010, U.S. authorities charged yet another American who had links to RM with terrorism offenses. Shaker Masri, a Chicago resident who claimed to be an associate of RM blogger Chesser, was arrested as he allegedly prepared to leave the United States to

fight jihad with the al-Shabab terrorist organization in Somalia. Masri allegedly told an undercover FBI informant that he wished to become a suicide bomber. According to the complaint against him, Masri told the informant that he personally knew Chesser, but would not repeat the mistake that he thought led to Chesser's arrest—communicating directly with al-Shabab.<sup>69</sup>

#### Growing Dangers

The ITS and RM are still active on New York streets. In April 2010, ITS held a protest rally against Israeli actions in Palestine outside the Israeli Consulate in New York. After the rally, the group's spokesman, Abu Mujaddid, told the author that they plan to step up their activities in New York and were successfully recruiting new followers. Mujaddid refused to provide his real name.<sup>70</sup>

In recent months, RM's website has featured a prominent link to the "Authentic Tawheed" room on PalTalk on its homepage. The channel, administered from Jamaica by Abdullah al-Faisal, contains regular talks from a variety of English-speaking radical preachers. On July 31, the channel organized a special "global online conference" entitled "Take Over Washington," featuring Abdullah al-Faisal, Omar Bakri Mohammed, Anjem Choudary, and Younes Abdullah Muhammad. The event was directed in particular to Muslims living in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. In his address, Bakri Mohammed urged listeners to resist the "Crusaders" led by the United States "verbally, financially or physically if you can."<sup>71</sup>

How dangerous are ITS and RM? While the majority of those involved in the groups are not implicated in terrorist activity, the growing tally of terrorism cases linked to them should raise concern. Radical-leaning young American Muslims who become followers of such groups—either online or in person—find an echo chamber for their views and a powerful sense of shared community and purpose. Yet because of strong freedom of speech protections in the United States, there is little that counterterrorism officials can do about such groups if they limit their activities to proselytizing.<sup>72</sup> "As much as the Islamic Thinkers Society might put out an extremist message, it seems they go right up to the line of the first amendment, for the most part they, themselves as a group aren't acting," said Mitch Silber, the director of intelligence analysis at the NYPD.

Charismatic radical preachers such as Younes Abdullah Muhammad may not explicitly encourage individuals to fight jihad, but they whip up anger among followers by portraying the United States as engaged in a murderous war against Muslims. Counterterrorism experts believe that such rhetoric makes groups such as ITS and RM dangerous. According to Sageman, "Even if they do not have the connections to help [young radicals] go further, they articulate the glory of fighting jihad, the glory of doing something, of being active and this very much inspires young people."<sup>73</sup>

The extent to which radical groups operating in the United States have connections to militant groups overseas is of crucial concern to U.S. counterterrorism officials. Officials do not believe a facilitation network has emerged in the United States for aspiring jihadists seeking to fight or train overseas on anything like the scale of the United Kingdom. There is concern, however, that a recruiting bridge may develop between American radicals who have joined jihadist groups overseas, such as North Carolina blogger Samir

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Cruickshank, "US Citizen Believed to be Writing for Pro Al Qaeda Website Source Says."

<sup>66</sup> Cruickshank and Lister, "Alleged American Jihadists: Connecting the Dots."

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Apart from that conversation, the FBI stated that it had "no other knowledge, at this time, of any direct contact between Chesser and Masri." Masri was charged with trying to provide material support to two terrorist organizations—al-Qa'ida and al-Shabab—and with another charge related to weapons of mass destruction, according to the criminal complaint. See *U.S.A. v. Shaker Masri*.

<sup>70</sup> Cruickshank and Robertson, "Analysis: The Spread of U.S. Homegrown Terrorism."

<sup>71</sup> "Take Over Washington Conference," Authentic Tawheed Room PalTalk, July 31, 2010.

<sup>72</sup> Anjem Choudary told this author in October 2009 that his radical comrades in the United States could say comments that he could not in the United Kingdom because of new laws passed in the United Kingdom in 2006 against glorifying terrorism.

<sup>73</sup> Cruickshank and Lister, "Arrested Men Attended Protests Organized by Radical Islamic Group."

Khan, and their former radical circle in the United States.<sup>74</sup>

U.S. counterterrorism officials hope they can prevent the American equivalent of the "British Jihadi Network" from emerging during the next several years.<sup>75</sup> Yet U.S. officials are under no illusions that trends seen in the United Kingdom are crossing the Atlantic. Although groups such as ITS and RM have fewer full-fledged members than their British equivalents, new social media platforms are allowing them to spread their message more widely than would have been possible a decade ago. According to Choudary, the deputy leader of the UK radical group al-Muhajiroun, groups such as his in the United States are only "five or ten years behind in terms of the struggle they are engaging in."<sup>76</sup>

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## Manchester, New York and Oslo: Three Centrally Directed Al-Qa`ida Plots

By Raffaello Pantucci

ON JULY 7, 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed fresh charges against a group of foreign and U.S. nationals that it claimed were at the heart of an al-Qa`ida conspiracy to attack New York and Manchester, England. A day later in Norway, prosecutors announced charges against a cell of individuals who they claimed were also part of the same conspiracy and were plotting an attack in Scandinavia. Allegedly planned and directed by senior al-Qa`ida figures as part of a series of operational cells dispatched at around the same time, the plots highlight the group's persistent ability to train individuals and then send them to carry out attacks in the West.

Using recently released information linked to the three separate, but centrally directed plots in Manchester, New York and Oslo, this article will explore al-Qa`ida's persistent ability to plot in Pakistan's badlands in the face of increased pressure from U.S. and Pakistani forces. It will highlight the group's ongoing ability to attract and train foreigners, and its focus on soft targets in the West. Finally, it will examine the increasing globalization of the network, with its apparent ability to utilize individuals linked to other extremist groups based in Pakistan's tribal areas.

The three plots do not appear to be the only elements drawn to al-Qa`ida's camps during 2008. American al-Qa`ida plotter Bryant Neal Vinas and a network of plotters around Malika el-Aroud, a Belgian-Moroccan who was the wife of one of Ahmad Shah Massoud's killers, both appear to have been connected to the same radical networks. Vinas provided information to American and European investigators showing the growing importance of Rashid Rauf as an al-Qa`ida plotter.<sup>1</sup>

1 Paul Cruickshank, "The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA's Terrorist Pipeline," *CTC Sentinel* 2:4 (2009); Paul Cruickshank and Nic Robertson, "Recruits Reveal Al Qaeda's Sprawling Web," CNN, July 30, 2009.

This article, however, focuses on the aspiring jihadists in Manchester, New York and Oslo, who trained in Pakistan and then headed back to their respective target countries where they launched preparations to carry out attacks using hydrogen peroxide-based devices. According to American and British court documents, as well as quotes from officials in Norway, the plots were directed and coordinated by senior al-Qa`ida figures Salah al-Somali, Rashid Rauf and Adnan Shukrijumah. Key individuals in all three cells were apparently present in the same parts of Pakistan in November 2008.<sup>2</sup> There may indeed be other plots that will prove to be linked in the same way, but they have not been publicly unmasked yet.

### The Manchester Plot

In April 2009, British authorities foiled a plot allegedly involving suicide attacks on soft targets in Manchester. The specifics of the initial tip-off are unclear. One story claimed the evidence came from a jihadist who was helping security service investigators in Belgium in late 2008.<sup>3</sup> Another said the information first came to MI5 in 2009 referring to an al-Qa`ida cell in northwest England. Codenamed Operation Pathway, the investigation launched in February that year was focused on British-Pakistani national Hamza Khan Shenwari of Cheetham Hill, Manchester.<sup>4</sup> According to his lawyers, Shenwari is a 42-year-old Pashtu speaker who worked as a security guard and came to England in 2000 seeking asylum following mistreatment at the hands of the Taliban.<sup>5</sup>

The investigation uncovered evidence of what security services believed was a large cell of some 12 individuals with links to al-Qa`ida in Pakistan. Key

74 Personal interviews, U.S. counterterrorism officials, 2009-2010.

75 British authorities in 2007 stated that they were monitoring around 2,000 individuals who posed a risk to national security and 30 active plots. See Frank Gardner, "MI5 Watch 2000 Terror Suspects," BBC, May 2, 2007. The number has not dropped appreciably since.

76 Nic Robertson, CNN interview with Anjem Choudary, London, November 2009. Segments of the interview aired on "Anderson Cooper 360" on November 11, 2009 as part of a series of reports on homegrown terrorism this author helped set up and produce.

2 "Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom," U.S. Department of Justice, July 7, 2010; "3 Arrested in Norway Al Qaeda Bombing Plot," Associated Press, July 8, 2010.

3 David Leppard, Kevin Dowling, Philip Cardy and Daud Khattak, "Ghost in the Machine," *Sunday Times*, April 12, 2009.

4 Duncan Gardham and Gordon Rayner, "A Plot for Mass Murder Here and in the US," *Daily Telegraph*, May 19, 2010.

5 Jonathan Brown, Robert Verkaik and Kim Sengupta, "Police and PM in Dock Over Arrest of Terrorist Suspects," *Independent*, April 23, 2009.

among these was Shenwari's roommate, Abid Naseer, a 24-year-old Pakistani national from Peshawar who first came to the United Kingdom in 2006.<sup>6</sup> Naseer arrived in the United Kingdom ostensibly to study at Liverpool John Moores University, having worked in Peshawar at the university's representative office there. It was here that he met some of the men who were subsequently to stand accused with him,

**“Despite persistent declarations of al-Qa`ida’s demise, the uncovering of this network highlights the group’s ongoing ability to generate plots in the face of increased pressure from drone strikes and Pakistani government efforts in its lawless regions.”**

including Tariq ur Rehman, a 39-year-old widower from Miran Shah in North Waziristan Agency. Rehman first came to the United Kingdom in September 2007, also to attend a course at the John Moores University.<sup>7</sup>

Neither man spent much time in their university courses, dropping out almost immediately after their arrivals to later sign up for English-language courses at the Manchester College of Professional Services, described by courts as “an institution with a dubious reputation.”<sup>8</sup> Instead, they appear to have spent their time wandering around taking pictures of themselves in front of local shopping malls and docks.<sup>9</sup> It is unclear exactly when these pictures were taken, but it would appear as though it was before Rehman and Naseer separately

went back to Pakistan in September–November 2008, meeting up twice in Peshawar while there.<sup>10</sup>

Prior to returning to the United Kingdom, Naseer opened an e-mail account under the name humaonion@yahoo.com on November 14, 2008, which 16 days later started receiving e-mails from the account sana\_pakhtana@yahoo.com.<sup>11</sup> This account was opened by an individual known only as “Ahmad” who was using it to pass messages from Salah al-Somali, referred to as al-Qa`ida’s then-chief of external operations.<sup>12</sup>

By the time British investigators started to uncover the network in February 2009, Naseer appeared to have progressed far down the path of preparation. E-mail traffic between the two accounts showed Naseer discussing a complex list of possible girlfriends—which security services interpreted as discussion of bomb ingredients—while investigators noted with alarm that Shenwari was working at a hair products company, giving him easy access to peroxide products.<sup>13</sup> He was also in contact with a network of Pakistani nationals in Liverpool and Manchester, at least some of whom were later assessed to be knowing conspirators.<sup>14</sup>

Security concerns reached a fever pitch on April 3, 2009, when an e-mail was intercepted from Naseer’s account to “Ahmad” that was believed to state that an attack was being prepared between April 15–20. Authorities decided to arrest the men a few days later, although the final action was rushed forward by a few hours after Assistant Commissioner Bob Quick of the Metropolitan Police was caught on camera entering 10 Downing Street displaying documents related to the plot.<sup>15</sup> Police arrested 12

individuals, although they were unable to locate any evidence of explosives or collection of materials beyond “large amounts of flour and oil.”<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, in addition to the photos of sites in Liverpool and Manchester, detailed maps of Manchester city center were found with the same sites highlighted. Mobile phones and surveillance footage of the different groups of plotters also tied the arrested men together to varying degrees.<sup>17</sup>

The evidence, however, proved inconclusive and the courts decided that the men could not be prosecuted, turning them either free or over to immigration authorities. Security services and the courts remain convinced that Abid Naseer “was an Al Qaeda operative who posed and still poses a serious threat.”<sup>18</sup> Yet while the media focused on the public relations disaster that followed, security officials concentrated on ascertaining Naseer’s contacts in Pakistan. Sometime later, they noticed activity from the account linked to “Ahmad” to a 24-year-old Pashtun-American named Najibullah Zazi.<sup>19</sup> Zazi and Naseer were both in contact with the same individual through this e-mail account and discussed the topic of marriages in similar terms.<sup>20</sup> Reports in the British press suggest that this was the tip-off that alerted U.S. authorities to Zazi’s activities, although this detail has not been officially confirmed.<sup>21</sup>

#### The New York Subway Plot

According to documents released in July 2010, Najibullah Zazi and two high school friends, Zarein Ahmedzay, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Afghanistan, and Adis Medunjanin, a Bosnian-born naturalized U.S. citizen, flew from New York through Doha to

6 *Abid Naseer, Ahmad Faraz Khan, Shoaib Khan, Abdul Wahab Khan and Tariq ur Rehman v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*, Special Immigration Appeals Commission, May 18, 2010.

7 *Ibid.*

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Sultan Sher, Mohammed Umar Farooq, Mohammed Rizwan Sharif v. Greater Manchester Police*, City of Westminster Magistrates, July 21, 2010.

10 *Abid Naseer, Ahmad Faraz Khan, Shoaib Khan, Abdul Wahab Khan and Tariq ur Rehman v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*.

11 *Ibid.*

12 “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom.”

13 Lord Carlile of Berriew, “Operation Pathway: Report Following Review,” October 2009.

14 *Abid Naseer, Ahmad Faraz Khan, Shoaib Khan, Abdul Wahab Khan and Tariq ur Rehman v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*.

15 Lord Carlile of Berriew.

16 “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom.”

17 *Sultan Sher, Mohammed Umar Farooq, Mohammed Rizwan Sharif v. Greater Manchester Police*.

18 *Abid Naseer, Ahmad Faraz Khan, Shoaib Khan, Abdul Wahab Khan and Tariq ur Rehman v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*.

19 “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom.”

20 *Ibid.*

21 “British Spies Help Prevent Al Qaeda-inspired Attack on New York Subway,” *Telegraph*, November 9, 2009.

Peshawar on August 28, 2008.<sup>22</sup> Once in Pakistan they established contact with "Ahmad" who took the men to Waziristan where they could receive military training.<sup>23</sup> At the training camp they met with individuals who were later identified as Salah al-Somali and Rashid Rauf, who urged the men to consider going back to the United States to carry out attacks rather than fight in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> They are said to have also met Adnan Shukrijumah, and the al-Qa`ida leaders recruited the men to carry out attacks on the New York subway.<sup>25</sup>

The three Americans left Waziristan soon afterward, with Medunjanin flying back to the United States on September 22, while the other two stayed to receive explosives training. In November 2008, however, "Ahmad" brought only Zazi to a training camp in Waziristan where he was trained in explosives.<sup>26</sup> It was during this period that he likely drafted notes on how to fabricate Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) using flour, oil, hydrogen peroxide and acetone, which he e-mailed to himself in early December 2008 and which were later used as evidence against him.<sup>27</sup> Ahmedzay later admitted to reviewing Zazi's notes.<sup>28</sup>

Having completed their time in Pakistan, Zazi returned to the United States on January 15, 2009, with Ahmedzay following on January 22. Zazi moved to Aurora, Colorado soon after this, while Ahmedzay and Medunjanin remained in New York. In Colorado, Zazi and unidentified others located the sources of the necessary ingredients to produce TATP, and he experimented with the ingredients in a hotel room he rented in Aurora.<sup>29</sup> During spring and summer of 2009, he made at least two trips to

New York where he discussed with Ahmedzay how he was proceeding with making the TATP, and they agreed to carry out suicide attacks on the New York subway system on September 14, 15, and 16.<sup>30</sup> As they got closer to the time of attack, Zazi attempted repeatedly to make contact with

### **"The al-Qa`ida narrative continues to draw in a wide community of individuals across ethnic lines and from around the globe."**

unknown individuals trying to confirm the exact measurements required to assemble the explosives.<sup>31</sup> At some point he also made contact with "Ahmad," this time using a code referring to the timing of a wedding that was similar to that which British services had noted in Abid Naseer's e-mails.<sup>32</sup>

Zazi was picked up by police in mid-September 2009 and pled guilty to training and plotting to attack the New York subway. Recognizing that the noose was closing, Medunjanin seems to have lost control, and on January 7, 2010 called 911 from his mobile phone telling the operator "we love death" before crashing his car on the Whitestone Expressway in Queens, New York.<sup>33</sup> He survived, and the next day both Ahmedzay and Medunjanin were indicted for seeking to fight abroad. In April, Ahmedzay confessed his role in the subway plot, while Medunjanin continues to plead his innocence.

#### **The Oslo Plotters**

The final plot from this network was disrupted in Oslo, Norway in July 2010, the day after the indictment officially linking the New York and Manchester plots was unsealed.<sup>34</sup> Whether the

prosecution's hand was forced by the indictments published the day before in the United States, other American pressure or the fact that the Associated Press had discovered the investigation, police felt they had to move in and arrest two men in Oslo: Mikael Davud, a 39-year-old ethnic Uighur with Norwegian citizenship, and David Jakobsen, a 31-year-old Uzbek with legal residency in Norway. At the same time, German police arrested a third man, Shawan Sadek Saeed Bujak, a 37-year-old Iraqi-Kurd who was on holiday in Duisburg, Germany.

Norwegian and U.S. officials were quoted in the press as saying that the men had been under surveillance for just over a year and the belief was that the plot was directed by Salah al-Somali.<sup>35</sup> As Petter Nesser and Brynjar Lia identify, it seems as though this cell was "one node" in a wave of attacks directed by al-Qa`ida at the West.<sup>36</sup>

The central figure in the Norwegian plot, Mikael Davud, was apparently in Waziristan at around the same time as Najibullah Zazi, although it is unclear that he trained at the same camp.<sup>37</sup> Officials in Norway believe the men were linked to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a primarily China-oriented extremist group based in Waziristan that has in the past called for attacks on China and which is often confused with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).<sup>38</sup>

As with most information connected to either group, the details are murky. The strongest connections between Davud and terrorist groups, however, flow through TIP; apparently TIP commander Seyfullah called Davud's phone number in September 2008.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, Davud was in possession of a passport photograph of missing British extremist Ibrahim Adam (brother of convicted

helping with research into the Oslo group.

35 Gwladys Fouchie and Joachim Dagenborg, "Norway Arrests Al Qaeda-Linked Suspects Over Plot," Reuters, July 8, 2010.

36 Petter Nesser and Brynjar Lia, "Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot," *CTC Sentinel* 3:8 (2010).

37 Ibid.

38 Edward Wong, "Chinese Separatists Tied to Norway Bomb Plot," *New York Times*, July 9, 2010.

39 Lia and Nesser.

22 *U.S.A. v. Adis Medunjanin, Abid Naseer, Adnan el Shukrijumah, Tariq ur Rehman, FNU LNU, and Name Redacted*, Eastern District of New York, 2010.

23 Ibid.

24 "Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to Terror Violations in Connection with Al Qaeda New York Subway Plot," U.S. Department of Justice, April 23, 2010.

25 *U.S.A. v. Adis Medunjanin, Abid Naseer, Adnan el Shukrijumah, Tariq ur Rehman, FNU LNU, and Name Redacted*.

26 Ibid.

27 *U.S.A. v. Najibullah Zazi*, Eastern District of New York, 2009.

28 "Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to Terror Violations in Connection with Al Qaeda New York Subway Plot."

29 *U.S.A. v. Najibullah Zazi*.

30 "Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to Terror Violations in Connection with Al Qaeda New York Subway Plot."

31 *U.S.A. v. Najibullah Zazi*.

32 "Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom."

33 *U.S.A. v. Adis Medunjanin, Abid Naseer, Adnan el Shukrijumah, Tariq ur Rehman, FNU LNU, and Name Redacted*.

34 The author is grateful to Anne Stenersen of FFI for



Crevice plotter Anthony Garcia), which Davud claimed he had received from an acquaintance in Turkey in 2009.<sup>40</sup> The connections between the terrorist group and the other two are instead unclear and clouded by the fact that the Uzbek suspect, David Jakobsen, had worked as an informant since November 2009. Jakobsen claimed that he had contacted the police after he realized what he was involved in and had met with them on a weekly basis since first providing them with information.<sup>41</sup> Police doubt his authenticity, highlighting the fact that he failed to inform them that he had purchased a quantity of hydrogen peroxide in furtherance of the plot.<sup>42</sup>

The plotters went quiet in the period running up to the arrests, but police claim Davud accumulated enough explosives and other materials to construct a large device or several small devices (they had in fact already swapped what he thought was hydrogen peroxide with an inert substance). Their exact target is unclear, although there is speculation that the oil industry was being targeted when it was revealed that Jakobsen had applied for a place at a school which trained people for jobs in the oil industry.<sup>43</sup>

#### Al-Qa`ida's Core Persists

There are a few key analytical points to be drawn from this series of plots. First, it appears that al-Qa`ida continues to maintain a capacity to train individuals from its base in Pakistan's tribal areas despite being under pressure. Faisal Shahzad, the attempted Times Square bomber, made his way to Peshawar in July 2009, apparently tracking a path similar to Zazi's network. This shows that as of a year ago, despite drone strikes operating at full tempo, the route and capacity to train in the region had not been closed down.

Second, the al-Qa`ida narrative continues to draw in a wide community of individuals across ethnic lines and from around the globe. While the Manchester plot was driven by recent arrivals to the United Kingdom who

were predominantly from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Uighur Davud had lived in Norway since 1999 and Zazi and his cell had all attended high school together in the United States. Also, while less successful in their attempts at plotting in the West, Vinas and the cell around Malika el-Aroud show the ideology's reach to converts and the North African diaspora in continental Europe. The cross-cultural appeal is equally visible in the growing roster of young Westerners being drawn to al-Shabab's jihad in Somalia. Furthermore, the possible link to TIP highlights the group's ability to draw upon networks fostered by "sister" extremist groups operating in Pakistan's tribal areas.

Finally, the plotters' persistence is worth noting. While it is unclear (and unlikely) that the three plots knew of each other (though it seems likely that some information on them may have come from interrogations of other terrorist camp graduates), they nevertheless continued plotting in the face of news that their leaders in Waziristan had been killed and information was leaking out about their network. Despite persistent declarations of al-Qa`ida's demise, the uncovering of this network highlights the group's ongoing ability to generate plots in the face of increased pressure from drone strikes and Pakistani government efforts in its lawless regions.

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## Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot

By Petter Nesser and Brynjar Lia

ON JULY 8, 2010, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) announced the arrests of three men, suspected of having formed an al-Qa`ida-linked terrorist cell and planning bomb attacks against what were later presumed to be Chinese targets in Norway.<sup>1</sup> The cell is believed to be "one node" in a far-reaching al-Qa`ida network that planned attacks in multiple countries, including the New York subway plot led by Najibullah Zazi and the conspiracy to bomb shopping malls in Manchester, both foiled in 2009.<sup>2</sup> The alleged leader of the Norwegian cell, Mikael Davud, a 39-year-old Norwegian citizen of Chinese Uighur origin, was reportedly trained in Waziristan and is suspected of having entertained direct contacts with the commander of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), as well as top al-Qa`ida personnel, such as Salah al-Somali, al-Qa`ida's former head of external operations who was killed in late 2009.<sup>3</sup> According to U.S. officials, al-Somali ordered all three attacks, and all cells planned to use the same type of portable homemade bombs.<sup>4</sup> Also, the Federal Bureau of Investigation believes that Adnan Shukrijumah, considered al-Qa`ida's new head of external operations, is probably connected to the Norway plot.<sup>5</sup>

1 "Tre personer pågrepet," Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, July 8, 2010.

2 Scott Shane and Eric Schmitt, "Norway Announces Three Arrests in Terrorist Plot," *New York Times*, July 8, 2010; Kristoffer Rønneberg, "Terrorplaner i Oslo, London og New York kobles sammen," *Aftenposten*, July 8, 2010; Harald Berg Sævereid, "Han tystet om norsk terror-celle," *Verdens Gang*, July 9, 2010.

3 Yassin Musharbash, "Festgenommene Qaida-Verdächtige Norwegisches Terror-Puzzle," *Der Spiegel*, July 8, 2010; Jonas Sverrisson Rasch and Gunnar Hultgreen, "Terrorgruppe tilhørte uigurisk separatistgruppe," *Dagbladet*, July 8, 2010; "Davuds mobilnummer funnet hos uigurtopp," *Dagbladet*, August 2, 2010.

4 Bruce Crumley, "Norway's al-Qaeda Arrests: Terrorism's Changing Face," *Time Magazine*, July 8, 2010.

5 "Ny al-Qaida-topp kobles til terrorplaner i Norge," *Aftenposten*, August 6, 2010; Curt Anderson, "New al-Qaida Leader Knows US Well," Associated Press, August 6, 2010.

40 Ibid.

41 "Norway: Al Qaeda Bomb Suspect Was Police Informant," Associated Press, July 12, 2010.

42 "Norwegian Police Secretly Filmed Terror Suspect: Report," Agence France-Presse, July 10, 2010.

43 Ibid.



From a counterterrorism perspective, the Norway cell is an interesting case study in several regards. First, it provides arguments to both sides in the Sageman-Hoffman dispute over whether the al-Qa`ida threat is becoming more "homegrown," "de-centralized," and "Europeanized,"<sup>6</sup> or whether al-Qa`ida has retained the ability to direct terrorist operations in Europe and elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> Second, it also casts light on two observable trends in jihadist terrorism during the past few years: (i) the expanding role of al-Qa`ida's regional branches and affiliated organizations in international terrorism; (ii) the growing multiethnic composition of jihadist cells and networks in Europe, where overwhelmingly Arab and Pakistani networks have been gradually replaced by more multinational cells. Third, the Norway cell may suggest a new emphasis in al-Qa`ida on targeting "the periphery" in the Western world, whereby the threat level in Norway may gradually converge toward that of the United Kingdom and continental Europe. Finally, the current investigation of the alleged terrorist cell in Oslo has demonstrated the continued difficulties of handling terrorism-related criminal offenses in Scandinavia where the justice systems only recently started to adapt to the new reality of transnational terrorist organizations, and where U.S. pressure to act more aggressively clashes with a deep commitment to prevention strategies and high standards of legal protection.<sup>8</sup>

This article will outline the details of the Norway plot and the investigation, and it will discuss the sociology of the alleged cell and possible motives. It concludes with a few remarks on the preliminary lessons learned and the implications of the plot.

6 See, for example, Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

7 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 87:3 (2008): pp. 133-138.

8 See, for example, Michael Jonsson and Christian N. Larson, "Scandinavian Trials Demonstrate Difficulty of Obtaining Terrorist Financing Convictions," *Terrorism Monitor* 7:5 (2009); Ian MacDougall, "Norway al-Qaida Case Highlights Terror Strategy," *Associated Press*, July 16, 2010. Also see the entries about Norway in the U.S. Department of State's "Patterns of Global Terrorism" for 2007 to 2009.

#### The Plot and the Investigation

On July 8, 2010, three men of Uighur, Uzbek and Iraqi-Kurdish descent were arrested on terrorism charges after a one year investigation involving extensive international cooperation. The ongoing investigation reportedly included electronic room surveillance, wiretapping, GPS and radio tracking, secret searches of apartments and

**"From al-Qa`ida's perspective, Norway maintains a close military alliance with the United States, has a historical, deep-rooted friendship with Israel and is a significant military contributor in Afghanistan and other fronts in the U.S.-led war on terrorism."**

electronic surveillance of internet traffic. It progressed at different levels of intensity during the past year. The case became more serious in February and March 2010 as the suspects allegedly sought to obtain quantities of chemicals suitable for making peroxide-based high explosives, also used by the 7/7 London bombers as well as by previously intercepted terrorist cells in Denmark and Germany. The amount of chemicals was far smaller, however, than the hundreds of liters acquired by the so-called Sauerland cell in Germany. Nevertheless, it was reportedly sufficient to make one large bomb device or several small ones.<sup>9</sup> The suspects also procured chemistry masks, gloves, and other types of substances and equipment suitable for bomb-making.<sup>10</sup> Using a technique applied by the British MI5 against a cell in Britain in 2004, the Norwegian police secretly replaced the dangerous chemicals with harmless substances.<sup>11</sup>

9 "Norge var terrormålet," *Aftenposten*, July 10, 2010; "Eksplosivene ble ikke oppbevart hos siktede," *Aftenposten*, July 11, 2010.

10 "Slik ble de avslørt," *Dagbladet*, July 16, 2010.

11 "Norge var terrormålet."

In addition to the bomb manufacturing activities, police secured a host of other circumstantial evidence suggesting a terrorist plot, including incriminating e-mail correspondence, phone books, notes and pictures, all indicating ties to international terrorist networks. The investigators found passport photos of Ibrahim Adam, a terrorist suspect wanted by British authorities for his alleged involvement in previous plots in London. One of the cell members claims he was asked to assist in procuring false passports for Adam with a view to bringing him into the country.<sup>12</sup> The cell may also have been involved in money transfers to illegal terrorist organizations.<sup>13</sup>

There is still much uncertainty and confusion surrounding the Norway cell and its intentions. Authorities believe the cell intended to strike a target on Norwegian soil, possibly against Chinese interests. Thus far, however, this assumption appears to rest more on inference and conjecture than actual evidence.<sup>14</sup> The fact that one of the cell members applied twice for a preparatory course at an oil drilling company (although he never showed up) has raised fears that the alleged cell planned attacks against Norway's vital oil industry; Norway is

12 Amund Bakke Foss, Francis Lundh, and Daniel Pinheiro Harbo, "Terrorsiktet ble bedt om å skaffe falskt pass," *Verdens Gang*, July 12, 2010; Frode Hansen and Harald S. Klungtveit, "Terror-etttersøkte Ibrahim (23) skulle hjelpes inn i Norge med falsk pass," *Dagbladet*, July 16, 2010.

13 According to U.S. Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey, the U.S. Terrorism Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), which has been accessing all international bank transactions recorded by the Belgium-based company SWIFT until the end of 2009, "provided support to the Norwegian investigation." Another possible indication is that one of the suspects had registered a private firm from which he withdrew nearly \$600,000 before the firm went bankrupt. The firm's transactions were considered illegal by experts. See Valentina Pop, "'Swift' Used in Norway's al Qaeda Sting, US Says," *EUObserver*, July 9, 2010; Jarle Brenna, Rolf J. Widerøe, Kari Tone Sperstad, and Amund Bakke Foss, "Terrorsiktet tok ut seks millioner i kontanter," *Verdens Gang*, July 9, 2010.

14 Harald S. Klungtveit et al., "Slik planla de terror på norsk jord," *Dagbladet*, July 13, 2010; Kari Tone Sperstad, Tom Bakkeli, and Amund Bakke Foss, "PST: -Terrorhandlingen skulle skje på norsk jord," *Verdens Gang*, July 12, 2010.

among the world's largest oil exporting countries.<sup>15</sup>

The investigation of the Norway cell has clearly been influenced by both national and international media. The timing of the arrests was premature and not ideal from an investigation point of view.<sup>16</sup> Officially, the story is that an Associated Press investigation into the global terrorist network, of which the

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Norway cell was part, forced Norwegian authorities to arrest the suspects.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, growing U.S. pressure to act decisively against a cell that had links both to the United States and to al-Qa`ida's top command may also explain why the police moved in prematurely.

Following the highly publicized arrests, a steady stream of leaks from sources close to the investigation has fed the national media. Initially, the leaks appeared to strengthen the prosecution's

case, but gradually information more favorable to the defendants has found its way to the newspapers, to a point where the security service chief threatened to have the defendants' lawyers replaced for leaking classified information.<sup>18</sup> Even though the present case looks much stronger than previous terrorism investigations in Norway when the defendants have been acquitted on terrorism charges, many commentators have voiced skepticism about the prospects of a conclusive verdict. Norway's antiterrorism laws require a collective effort, a "conspiracy" of two or more people, which in principle makes it legal for a lone individual to initiate limited preparations for terrorist acts on his/her own.<sup>19</sup> The defense lawyers have had some success in pushing this argument, not the least because it has transpired that one of the defendants had in fact been a police informant since 2009—one of the more intriguing details of the Norway plot. He claims to have alerted the authorities about the passport fraud operation and other issues. He has, however, reportedly admitted that he failed to notify them about the purchase of chemicals.<sup>20</sup> Information so far suggests that the cell leader, the Uighur national, was far more involved than the other two, and it remains to be seen if a conspiracy can be proven conclusively.

#### The Sociology of the Alleged Terrorist Cell

The three cell members are all relatively recent immigrants to Norway. They arrived in the country in the late 1990s or early 2000s, and gradually obtained permanent residency and, in the case of Davud, Norwegian citizenship. Their profiles depart somewhat from the new archetype of homegrown terrorism, in which cell members are young disenfranchised second or third generation immigrants, and are mostly self-radicalized and self-recruited, operating autonomously from any central leadership.

Information so far suggests that the cell leader, Mikael Davud, had established contacts with al-Qa`ida back in 2001-2002 and is suspected of having maintained longtime contacts with militant leaders in Waziristan, which he allegedly visited in 2008-2009.<sup>21</sup> Investigators first came across his name when Seyfullah, the top commander of the Turkistan Islamic Party, reportedly tried to call his mobile number in September 2008.<sup>22</sup> Davud had also studied at an Islamic boarding school (*madrasa*) in Karachi during the late 1990s, but did not complete his education for unknown reasons.<sup>23</sup> The two other cell members, the Iraqi-Kurd Shawan Sadek Saeed Bujak (37-years-old) and the Uzbek national David Jakobsen (31-years-old), had apparently been radicalized in Europe. Bujak spent several years seeking asylum in Germany where he reportedly became "more religious."<sup>24</sup> Jakobsen, the youngest cell member, adopted radical views after arriving in Norway.<sup>25</sup> Leaders of the Uzbek community in Oslo claim they knew about him and had alerted the authorities about militant activism in their community.<sup>26</sup>

Despite living relatively inconspicuous lives, several of the cell members were involved in various forms of petty crime, such as the smuggling of *halal* meat from Sweden, the purchase of illegal travel documents, and misappropriation of company funds.<sup>27</sup> They may also have drawn attention to themselves by the fact that they engaged openly in Islamic activism in the Norwegian towns where they set foot; they made little effort to hide their radical leanings. Bujak headed an Islamic cultural center in Førde, a small town in western Norway and was remembered among his former work colleagues for having voiced

15 Amund Bakke Foss et al., "Terrorstiktet meldte seg opp til oljeboringskurs," *Verdens Gang*, July 9, 2010. It is not uncommon for jihadists in Europe to find work in sectors vulnerable to terrorist attacks. For example, several members of the Dutch-Moroccan Hofstadgroup linked to the 2004 murder of Theo Van Gogh worked at Schiphol airport, and a central member of a Pakistani cell planning attacks in the United Kingdom in 2004 worked at Britain's main electricity grid provider, stealing information about its vulnerabilities. See The British Crown, "Opening statement Regina vs Omar Khyam et al.," as published in "Momin Khawaja Constitutes the Canadian End of the Conspiracy," *Ottawa Citizen*, March 23, 2006.

16 "Terrorstiktelsen kunne ha vært utvidet," *Aftenposten*, July 8, 2010.

17 Randi Fuglehaug and Jonas Sverrisson Rasch, "Amerikansk nyhetsbyrå visste om saken," *Dagbladet*, July 9, 2010.

18 "Forsvarer: - PST bør holde kjeft," *Aftenposten*, July 10, 2010; "PST anklager forsvarere for lekkasjer," *Verdens Gang*, August 6, 2010.

19 Per Asle Rustad, "Terrorstiktet kan reddes av norsk lov," *Verdens Gang*, July 21, 2010.

20 Tom Bakkeli et al., "Terrorstiktet har vært informant for PST siden 2009," *Verdens Gang*, July 12, 2010; Lars Akerhaug, Jenny Sandvig, and Lars-Christian U. Talseth, "Var mistenkt - ble informant," *Aftenposten*, July 12, 2010.

21 Musharbash.

22 "Davuds mobilnummer funnet hos uigutroptopp."

23 Davud had obtained permission by Chinese authorities to travel to Pakistan. See Line Brustad, Ida Hanstad and Per Asle Rustad, "Terrorstiktet ville bli imam," *Verdens Gang*, July 17, 2010.

24 Eiliv Frich Flydal and Mikal Hem, "Terrorstiktet hyllet Bin Laden," *Dagbladet*, July 25, 2010.

25 Harald S. Klungtveit et al., "Her pågripes terrorstiktetede Shawan (37) av tysk spesialpoliti," *Dagbladet*, July 9, 2010.

26 Ibid.

27 Hans Torgersen et al., "Her drev én av de terrorstiktetede kiosker," *Aftenposten*, July 11, 2010.

strong sympathies for al-Qa`ida and Usama bin Ladin.<sup>28</sup> Davud attended the Muslim Culture Center, a controversial mosque known for its militant views, in the sleepy town of Sarpsborg, southeast of Oslo.<sup>29</sup> This is where he got to know Jakobsen.<sup>30</sup> Davud also frequented radical milieus in Bergen, where he reportedly met Bujak.<sup>31</sup>

One interesting detail of the Norway cell is the fact that all members changed their names in 2006-2007, following the Prophet Muhammad cartoon crisis. Two of them adopted names that sounded less foreign. Jakobsen's original name was Alisjer Abdulaif and Davud's name was Mohammad Rashidin. They also changed addresses relatively often, presumably to make it more difficult for authorities to keep track of them.<sup>32</sup>

Age-wise, the Norway cell also departs slightly from the typical pattern, with all members well into their 30s, and one of them close to 40. Analyses of recent terrorism cases in Europe have hypothesized that there is a trend toward younger militants.<sup>33</sup> The Norway cell is one of several examples contradicting this thesis. Throughout the history of jihadism in Europe, terrorist cells have typically been mentored and led by people in their late 30s, whereas the foot soldiers have been youngsters in their teens or early 20s.<sup>34</sup>

The multinational character of the cell is also interesting, as it is consistent with what appears to be an increasingly more important pattern of jihadist terrorism in Europe. Previously dominated by Arabs from North Africa and the Middle East, jihadist networks have grown more diverse, including large numbers of activists from Asia, mainly Pakistan, the Caucasus, and East Africa, as well as European converts. In a growing number of cases, non-Arabs have also assumed important leadership positions. The Germany-based Sauerland-cell in 2007 is a case in point.<sup>35</sup> Uighurs, however, have hardly ever figured in jihadist networks in Europe.

#### Possible Motives

The available information provides few clues about the exact motive for an attack in Norway at this point. If Chinese interests were in fact the target, the ongoing conflict between Uighur separatists and the Chinese government will be seen as the most likely motive, in which case Norway is merely an opportune arena rather than a target. It should not be surprising, however, if it develops that the group sought to strike at Norwegian interests directly. While Norway has not been a priority target for al-Qa`ida in the past, it has been specifically singled out by name in al-Qa`ida speeches, most ominously by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2003 and 2004, and by Abu Yahya al-Libi in 2006. There are good reasons for this: from al-Qa`ida's perspective, Norway maintains a close military alliance with the United States, has a historical, deep-rooted friendship with Israel and is a significant military contributor in Afghanistan and other fronts in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Moreover, Norwegian authorities previously imprisoned Mullah Krekar, the infamous

founder of the Kurdish-Iraqi terrorist group Ansar al-Islam, and have ordered his deportation. Finally, the publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons by a few Norwegian newspapers also added to the country's visibility on jihadist websites, although it was overshadowed by events in neighboring Denmark.

**Preliminary Implications and Lessons Learned**  
Assessments of the wider implications of the Norway cell will necessarily have to take into account its organizational origins and its intended target, key details that still remain murky. If the cell primarily operated on behalf of the Turkistan Islamic Party, targeting Chinese interests internationally, the case may be seen as another example of increased involvement by al-Qa`ida's

**"The multinational character of the cell is also interesting, as it is consistent with what appears to be an increasingly more important pattern of jihadist terrorism in Europe."**

regional affiliates in international terrorism outside their immediate theater of operation. Other recent examples of this include the role of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula in the Christmas Day airliner plot in Detroit in 2009, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's involvement in the Times Square attack in May 2010, and the Islamic Jihad Union's plot in Germany (the Sauerland cell) in September 2007. One may also add the recent assassination attempt on Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard by a Danish-Somali who has been linked to the al-Shabab movement.

If, on the other hand, it is proven that the plotters received direct orders from al-Qa`ida's central command in Pakistan, the case should be interpreted as another sign of al-Qa`ida's success in sustaining an operational capability in the West. Furthermore, the discovery of al-Qa`ida cells in Norway may suggest that the organization seeks to build

28 Flydal and Hem; Harald S. Klungtveit and Torgeir P. Krokfjord, "Slik levde de terrordiktende et dobbeltliv," *Dagbladet*, July 11, 2010.

29 The mosque's imam, Shaikhjani Abdul-Qudus, has preached the death penalty for Muslims converting to Christianity and that Islamic law is above Norwegian law. Reportedly, there have been several conflicts between Muslim communities in Sarpsborg over issues such as suicide bombing and the Iraq war. See Anders Engen Sanden, "Omstridt moské i Sarpsborg," *Aftenposten*, July 12, 2010.

30 Ibid.

31 In spring 2010, another Uighur resident from Bergen was reportedly arrested in Pakistan on terrorism charges. See "Uigur fra Bergen pågrepet i Pakistan," ABCNyheter.no, July 15, 2010.

32 Klungtveit and Krokfjord.

33 See, for example, Lorenzo Vidino, "The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30:7 (2007): pp. 579-592.

34 In fact, young people have only headed terrorist cells in a limited number of cases. See Petter Nesser, *Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in Post-Millennium Europe* (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004); "Profile: Omar

Khyam," BBC, April 30, 2007.

35 See, for example, Guido Steinberg, *The Islamic Jihad Union* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008); Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, "Operation Alberich, How the CIA Helped Germany Foil Terror Plot," *Der Spiegel*, September 10, 2007. Also see Morten Skjoldager, *Truslen indefra - De Danske Terrorister* (Copenhagen: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 2009); Petter Nesser, "Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot," *CTC Sentinel* 1:4 (2008); Petter Nesser, "Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31:10 (2008): pp. 924-946.

a new capability to strike Europe's periphery. Its networks in central Europe have suffered serious setbacks after the disruption of numerous cells in Spain, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark, and it may have pushed al-Qa`ida to seek new opportunities in countries less affected by al-Qa`ida terrorism.

From Norway's perspective, it is important to acknowledge the fact that terrorist cells hardly ever emerge from a vacuum. Terrorist cells need supporters and sympathizers to recruit and operate successfully. Discovery of such cells is usually a strong sign that radicalism and underground extremist networks are on the rise.

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## American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists and Foreign Conflicts During the 1980s and 1990s

By William Rosenau and Sara Daly

VIOLENT EXTREMISM AMONG American Muslims has been the subject of considerable official and analytical attention in the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. This scrutiny, however, is devoted almost entirely to the post-9/11 period.<sup>1</sup> Particularly neglected has been the subject of American Muslims who traveled to "fields of jihad" in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir during the 1980s and 1990s—a significant gap in knowledge, given plausible claims that hundreds if not thousands of individuals (most, if not all, presumably Muslims) left the United States to join armed struggles abroad during this period. After nearly 10 years of the "global war on terrorism," it is necessary to explore the "pre-history" of contemporary Islamist extremism in the United States. Such an examination can help calibrate the scale of current challenges, design appropriate countermeasures and, ideally, avoid the mistakes of the past as well as the follies of present-mindedness.

This article considers the cases of four Americans—Hiram Torres, Abu Adam Jibreel, Clement Rodney Hampton-El, and Isa Abdullah Ali—who made journeys to foreign jihads before 9/11. Although hundreds if not thousands of Americans may have left the United States for jihad, robust biographical information exists on only a handful of individuals—and even this information is incomplete. For example, little is known, at least publicly, about what networks might have helped these men join foreign struggles. Given these

limitations, it is impossible to say with confidence whether or not these four cases are representative. At the very least, however, a consideration of these cases represents a first step toward the goal of creating a fuller picture of violent extremism among American Muslims before 9/11.

### Hiram Torres

As a high school student in working-class Perth Amboy, New Jersey, Hiram Torres explored a variety of religions and political creeds and yearned "to be part of a revolution somewhere," one friend, Sachin Timbadia, recalled.<sup>2</sup> Torres traveled with another friend to Bangladesh in the summer of 1993, returning "a changed person," according to his mother.<sup>3</sup> She recalled that he began wrapping sheets around his head like a turban and expressing outrage at the poverty he had witnessed in South Asia.<sup>4</sup>

An excellent student, Torres attended Yale but dropped out in 1993 during his freshman year. "He wanted to be in another country," according to a college roommate, who added that Torres "certainly wasn't violent and he didn't talk about hating America—it just wasn't a place he wanted to live."<sup>5</sup> Acquaintances said that Torres was not noticeably secretive. Yet in high school he refused to have his picture taken for the high school yearbook because he "wanted to keep a low profile in case something happened in the future," said Timbadia. At Yale, he declined to submit a photo for the freshman face book—suggesting, perhaps, preparation for a new and possibly clandestine existence.<sup>6</sup>

Several months after dropping out of college, Torres returned to Bangladesh and then moved to Pakistan and finally Afghanistan, where he last made contact with his mother in 1998.<sup>7</sup> Nothing more was heard of Torres until December 2001, when a *New York Times* reporter discovered documents in a house in

1 For recent examples, see Rick "Ozzie" Nelson and Ben Bodurian, *A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing 'Home-grown' Extremism in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010); Brian Michael Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010). An important exception is Lorenzo Vidino, "Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32:1 (2009).

2 David Rohde and James Risen, "A Nation Challenged: Another Expatriate," *New York Times*, February 6, 2002.

3 Jocelyn Lippert, "1993 Yale Drop-Out Linked to Al Qaeda," *Yale Daily News*, February 7, 2002.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Rohde and Risen.

Kabul used by Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, a pro-Taliban Pakistani militant group which among other activities had trained John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Talib" captured as an enemy combatant in November 2001.<sup>8</sup> Among al-Qa`ida bomb-making manuals and other material was a list of recruits that included Torres' name and the notation that he was also known as Mohammed Salman.<sup>9</sup> Torres' ultimate fate remains unknown.

#### Abu Adam Jibreel

In 1998, Abu Adam Jibreel, a member of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LT, or LeT), was killed in Kashmir during operations against Indian security forces. His life was recounted in a hagiographical internet essay written by a fellow jihadist, Abdur-Raheem As-Siddiqi,

**"Nearly a decade into the 'war on terrorism,' government officials, policy specialists and terrorism scholars still know relatively little about the participation of Americans in violent extremism abroad before 2001."**

who described Abu Adam as the product of a "considerably wealthy family in Atlanta, Georgia" who attended the Ebenezer Baptist Church where Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had once served as pastor.<sup>10</sup>

A restless spiritual seeker, Abu Adam looked beyond the Baptist creed of his family and spent time at the Atlanta Community Mosque, whose spiritual leader Jamil Abdullah al-Amin (the former Black Panther once known as H. Rap Brown) was serving a prison term for murder.<sup>11</sup> As a student at North

Carolina Central University, Abu Adam converted to Islam. Concerned about the plight of Muslims in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Chechnya, he dropped out of the university and, according to As-Siddiqi, "began to prepare for the journey that most never think about—much less prepare for: jihad."

In November 1997, after months of spiritual and physical preparation, including training provided by a fellow Muslim who had served with the U.S. Army Rangers, 19-year-old Abu Adam traveled to Kashmir. Abu Adam (known to comrades as "al-Amreekee") distinguished himself at an LT training camp with his piety, discipline, and modesty. "Our brother was in my view, a true *zaahid* (one who abstains from the glitter of this worldly life)," As-Siddiqi writes.

After four months, Abu Adam completed LT's commando training course and began preparations "to carefully infiltrate the occupied valley of Kashmir to strike down and destroy the enemies of Allah, the vile Hindus and Sikhs from the Indian army," according to As-Siddiqi. In July 1997, Abu Adam and his fellow fighters entered into the "occupied valley" and began laying ambushes and carrying out raids against Indian forces. During one "bloody raid on an army post in the Doda sector in the Jammu region," Abu Adam was killed, but not before killing 17 Indian soldiers, according to As-Siddiqi.

#### Clement Rodney Hampton-El

Raised in impoverished circumstances, Hampton-El had been a member of the Moorish Science Temple—a predominantly African-American religious sect—before converting to orthodox Sunni Islam and adopting the name Abdul Rashid Abdullah. Hampton-El was also reportedly a member of Jama`at al-Fuqara',<sup>12</sup> an extremist sect whose U.S. branch was founded in 1980 by Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, a Pakistani Sufi cleric and supporter of Islamist militancy in Indian-occupied Kashmir. By the late 1980s, Jama`at al-Fuqara' (also known later as Muslims of the Americas) was allegedly acquiring weapons and recruiting fighters for Afghanistan.<sup>13</sup>

12 Elizabeth Shogren, "Fuqra: A Name for Muslim Terrorism," *Los Angeles Times*, July 6, 2003.

13 Christopher Heffelfinger, "Evaluating the Terrorist

Hampton-El joined the Afghan jihad, reportedly serving as a medic with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami mujahidin force.<sup>14</sup> Wounded by a Russian shell, he returned to New York in late 1988 to recuperate. For Hampton-El, also known as "Dr. Rashid" for his work with the mujahidin and his later employment as a hospital technician,

**"Potential terrorist recruits today have more opportunity to connect with like-minded individuals in the United States than prior to 9/11, and there is more ideological and possibly logistical support for conducting domestic terrorist attacks."**

Afghanistan was a transformative experience. "The war was a life-force experience that he dearly wanted to return to...so he could have another chance at martyrdom and paradise," according to one press account.<sup>15</sup>

He never returned to Afghanistan. Instead, he became a significant figure at the al-Kifah Refugee Center in New York, a branch of al-Qa`ida's international fundraising and support network. During the early 1990s, "Dr. Rashid" trained prospective jihadists and smuggled funds into the United States as part of "Project Bosnia," an effort to recruit, support and prepare militants for Bosnia.<sup>16</sup> A member of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing conspiracy, Hampton-El was convicted in 1996 with the "blind shaykh," `Umar `Abd al-Rahman, and others in

Threat Posed by African-American Muslim Groups," *CTC Sentinel* 1:6 (2008).

14 Jason Burke, "Frankenstein the CIA Created," *Guardian*, January 17, 1999.

15 Francis X. Clines, "Specter of Terror," *New York Times*, June 28, 1993.

16 *U.S.A. v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdul Rahman, et al.*, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1996; Evan Kohlmann, *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network* (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 2004), pp. 73-74.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Abdur-Raheem As-Siddiqi, "An American Born Shaheed (Martyr), Abu Adam Jibreel," May 20, 2001, available at [www.albalagh.net/general/abu\\_adam\\_jibreel.shtml](http://www.albalagh.net/general/abu_adam_jibreel.shtml).

11 Donna Leinwand, "A U.S. Teen's Journey to Jihad," *USA Today*, June 14, 2002.

connection with the "Day of Terror" plot against New York City landmarks.

#### Isa Abdullah Ali

One of eight children from a Washington, D.C. African-American family, Cleven Raphael Holt dropped out of ninth grade in 1972, and as a 15-year-old lied about his age and joined the U.S. Army.<sup>17</sup> Discharged from service after 18 months, Holt returned to Washington. After a dissolute period of minor criminality and odd jobs, Holt had a spiritual awakening and converted to Sunni Islam, adopting the name Isa Abdullah Ali.<sup>18</sup>

During the late 1970s, Abdullah Ali became caught up in Washington's dissident Iranian Shi'a community fighting for the ouster of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.<sup>19</sup> Abdullah Ali eventually abandoned Sunni Islam

### **"Before 9/11, however, American Muslims seeking jihad abroad appeared to do so most often as individuals—or 'lone-wolf' jihadists."**

for Shi'ism, and after the 1979 Islamic revolution went to work as a security guard at the new Islamic republic's Washington embassy.<sup>20</sup>

In 1980, after a brief period with the mujahidin in Afghanistan, Abdullah traveled to Beirut, where he joined the Shi'a Amal militia.<sup>21</sup> During the next six years, he reportedly trained militiamen, fought alongside the

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in West Beirut, and served as a bodyguard to Hizb Allah's spiritual leader, Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah.<sup>22</sup> After being wounded in 1986, Abdullah returned to Washington and took a job as a groundskeeper at Howard University.<sup>23</sup>

In 1995, he told friends that he would be traveling to Bosnia to help defend the country's Muslim community.<sup>24</sup> The following year, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry described Abdullah as "a known American terrorist" suspected of posing a threat to NATO peacekeepers,<sup>25</sup> and guards at the Tuzla Air Base were warned to be on the lookout for him.<sup>26</sup> NATO forces, however, lacked the legal authority to detain Abdullah, and with no outstanding arrest warrants he was able to return to the United States and a life of relative obscurity.<sup>27</sup>

#### Why Did They Join?

A full consideration of the motivating factors that underlay the entries into jihad described above is beyond the scope of this article. It is important, however, to note that as Andrew Silke suggests, "becoming a terrorist is for most people a gradual process."<sup>28</sup> Although it is difficult to surmise what this process looks like for the majority of American Muslims who have chosen this path, Silke and Alan Krueger both suggest that a vast number of those who have chosen terrorism were young (teens to early 20s), married males who were well-educated professionals, had a strong Muslim identity, and who felt socially marginalized and experienced some form of discrimination.<sup>29</sup> This characterization, however, is not meant

to simplify the complex factors that lead individuals to choose terrorism. Indeed, some of the more recent homegrown cases in the United States have involved less educated, unmarried males who are from the middle-class and are more socially-integrated than their European counterparts.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, many of the more contemporary extremists in

### **"U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen may also spur more U.S. Muslims to consider jihad than in the years prior to 9/11."**

the United States who have attempted to link up with international conflicts have often done so as members of small groups—such as the Lackawanna Six (2002), the "Virginia jihad" network (2003), and the five Virginia men convicted in a Pakistani court in June 2010 of terrorist offenses. This reality reflects Marc Sageman's thesis that individuals are introduced to radical ideas largely through "loose networks" that include kinship or friendship ties often at places of worship or in private homes or gatherings.<sup>31</sup> These closed networks are difficult to both penetrate and anticipate.<sup>32</sup>

Before 9/11, however, American Muslims seeking jihad abroad appeared to do so most often as individuals—or "lone-wolf" jihadists. Although it is not clear why these "lone wolves" opted to seek jihad on their own rather than as part of a group, one explanation may be that although there were Islamic charities and other groups, such as the al-Kifah Refugee Center, that were organized to send American Muslims abroad to wage jihad, it may have been difficult

17 Harry F. Rosenthal, "Profile of a Fugitive: 'Very, Very Weird Story,'" Associated Press, January 24, 1996.

18 Tod Robberson, "The Unfinished Journey of Isa Abdullah Ali," *Washington Post Magazine*, December 16, 1990.

19 Abdullah Ali was reportedly associated with David Belfield (also known as Daoud Salahuddin), an American supporter of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini later indicted for the July 1980 murder of Ali Tabatabai, an anti-Khomeini activist. See William Branigin, "US Sniper in Beirut," *Washington Post*, July 28, 1982.

20 Ibid.

21 Brian Blomquist, "'Terrorist' Was a Regular in Adams Morgan Bar," *Washington Times*, January 26, 1996.

22 Robberson; Edward D. Sargent, "DC Mother Told PLO Fighter Son Is Alive," *Washington Post*, July 29, 1982.

23 Ibid.

24 Blomquist.

25 Ibid.

26 Tim Weiner, "NATO Forces Are Warned of US Extremist in Bosnia," *New York Times*, January 24, 1996.

27 That said, he was the subject of a 2010 documentary, "American Jihadist."

28 Andrew Silke, "Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization," *European Journal of Criminology* 5:1 (2008): p. 105.

29 Ibid., pp. 106-119; Alan B. Krueger, "What Makes a Homegrown Terrorist? Human Capital and Participation in Domestic Islamic Terrorist Groups in the USA," *Economics Letters* 101:3 (2008): pp. 294-296.

30 Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, "Homegrown Terrorism Fact Sheet," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 22, 2010.

31 Daniel B. Kennedy, Robert J. Homant, and Erick Barnes, "An Insider View of the Sleeper Cell: A Face Validity Study," *Journal of Applied Security Research* 3:3-4 (2008): p. 329.

32 Waqar Gillani and Sabrina Tavernise, "Pakistan Sentences Five Americans in Terror Case," *New York Times*, June 24, 2010.

for these Muslims, many of whom may have felt alienated in their communities because of their race, religion or economic status, to identify peers who felt a similar pull toward radical Islam. To connect with others who shared their extremist views and thus relieve their sense of alienation, these Muslim Americans often sought out like-minded individuals at mosques, where they were encouraged by an imam to travel outside the United States to wage jihad.<sup>33</sup> Some may have chosen to travel abroad because joining a terrorist group is a punishable crime, and evading the authorities by leaving the country may have been their preferred option, especially for those with prior criminal records.<sup>34</sup>

Potential terrorist recruits today have more opportunity to connect with like-minded individuals in the United States than prior to 9/11, and there is more ideological and possibly logistical support for conducting domestic terrorist attacks. In addition to a larger network of "facilitators" for would-be terrorists, unrestricted access to the internet has introduced many American jihadists to the extremist ideology that underpins terrorist violence. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen may also spur more U.S. Muslims to consider jihad than in the years prior to 9/11.<sup>35</sup>

#### Conclusion

American Muslim extremists who journeyed to foreign fields of jihad during the 1980s and 1990s did so largely outside the gaze of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) suspected that hundreds if not thousands of people left the United States for conflicts abroad, a senior FBI counterterrorism official conceded in 2002 that "we didn't understand the magnitude of what was going on here."<sup>36</sup>

Today, government scrutiny of Americans suspected of terrorist activities abroad is intense, as evidenced by the spate of prosecutions of U.S.

citizens accused of extremist activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and elsewhere. Yet nearly a decade into the "war on terrorism," government officials, policy specialists and terrorism scholars still know relatively little about the participation of Americans in violent extremism abroad before 2001. Politicians and policymakers typically frame the issue of violent extremism among U.S. Muslims as a novel, essentially post-9/11 phenomenon.

Building on the handful of pre-9/11 cases and mining the experiences of a much broader set of individuals could identify factors—personal, social, logistical, and ideological—that facilitated entry into foreign jihads. Ideally, a more comprehensive understanding of journeys to jihad in the 1980s and 1990s would inform and improve current efforts by the U.S. government—and the American Muslim community itself—to prevent the involvement of U.S. Muslims in violent extremism overseas.

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## Tensions Rise Between Hizb-i-Islami and the Taliban in Afghanistan

By Matthew DuPee and Anand Gopal

IN MARCH 2010, clashes erupted between two of Afghanistan's most important insurgent groups in northern Baghlan Province. A days-long battle between Hizb-i-Islami<sup>1</sup> and the Taliban left nearly 60 militants and 20 civilians dead. Hostilities between the two sides flared again in Wardak Province in July, where ongoing clashes killed 28 Taliban fighters, including an important local Taliban commander.<sup>2</sup>

The skirmishes, sparked by the growing reach of the Taliban and turf battles between the two groups, mark a significant fissure in the country's militant movement. This article provides a closer look at these frictions and at Afghan government and coalition efforts to exploit them.

#### Northern Expansion

The intra-insurgent tensions are rooted in the dynamics of northern Afghanistan, once peaceful areas that have experienced spiraling violence in recent years. Since 2007, high-level Taliban commanders have repeatedly threatened to expand the war into the largely passive and ethnically divided north, a sparsely populated area where the main forces were non-combat ready International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units and local security groups. The Taliban's initial strategy for the north was to slowly build up intelligence and support networks in

1 Hizb-i-Islami is one of the three largest insurgent groups in Afghanistan. A young Islamist named Gulbuddin Hekmatyar formed the political faction in Pakistan in 1976 in response to the growing influence of leftist movements in the Afghan government and university campuses. During the 1980s, Hekmatyar, along with guidance from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and financial assistance from U.S. and Saudi intelligence services, propelled Hizb-i-Islami into the biggest mujahidin organization fighting against the Soviet occupation. Hekmatyar is infamous for his brutal battlefield tactics and backstabbing political deals, including the assassination of many of his political rivals.

2 Hakim Basharat, "Taliban, HIA Fighting Over Territory in Maidan Wardak," Pajhwok Afghan News, July 29, 2010; Hakim Basharat, "HIA Backers Kill Taliban Member in Wardak," Pajhwok Afghan News, July 13, 2010.

33 Silke, p. 118.

34 Ibid., p. 117.

35 Nelson, "Homegrown Terrorism Fact Sheet."

36 John Mintz, "For US, American Holy Warriors Hard to Track," *Washington Post*, July 16, 2002.



the northwest and northeast.<sup>3</sup> They were able to exploit local grievances, particularly those caused by corrupt, ineffective government and ethnic tensions between non-Pashtuns and Pashtuns. By 2008, insurgent leaders were issuing special decrees calling for more attacks in these regions, spawning a surge of anti-government activity that has since seriously destabilized parts of the north and west.<sup>4</sup>

In particular, the northern corridor linking Kabul to the Tajikistan border has increasingly come under tremendous pressure from anti-government forces, including the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami. Both groups largely operated in separate areas, but occasional tactical level cooperation was reported, although suspicion and competition between both fronts remained the norm. Kunduz and Baghlan provinces, located about 155 miles from Kabul, have suffered the brunt of deadly insurgent attacks and increasing insecurity.<sup>5</sup> The Taliban have built an extensive network in the region—there are now an estimated 300 to 600 “hard core” fighters, most of them local, and scores of foreign fighters—both sharp increases from 2007.<sup>6</sup> In June, Baghlan’s provincial council chief Muhammad Rasoul Muhsini said that the Taliban

have established clandestine “military centers” in 11 of Baghlan’s districts and that only five of the remaining districts were under *de facto* government control (Barka, Tala Barfak, Farang, Khost and Dahan-i-Ghori).<sup>7</sup>

Alongside the Taliban, Hizb has traditionally maintained a significant presence in both provinces. Under the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun originally from Kunduz (Imam Sahib district), Hizb easily reactivated parts of its northern networks from the anti-Soviet insurgency and consolidated party representation, albeit modestly, in Baghlan and Kunduz. The group also

**“The region has strategic importance for both groups because of a key transit route that runs south from Tajikistan through Kunduz and Baghlan. The route provides fuel and other vital logistical supplies to NATO forces, making it a magnet for insurgent attacks.”**

has fighters in the region around Kabul and in the provinces near the eastern Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The U.S. military has previously estimated Hizb’s overall forces to number around 400 to 600, although experts suggest that the number is more likely to total close to 1,500 full-time fighters.<sup>8</sup> Despite such numbers, the Taliban have in recent years surpassed Hizb as the dominant insurgent force in the area.<sup>9</sup> Today, the

Taliban are far more aggressive and militarily resilient, as measured by the number of attacks they initiate and the extent of territory under their control.<sup>10</sup> The Taliban succeeded in marginalizing Hizb’s influence in the area by implementing heavy-handed terrorist attacks, especially targeting influential tribal leaders and former commanders. This resulted in a power vacuum that they were able to exploit.<sup>11</sup>

The region has strategic importance for both groups because of a key transit route that runs south from Tajikistan through Kunduz and Baghlan. The route provides fuel and other vital logistical supplies to NATO forces, making it a magnet for insurgent attacks. Indeed, violence in the area surged as international forces began to rely heavily on the route. The route, however, also began to fuel tensions between insurgent groups. At stake was access to a trade corridor—a valuable source of income and power.<sup>12</sup> By late 2009, turf battles over key pieces of terrain, including fertile farming areas and key logistical hubs, exploded between Hizb and the Taliban.

#### Fissures in the Insurgency

The largest clash between the two groups was the March 7, 2010 incident in northern Baghlan, when Taliban fighters nearly overran Hizb positions, prompting Hizb commanders to contact Afghan government officials in search of military support. Ultimately, the feud ended with the Hizb fighters being expelled from their strongholds and the Taliban seizing sizeable portions of Dahan-i-Ghori and Baghlan-i-Jadid districts.<sup>13</sup> Since that time, a number of other clashes have taken place, even outside of the northern area. For

3 Officials believed the Taliban were distributing weapons and ammunition to groups in Kunduz and Baghlan in November 2006. A similar trend emerged in the northwestern province of Badghis around the same time. For more, see Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 130-131; Matthew C. DuPee, “Badghis Province: Examining the Taliban’s Northwestern Campaign,” *Culture & Conflict Review* 2:4 (2008).

4 In the spring of 2009, Mullah Baradar announced the launch of Operation Nusrat (Victory), the 2009 Taliban campaign aimed at attacking NATO and Afghan government forces including a special decree for insurgents in Kunduz to ramp up their activities.

5 In the case of Baghlan Province, a non-traditional Taliban stronghold, Hizb-i-Islami is more entrenched and politically established with many former commanders and their militias enjoying local autonomy and freedom of movement. The Taliban are considered more capable militarily and typically employ more coercive force, threats and violence to win the “hearts and minds.”

6 For more details, see Matthew DuPee, “Operation Nusrat (Victory): Understanding the Taliban Threat to Kunduz Province,” *Culture & Conflict Review* 3:3 (2009); Matthias Gebauer and Shuib Najafzade, “Situation Worsens in Northern Afghanistan,” *Der Spiegel*, August 3, 2009.

7 Habib Rahman Sherzai, “All Districts in Baghlan May Fall into Taliban Hands,” *Pajhwok Afghan News*, June 14, 2010.

8 Giustozzi, p. 132. According to a Hizb commander, however, the group has 4,000 members in the northern regions alone, although this figure is likely exaggerated. See Najibullah Quraishi, “Behind Taliban Lines,” *PBS Frontline*, February 23, 2010.

9 Following the successful parliamentary elections in 2005, many Hizb commanders and cadres folded back into the community, creating a vacuum for the Taliban to eventually penetrate and establish a more aggressive and violent military campaign in the north.

10 Personal interview, Afghan security official, May 2010.

11 Several prominent anti-Taliban militia commanders have been killed recently by the Taliban in Kunduz, including Commander Selab, Commander Hassan and a Taliban defector named Commander Abdullah.

12 Successful insurgent attacks on convoys can bring monetary rewards from the leadership or build the prestige of the field commander involved in the incident. Moreover, companies organizing supply convoys sometimes pay “protection money” to insurgents to ensure safe passage. See, for example, Aryn Baker, “How Crime Pays for the Taliban,” *Time Magazine*, September 7, 2009.

13 For details, see Fabrizio Foschini, “Baghlan - Divided We Stand,” *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, July 7, 2010.



instance, in late June the two sides skirmished in Wardak Province, near Kabul.<sup>14</sup> In July, these skirmishes led to full battles in Nirkh district, when Hizb fighters—who were locals and had a better understanding of the terrain—handed a defeat to Taliban forces who had come from surrounding districts. In response, the Taliban brought in reinforcements from other provinces, which Hizb matched by mobilizing Kuchis<sup>15</sup> from Nangarhar Province.<sup>16</sup> In

**“Increasingly desperate, the government appears to be outsourcing security and intelligence networks to Hizb-i-Islami to prevent the Taliban from gaining more territory, while at the same time Hizb-i-Islami is siding with the government to prevent further erosion of its influence from Taliban intrusions.”**

late July, the combined Hizb-Kuchi force routed the Taliban and killed a number of their commanders, prompting the Taliban's Quetta *shura* to send a commission to the district to assess the reasons behind their losses.<sup>17</sup>

In another instance, Hizb-aligned elders took control of parts of Nuristan Province in the country's northeast after U.S. forces withdrew from the area in 2009, sparking further clashes with the Taliban.<sup>18</sup> Taliban fighters have also assassinated key Hizb-aligned officials in recent months, the most prominent of whom was Maulavi Gul Rahman, a famous commander under

Hekmatyar during the anti-Soviet insurgency.<sup>19</sup>

In some cases, Taliban fighters see Hizb-i-Islami as ineffective or disapprove of their contacts with the Afghan government. Qari Ziaur Rahman, a prominent Taliban commander active on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near Kunar, recently dismissed the group. “Hizb has not been effective in the last eight years,” he said. “They haven’t had any major successes in these years.”<sup>20</sup>

Afghan and Western officials have made moves in an attempt to take advantage of these strains. A key element of their strategy is to convince rank-and-file Hizb fighters to leave the insurgency and form pro-government militias as a bulwark against Taliban activity. In other cases, they are attempting to adroitly exploit local dynamics. For instance, in a political move that largely escaped media attention, Afghan President Hamid Karzai appointed Hajji Abdul Munshi Majeed, the long-standing governor of Badakhshan Province, as Baghlan's new governor in May 2010. Majeed is a Pashtun from Baghlan and reportedly has longstanding ties to Hizb-i-Islami. In fact, one group of analysts even contends that he is involved in “consolidating the party and reviving its communications network across the country.”<sup>21</sup> This move also highlights the seriousness in which the government views the increase in Taliban activities and consolidation in the northern districts of Kunduz and Baghlan. Increasingly desperate, the government appears to be outsourcing security and intelligence networks to Hizb-i-Islami to prevent the Taliban from gaining more territory, while at the same time Hizb-i-Islami is siding with the government to prevent further erosion of its influence from Taliban intrusions.

With Majeed now acting as the governor of Baghlan, relations between the two groups are likely to strain further.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, his appointment coincides with a push to eliminate the Taliban leadership in the province. According to NATO statements, joint Afghan and ISAF operations have “removed three successively appointed Taliban provincial shadow governors for the province.”<sup>23</sup> On May 14, Mullah Rohullah was killed along with his entourage, including his deputy, and his replacement, Maluvi Jabbar, was killed along with two Taliban military commanders (Mullah Haji Muhamood and Mullah Kajoor) on May 28.<sup>24</sup> Only three days later, the newly installed Taliban governor for Baghlan was also arrested. The events marked one of the biggest losses of provincial-level leadership for the Taliban anywhere in the country. Officials say that this is partly due to Hizb providing information to Afghan forces. “Intelligence comes from the armed forces of Hizb-i-Islami,” said a senior Afghan provincial official in July. “We buy information from the fighters.”<sup>25</sup> More than 50 Hizb fighters are being kept in a government safe house in Baghlan, also a likely source of intelligence for coalition forces.<sup>26</sup>

In addition to the friction among insurgents at the local level, Afghan and U.S. officials have modified their stance toward engaging some of the insurgent leadership. For instance, the United States has publicly released several high-value Hizb associates beginning in 2008, including Dr. Ghairat Baheer, Hekmatyar's son-in-law and top public relations figure, who was apprehended and held in custody since 2002.<sup>27</sup> Abdullah Shahab,

22 Strictly speaking, Majeed belongs to the legal wing of Hizb-i-Islami, which has officially repudiated Hekmatyar and abides by the Afghan constitution. Many observers, however, agree that there remain deep links between some officials in the legal Hizb-i-Islami and Hekmatyar's wing.

23 “IJC Operational Update, June 22,” ISAF joint command statement, June 22, 2010.

24 Bill Roggio, “Newly Minted Shadow Governor Captured,” *The Long War Journal*, June 3, 2010.

25 Hamid Shalizi and Jonathon Burch, “Afghan Insurgents Supplying Taliban Intel to NATO—Officials,” *Reuters*, July 8, 2010.

26 Ibid.

27 Baheer was also given a visa to travel to London by British authorities in January 2009. For details, see “Se-

14 Hakim Basharat, “Three Injured as Taliban, Hizb Clash in Wardak,” *Pajhwok Afghan News*, June 27, 2010.

15 Kuchis are a nomadic, pastoralist culture in Afghanistan.

16 Personal interview, UN official, Kabul, August 2010.

17 Personal interview, Taliban commander for Wardak Province, Kabul, August 2010.

18 Personal interview, Afghan official from Nuristan, May 2010.

19 “Afghan Peace Cleric Rahman Gul Shot Dead in Kunar,” *BBC*, May 17, 2010.

20 Anand Gopal, “Afghanistan Warlord Hekmatyar Shuns Peace Jirga but Offers His Own Deal,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 2, 2010.

21 Cole Hansen, Christian Dennys and Idrees Zaman, “Conflict Analysis: Baharak District, Badakhshan Province,” *Cooperation for Peace and Unity*, February 2009. Also see David Isby, “Trojan Horse or Genuine Schism? The Hizb-i-Islami Split,” *Terrorism Monitor* 2:11 (2004).

Hekmatyar's nephew, was captured and held by U.S. forces since 2005 before his unexpected release in July 2009.<sup>28</sup> More generally, the United Nations has approved measures to ease some of the financial restrictions of those linked to the insurgency (but not to al-Qa`ida) and to review all detainees in Afghan, U.S. and NATO custody.

From Hizb's side, representatives of its military committee reached out to the Afghan government as early as 2008.<sup>29</sup> That year a group of lawmakers who once had ties to Hekmatyar met with Hizb representatives in Peshawar, while Hekmatyar himself sent conciliatory

**"If handled correctly, the developments could be a step toward de-escalation of hostilities, where some rank-and-file insurgents abandon the fight and the violence mitigates in some parts of the country."**

messages to Afghan President Hamid Karzai that spring.<sup>30</sup> In February 2010, this group hosted a second meeting in the Maldives, featuring a number of Hizb-linked clerics and unofficial representatives. The two sides agreed to explore ways to bring all parties to the negotiating table. At the same time, a group of Hizb figures, such as Hekmatyar deputy Qutbuddin Hilal and U.S. representative Daoud Abedi, began to open dialogue with U.S. and Afghan officials. These various moves culminated in an official Hizb delegation to Kabul, where Hilal, Baheer and other representatives met with President Karzai and former Northern Alliance

and Taliban figures on March 18. The group delivered a 15-point peace proposal, which included a call for elections in return for a timetable for the withdrawal of troops. Hekmatyar said that the overture was prompted by the Obama administration's admission that the war could not be won solely through military means.<sup>31</sup>

Nevertheless, Hekmatyar and his senior military leadership appear to be seeking to negotiate from a position of weakness, as their base in the north erodes with the Taliban's advance. The defense of their stronghold in Nirkh in Wardak, however, shows that their capitulation is far from certain, and the dynamic of tensions with the Taliban while reaching out to the government is likely to continue for some time.

#### Conclusion

Given Hekmatyar's insistence on a troop withdrawal, the U.S. and Afghan governments are unlikely to strike a deal with him soon. Moreover, the peace overtures raise the question of what Hekmatyar's role will be in any post-agreement government, a deeply controversial issue. Nonetheless, if handled correctly the developments could be a step toward de-escalation of hostilities, where some rank-and-file insurgents abandon the fight and the violence mitigates in some parts of the country. Moreover, the approaches between the two sides could change the dynamic on the battlefield, giving much needed space for international forces to isolate the Taliban in the northern provinces. On the political front, Hizb-i-Islami has even attempted to portray itself as a force that can act as a bridge between Washington and the Taliban—a senior Hizb representative met with U.S. State Department officials in 2009 and then traveled to Quetta to meet the Taliban leadership in an attempt to foster dialogue.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, Hizb-i-Islami has little influence over the Taliban movement, and this specific meeting did not lead to an opening of dialogue among the three sides.

Peeling away rank-and-file Hizb fighters, or even striking a deal with the leadership, will not end the war—the problem of the Taliban and other insurgent groups such as the Haqqani network would remain major issues. Moreover, it is possible that some Hizb fighters could simply switch allegiances and fight under the Taliban's banner, and past atrocities attributed to Hekmatyar and Hizb commanders will not quickly be forgotten.<sup>33</sup> Yet if such moves open the door to more nuanced and varied approaches to the insurgency, it could augur well for an eventual approach to a political solution to the conflict.

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cret Talks with Taliban Under Way," al-Jazeera, February 27, 2009; Syed Saleem Shahzad, "A Struggle Between War and Peace," *Asia Times Online*, June 3, 2008.

28 *Wrazpanra Weesa*, July 29, 2009.

29 This interaction refers to the insurgent component of Hekmatyar's military committee. A political bloc of former Hizb-i-Islami commanders and political leaders broke away from the central Hizb party led by Hekmatyar and became a legally registered party and participated successfully in the 2005 parliamentary elections.

30 Personal interview, Afghan officials, April 2008.

31 Anand Gopal, "Interview with Afghan Warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: Can Peace Talks Succeed?" *Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 2010.

32 Personal interview, senior Hizb-i-Islami representative, February 2010.

33 Commanders and fighters are organized by the *andawal* network, which is based on personal ties between fighters and commanders. This means a wholesale transfer from Hizb to the Taliban is not likely, as it would mean breaking longstanding ties. Yet, it remains a possibility for some commanders.

## Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

July 1, 2010 (UNITED STATES): The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that government prosecutors must present evidence that an Algerian national, who has been held at Guantanamo Bay for more than eight years, was truly an al-Qa`ida member, otherwise he must be released. According to the Associated Press, the decision "has broad implications for the credibility of evidence the administration of President Barack Obama has presented to justify holding terror suspects without trial." - *AFP, July 3*

July 1, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two suicide bombers targeted the shrine of Data Ganj Baksh in Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province. The bombs killed at least 41 people. The site is considered Pakistan's most important Sufi shrine. The Pakistani Taliban, however, publicly denied responsibility for the attack. - *CBS News, July 1; New York Times, July 1*

July 1, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni Political Security officer Saleh Amtheeb was assassinated in Zinjibar, Abyan Province. Authorities later apprehended four suspects, two of whom were al-Qa`ida members. - *Saba, July 3; AFP, July 3*

July 1, 2010 (SOMALIA): Somali and African Union troops launched an offensive against al-Shabab insurgents in Mogadishu. The insurgents have vowed to topple the government. - *Wall Street Journal, July 2*

July 1, 2010 (THAILAND): Muslim separatists killed five people in Narathiwat Province in southern Thailand. The fighters detonated a roadside bomb near a military vehicle and then opened fire. - *Voice of America, July 2*

July 2, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban fighters, including multiple suicide bombers, stormed the compound of a U.S. aid group in Kunduz Province, killing at least two expatriate workers, a security guard and an Afghan police officer. All six of the Taliban assailants died in the

attack. The killed expatriate workers were from Germany and the United Kingdom. - *Los Angeles Times, July 3; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, July 2*

July 2, 2010 (THAILAND): A roadside bomb killed three Thai soldiers in Yala Province in southern Thailand. - *Voice of America, July 2*

July 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Taliban fighters attacked a checkpoint in Upper Orakzai, located in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Security forces retaliated, killing four Taliban fighters. - *Daily Times, July 4*

July 4, 2010 (GERMANY): German police arrested a 24-year-old Syrian man, identified as Hussam S., who is accused of recruiting for al-Qa`ida on the internet. He is also suspected of operating a German-language internet forum to distribute Islamist literature. The man was arrested in the southwestern town of Montabaur in Rhineland-Palatinate. - *Reuters, July 7*

July 4, 2010 (IRAQ): A female suicide bomber killed at least four people in Ramadi, Anbar Province. The bomber, who wore an explosives vest, managed to slip through four checkpoints at the provincial governor's compound. She detonated her explosives outside Governor Qassim Mohammed Abid's office. The governor and his two deputies were not injured. - *Washington Post, July 4*

July 4, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani security forces reportedly killed a senior commander in the Pakistani Taliban, identified as Ameerullah Mehsud (also known as Qari Gud). The commander, who was killed in a shootout with soldiers in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, carried a \$234,000 bounty for his arrest or death. He is considered one of the founders of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. - *AFP, July 5; CNN, July 6*

July 5, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide squad of four militants attacked a paramilitary fort in Lower Dir District of the North-West Frontier Province. The militants, armed with car bombs and rockets, killed one soldier. All four of the fighters were killed. - *AFP, July 4*

July 5, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni soldiers and al-Qa`ida militants clashed in eastern Hadramawt Province. The militants killed two soldiers, while authorities apprehended two al-Qa`ida suspects. Another two al-Qa`ida suspects escaped. A third soldier later died of wounds sustained during the firefight. - *Reuters, July 5; Reuters, July 6*

July 5, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): Wu Xili, a Chinese shopkeeper held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group for nearly 19 months, was rescued by police. The rescue operation took place on Jolo Island in the southern Philippines. - *AFP, July 5*

July 7, 2010 (GLOBAL): Federal prosecutors in the United States revealed that the plot to bomb New York City's subway system, which was foiled in September 2009, was directly related to a similar plot in Manchester in the United Kingdom. The Manchester plot involves Abid Naseer and Tariq ur Rehman, who were arrested by UK authorities in April 2009. U.S. authorities also allege that three senior al-Qa`ida operatives—Adnan Shukrijumah, Salah al-Somali and Rashid Rauf—organized the New York subway plot, recruiting Najibullah Zazi and two other men to conduct the attack. - *Wall Street Journal, July 7*

July 7, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Sudanese national Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi pleaded guilty in a U.S. military court at Guantanamo Bay to conspiring with al-Qa`ida and providing material support to terrorism. Al-Qosi ran the kitchen and provided supplies at one of Usama bin Ladin's compounds in Afghanistan. He has been held at Guantanamo Bay for more than eight years. The terms of his plea agreement were not disclosed. - *Washington Post, July 8*

July 7, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Gunmen shot to death Mohammad Gul, director of the intelligence department of Kabul's counter-crime police branch. One of his bodyguards was also killed. - *AFP, July 8*

July 7, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber killed at least 28 people in northern Baghdad. The bomber targeted Shi'a pilgrims en route to the Imam Musa

al-Kadhimi mosque for a major festival. - *RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty*, July 7; *New York Times*, July 7

July 7, 2010 (YEMEN): A Yemeni court sentenced two al-Qa`ida members to death for their role in killing military and security officials. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, "The two men sentenced Wednesday were found guilty of ambushing and looting a military truck carrying weapons and of killing three soldiers, a policeman and a civilian during the subsequent pursuit in July 2009. The prosecution said they also attacked a convoy that killed two high-ranking police officials, including the director of political security, in November [2009]." They were identified as Mansour Daleel, who is 18-years-old, and Mubarak al-Shabwani, who is 23-years-old. - *Wall Street Journal*, July 8

July 8, 2010 (UNITED KINGDOM): A court convicted three Britons of plotting to kill hundreds of people in suicide bombings after being recruited by an al-Qa`ida-inspired cell. The men—Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Waheed Khan and Waheed Zaman—were part of the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot that involved liquid explosives. According to Reuters, "Their conviction follows one of Britain's biggest counter-terrorism investigations and a series of trials around a plot that prosecutors said could have been on the same scale as the 9/11 attacks." On July 12, the men were sentenced to life in prison. - *Reuters*, July 8; *BBC*, July 12

July 8, 2010 (NORWAY): Authorities arrested three al-Qa`ida suspects in Norway and Germany, accused of planning terrorist attacks in Norway. The men arrested in Norway were identified as Mikael Davud, a 39-year-old ethnic Uighur with Norwegian citizenship, and David Jakobsen, a 31-year-old Uzbek with legal residency in Norway. The third man, who was arrested in Germany, was identified as Shawan Sadek Saeed Bujak, a 37-year-old Iraqi-Kurd who was on holiday in Duisburg. The plot is reportedly linked to the September 2009 New York City subway plot, as well as the April 2009 terrorist plot in Manchester in the United Kingdom. - *Voice of America*, July 8; *Reuters*, July 13

July 9, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked an Iraqi Army checkpoint in western Baghdad, killing five people. Three of the dead were soldiers. - *CNN*, July 9; *BBC*, July 9

July 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber attacked a group of tribal elders in the administrative center of Mohmand Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. More than 100 people were killed. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. - *New York Times*, July 9; *Dawn*, July 10

July 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Taliban fighters attacked an army patrol in Makeen district of South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Three soldiers were killed. - *AFP*, July 10

July 10, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Insurgents overran a police checkpoint in Emam Saheb district of Kunduz Province, killing nine policemen. - *Reuters*, July 11

July 10, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A bomb killed the head of the police department in Qaleh Zaal district of Kunduz Province. - *Reuters*, July 11

July 10, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Five policemen were killed after hitting a roadside bomb in Badakhshan Province. - *Reuters*, July 11

July 11, 2010 (UGANDA): Two suicide bombers attacked crowds gathered to watch the World Cup final in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. The bombings, which were claimed by the al-Shabab militant group in Somalia, killed approximately 76 people. One attack targeted a rugby club filled with soccer fans, while the other bomber targeted a popular Ethiopian restaurant. At least one American was killed in the attacks. - *ABC News*, July 11; *Washington Post*, July 13

July 11, 2010 (NORTH AFRICA): Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) threatened to execute a French hostage in 15 days if the French government failed to meet its demands. The hostage has been identified as 78-year-old Michel Germaneau, who was seized in northern Niger in April. - *Reuters*, July 11

July 11, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani fighter jets and helicopter gunships attacked Taliban positions in Orakzai Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Authorities allege that 22 Taliban fighters were killed in the strikes. - *RTTNews*, July 12

July 11, 2010 (YEMEN): Security forces arrested eight suspected al-Qa`ida fighters, including a Saudi fugitive, accused of plotting attacks against security facilities in Yemen. - *al-Jazeera*, July 11

July 12, 2010 (RUSSIA): Russian security officials announced that they broke up a terrorist cell that was preparing female suicide bombers for attacks on major Russian cities. Authorities arrested six women, who had apparently already written "farewell letters" in anticipation of their impending attacks. The women were detained in the Muslim region of Dagestan. - *New York Times*, July 12

July 12, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): According to a senior Afghan official, President Hamid Karzai is seeking the removal of 50 former Taliban officials from a UN terrorism blacklist with the goal of advancing political reconciliation talks with Taliban insurgents. - *Washington Post*, July 12

July 12, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): The Afghan Defense Ministry said that 80% of Taliban bombs are made with ammonium nitrate and potassium nitrate fertilizer. Before 2007, however, most bombs were constructed from ordnance leftover from the Soviet occupation of the country in the 1980s. - *AFP*, July 12

July 13, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban fighters attacked a police unit headquarters in Kandahar city, killing three U.S. soldiers, five civilian Afghan employees and one Afghan policeman. As part of the attack, a suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated his explosives at the entrance to the Afghan National Civil Order Police. Immediately after, Taliban militants fired rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns at the facility. - *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14

July 13, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani police arrested 650 suspected militants in the North-West Frontier Province in response to the July 9 suicide attack that killed more than 100 people in Mohmand Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The arrests took place in a three-day period. - *AFP, July 13*

July 13, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Taliban militants blew up a government-run middle school for boys in Bajaur Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. - *Daily Times, July 14*

July 14, 2010 (UNITED STATES): A video surfaced of Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in New York City's Times Square on May 1, describing his planned bombing as a "revenge attack." In the video, Shahzad, who is in U.S. custody, dedicated his planned attack to Baitullah Mehsud and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, both of whom were killed by the United States. The video appears to have been filmed in Pakistan, and Shahzad is seen shaking hands with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan leader Hakimullah Mehsud. - *AOL News, July 14; Christian Science Monitor, July 15*

July 14, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): The Afghan government approved a program to establish local defense forces in the country. The program is similar to the Awakening Councils created by General David Petraeus in Iraq. According to the *New York Times*, "...the two programs would not be identical. Unlike the Iraqi units, the Afghan forces would not be composed of insurgents who had switched sides. They would be similar as a lightly armed, trained and, significantly, paid force in a nation starving for jobs." - *New York Times, July 14*

July 14, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A roadside bomb killed four U.S. soldiers in southern Afghanistan. - *Christian Science Monitor, July 14*

July 14, 2010 (INDIA): India's home secretary argued that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence was behind the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, in collaboration with Lashkar-i-Tayyiba. "The ISI has had a much more significant role to play (in the Mumbai attacks)," the official said. "It was

not just a peripheral role. They were literally controlling and coordinating it (the attacks) from the beginning till the end." According to Reuters, "His accusations are the strongest comments made by Indian officials since the attacks which brought the South Asian nuclear neighbours to the brink of war." - *Reuters, July 14*

July 14, 2010 (YEMEN): Approximately 20 suspected al-Qa`ida fighters attacked a Yemeni intelligence agency in Zinjibar, located in Abyan Province. A policeman and two militants were killed in the incident. - *Bloomberg, July 14*

July 15, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): NATO forces killed Mullah Akhtar, identified as a Taliban commander responsible for bringing foreign fighters from Iran into Afghanistan. He was killed in Farah Province. - *CNN, July 16*

July 15, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. aerial drone killed at least two people in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. - *USA Today, July 15*

July 15, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a bus stop in Mingora, the main town of Swat District of the North-West Frontier Province. Five people were killed. Authorities believe that the bomber tried to target a security force convoy. - *BBC, July 15; Reuters, July 15*

July 15, 2010 (IRAN): Two suicide bombers detonated their explosives at a Shi'a mosque in Zahedan, located in Sistan-Baluchistan Province in southeastern Iran. The explosions killed at least 26 people at the Jamia mosque. The Sunni rebel group Jundallah reportedly claimed credit for the bombings, saying it was revenge for Iran's execution of the group's leader, Abdulmalek Rigi, on June 20. - *BBC, July 16; AFP, July 15; New York Times, July 16*

July 16, 2010 (UNITED STATES): The U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi, identifying him as a "specially designated global terrorist." - *Reuters, July 16*

July 16, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A bomb ripped through a used car market in Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, killing six people. - *BBC, July 16*

July 17, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen shot to death 16 Shi'a Muslims in the Sunni-dominated Charkhel area of Kurram Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The victims were ambushed as they headed to Peshawar in two passenger vehicles. - *AFP, July 17*

July 17, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two bombs exploded at a congested market in Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province, killing six people. Both bombs struck internet cafes. - *AFP, July 17*

July 18, 2010 (GLOBAL): A senior U.S. law enforcement official told CNN that the author of the new online al-Qa`ida magazine, *Inspire*, may be U.S. citizen Samir Khan, who previously lived in North Carolina and left for Yemen in October 2009. Khan, who is 23-years-old, has previously been involved in radical Islamist blogs, and he once lived in the New York area. - *CNN, July 18*

July 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber killed three people near a market in eastern Kabul. - *RTTNews, July 18; Washington Post, July 19*

July 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban fighters blew up the gate to a jail and freed 23 insurgents in Farah Province. - *Reuters, July 18*

July 18, 2010 (IRAQ): Two suicide bombers killed at least 50 people in southwestern Baghdad. The bombers targeted members of a government-backed Sunni militia who were waiting to receive their paychecks outside a military base. - *BBC, July 18; Los Angeles Times, July 19*

July 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a Shi'a mosque in Sargodha, Punjab Province, wounding at least 15 people. - *Reuters, July 18*

July 19, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri purportedly released a new audio message, promising al-Qa`ida's followers victory in Afghanistan

and Iraq. Al-Zawahiri also said that the battle to liberate Jerusalem will eventually occur. - CNN, July 20

July 19, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into a convoy of armored SUVs in Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing one British security contractor. - Guardian, July 19

July 20, 2010 (GLOBAL): The United Nations blacklisted Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi, identifying him as an al-Qa`ida operative. - Reuters, July 20

July 20, 2010 (UNITED KINGDOM): Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5, harshly criticized the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, saying "we gave Osama bin Laden his Iraqi jihad, so that he was able to move into Iraq in a way that he was not before." Manningham-Buller, who was the head of MI5 from 2002-2007, also said, "Our involvement in Iraq radicalized, for want of a better word, a whole generation of young people—not a whole generation, a few among a generation—who saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam." - Christian Science Monitor, July 21

July 20, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban fighters beheaded six Afghan police officers in Baghlan Province. The Taliban denied that they beheaded the officers. - al-Jazeera, July 21; AFP, July 21

July 20, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Five militants attacked a military training center in Mardan, located in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. As the fighters tried to enter the training facility, security forces opened fire, killing all five assailants. Three of the fighters wore suicide bomb vests. Four soldiers were wounded. - AFP, July 19

July 21, 2010 (UNITED STATES): U.S. authorities arrested Zachary Adam Chesser on charges of providing support to the al-Shabab terrorist group in Somalia. Chesser, who is from Fairfax County, Virginia, was turned away from a July 10 flight out of New York's John F. Kennedy airport after he was told he was on a "no-fly" list. Chesser, who is 20-years-old, also reportedly told federal agents that he

twice attempted to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabab. - Bloomberg, July 21

July 21, 2010 (MAURITANIA): A Mauritanian court sentenced Omar Sid'Ahmed Ould Hamma to 12 years in jail for kidnapping three Spanish aid workers and handing them over to al-Qa`ida. Hamma, a Malian national, was arrested by Mauritanian security forces in February. - AFP, July 21

July 21, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns announced that U.S. troops will remain in the southern Philippines to help local security forces in their fight against Muslim extremists. According to Agence France-Presse, "About 500 US Special Forces troops train Filipino soldiers in Mindanao to combat militants from the Al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf group, which the United States lists as a terrorist organisation." - AFP, July 21

July 22, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Two U.S. soldiers were killed in a helicopter crash in Helmand Province. NATO forces are investigating the cause of the crash, while the Taliban said they shot down the aircraft. - Los Angeles Times, July 23

July 22, 2010 (SOMALIA): Somali officials admitted that members of the country's elite presidential guard had defected to the al-Shabab insurgent group. - New York Times, July 22

July 22, 2010 (MAURITANIA): Mauritanian commandos supported by the French military launched a raid on fighters belonging to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The soldiers killed six AQIM members, while four militants managed to escape. Reports suggested that the goal of the operation was to free a 78-year-old French hostage, Michel Germaneau, a retired engineer who was kidnapped in neighboring Niger in April. Germaneau, however, was not found. - Washington Post, July 23; AFP, July 22

July 23, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Reports said that two U.S. soldiers were captured by Taliban fighters in Logar Province. Later, however, both soldiers were found dead. One of the soldiers appears to have been

killed in the initial firefight. It was not immediately clear if the second soldier died from wounds sustained during the initial firefight, or if he was executed by Taliban fighters. - Los Angeles Times, July 30

July 24, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A roadside bomb killed four U.S. soldiers in southern Afghanistan. - BBC, July 24

July 24, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. aerial drone killed at least 16 militants in South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. - BBC, July 24

July 24, 2010 (NORTH AFRICA): Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) executed French national Michel Germaneau in revenge for the July 22 failed rescue raid by French and Mauritanian troops. - BBC, July 26

July 25, 2010 (IRAQ): New reports suggest that the Iraqi military arrested the minister of defense for the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), who has been identified as Saleem Khalid al-Zawbayi. Two other senior ISI leaders were also reportedly arrested. - Bloomberg, July 25

July 25, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. aerial drone strike left 10 suspected militants dead in the Shaktoi area of South Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. - BBC, July 26

July 25, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. aerial drone strike killed four suspected militants in Srarogha, located in South Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. - BBC, July 26

July 25, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. aerial drone killed five suspected militants in Tabbi Tolkhel, located in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. - BBC, July 26

July 25, 2010 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida fighters killed six Yemeni troops in Shabwa Province. - CNN, July 26

July 25, 2010 (ALGERIA): A suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked members of the Algerian National Gendarmerie in Tizi Ouzou, killing one person.

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The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/support/> or call Wayne Richardson at West Point's Association of Graduates at 845-446-1553.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb later claimed credit for the attack. - *al-Barwaba*, July 25; *AFP*, July 29

July 26, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked the Baghdad offices of al-Arabiya television, killing four people. The Islamic State of Iraq later took credit for the attack. - *AFP*, July 28

July 26, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber targeted a group of people mourning the death of a cabinet minister's son who was murdered in a suspected Taliban attack. The suicide blast killed seven people. It occurred near Peshawar. - *BBC*, July 26

July 27, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri purportedly released a new audiotape, threatening more attacks in the United States and in the West. "Oh American people... We offered you a peace plan, and mutual benefit; but your governments were proud and haughty, and so the attacks against you followed one after another, everywhere—from Indonesia to Times Square, by way of Madrid and London," the voice said. "And the attacks are ongoing, and more will come one after another." - *ABC News*, July 27

July 27, 2010 (FRANCE): French Prime Minister Francois Fillon reacted to the recent execution of French hostage Michel Germaneau by al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, stating that France is "at war with al-Qa`ida." French President Nicolas Sarkozy vowed that the murder "will not go unpunished." - *Christian Science Monitor*, July 27

July 28, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Madhatta Haibe, a Philippine citizen who was a founding member of the al-Qa`ida-linked Abu Sayyaf Group, pled guilty in a U.S. court to the 1995 kidnappings of 16 people, including four U.S. citizens. Haibe was extradited to the United States in 2009. - *AFP*, July 28

July 28, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A bomb ripped through a crowded bus in Nimroz Province, killing 25 civilians on board. - *Los Angeles Times*, July 28

July 29, 2010 (IRAQ): Gunmen launched a coordinated attack on Iraqi soldiers in a predominately Sunni Baghdad neighborhood, killing at least six of them. The gunmen also briefly erected the flag of the insurgent group al-Qa`ida in Iraq near the destroyed army checkpoint. - *Washington Post*, July 30

July 29, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A new poll released by the Pew Research Center showed that nearly six in 10 Pakistanis described the United States as an enemy, and only one in 10 called it a partner. - *AP*, July 29

July 30, 2010 (GLOBAL): The United Nations removed five members of the Taliban from its sanctions blacklist. According to Voice of America, "Afghan President Hamid Karzai had been calling for the removal of at least 10 former Taliban members from the blacklist, as part of a reintegration plan for Taliban fighters willing to lay down their weapons." Two of those removed from the list are deceased. - *Voice of America*, July 30

July 30, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A bomb attached to a motorcycle exploded in Kandahar, killing a woman and a child. The target of the attack was a candidate in the country's upcoming parliamentary elections, yet the candidate was unharmed. - *News24.com*, July 30

July 31, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber killed a former militia commander who supported the Afghan government, in addition to two other people, in northern Afghanistan's Kunduz Province. - *AP*, July 31

July 31, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): At least 66 U.S. troops died in Afghanistan in July, making it the deadliest month for American forces in the country since the intervention began in 2001. As stated by the *Guardian*, "US and NATO commanders had warned that casualties would rise as the international military force ramped up the war against the Taliban, especially in the organisation's southern strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar provinces." - *Guardian*, July 30; *AP*, July 31

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 04-13-2017

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[REDACTED]  
(CE) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)  
Sent: Wednesday, September 22, 2010 10:02 AM  
To: [REDACTED] (CE) (FBI)  
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] - FYI. [REDACTED] (S)

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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From: [REDACTED] (FBI)  
Sent: Tuesday, September 21, 2010 5:57 PM  
To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]  
Subject: [REDACTED] (S)

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RECORD [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
**Management and Program Analyst**

**Room** [REDACTED] (S)

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U.S. Air Force.....Aim High

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DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/30/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: [REDACTED]

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From: Charlotte

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *ksl*

Drafted By: [REDACTED] *kae*

Case ID #: (U) [REDACTED]

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To document requested research [REDACTED] (S)

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~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350930~~

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(U) [REDACTED]

Reference: (U) [REDACTED]

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Details: ~~(S)~~ Queries of various databases gleaned the following information [REDACTED] (S)

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 09/30/2010

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(U) Records checks of the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not provide any information  
that would indicate the institute sponsored person/s US visa  
application.

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(Rev. 05-01-2008)

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/15/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn: SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

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From: Charlotte

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

rec REC

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Case ID #: (U)  
(U)  
(U)

Title: (X) (U)

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SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
IT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

Synopsis: (U) To document interview of Charlotte Liaison  
Contact on 09/09/2010.

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG 20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20350915~~

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Details: (U) On 09/09/2010, SA [redacted] met with [redacted]  
[redacted] Charlotte Liaison Contact [redacted] at the Carolina Place Mall,  
in Pineville, NC.

(U) [redacted] recently [redacted]  
from attending classes at the [redacted]  
school, located on Shamrock Drive, in Charlotte, NC. [redacted] was  
unhappy that the [redacted] school was teaching [redacted] the  
distinctions between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. [redacted]  
only wanted [redacted] to learn Arabic at the [redacted] school. When  
[redacted] confronted [redacted] teacher about this information,

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To: Charlotte From: Charlotte  
Re: (U) [redacted] 09/15/2010

the teacher denied that the [redacted] school was teaching [redacted] about religion. [redacted] personally knows [redacted] and was planning to meet with [redacted] on 09/10/2010 to discuss this problem. [redacted] is planning to send [redacted] to public school and to "Sunday school" at the Plaza Masjid, in Charlotte, NC. [redacted] added that other Muslim parents are also removing their children from the [redacted] school.

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(U) [redacted] personally knows [redacted] who is currently [redacted] Plaza Masjid Shura Council. [redacted] is primarily affiliated with the Plaza Masjid and has not been involved with the Gastonia Masjid for several years. According to [redacted] at the Plaza Masjid around 1997 and 1998. [redacted] [redacted] within North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. [redacted] [redacted] Charlotte Muslim community. [redacted] described [redacted]

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[redacted] noted that [redacted] is not known for being a big zakat donor. [redacted] commented that some individuals in the Muslim community like [redacted] while others do not like [redacted]

(U) [redacted] has unidentified cousins in New York who also [redacted] met these unidentified cousins in New York around 1999. While in New York in 1999, [redacted] personally observed these unidentified cousins carrying bags of money. [redacted] also has an unidentified cousin in Lahore, Pakistan, who is running for an elected Pakistani Government position. [redacted] this unidentified cousin's campaign for election. [redacted] heard that millions of rupees have been spent by this cousin to run in the election.

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(U) [redacted] commented that an unidentified Pakistani male, who [redacted] Harris Boulevard in Charlotte, often "talks hard" against Americans. Due to these comments, [redacted] avoids contact with this unidentified Pakistani male.

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(U) When asked by SA [redacted] recalled possibly meeting SAMIR KHAN on one occasion in the past. [redacted] heard second-hand information that an unidentified member of the Plaza Masjid leadership originally invited SAMIR KHAN to join the Plaza Masjid. [redacted] did not know the name of the member of the Plaza Masjid leadership.

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REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 10-04-2018b6  
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/06/2010

On 5 June 2010, [REDACTED] was interviewed at the [REDACTED] Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Washington Field Office conducted the interview, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] national with a date of birth of [REDACTED] and a place of birth of [REDACTED] is married, with no children. He is approximately [REDACTED] [REDACTED], who was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are the only sons of their parents. They have one sister. The [REDACTED] have been together [REDACTED] After getting married, both [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] as [REDACTED] is considered the more [REDACTED] was able to travel to Yemen only because [REDACTED] agreed to go, as well. [REDACTED] expects that he will be in trouble with his parents when they return to [REDACTED] as he is supposed to be [REDACTED] expressed concern as to whether [REDACTED] had enough money to purchase items, such as water, while [REDACTED]

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During the beginning of November 2009, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] heard from [REDACTED] that one of his friends, Samir Khan, was teaching at Yemen University. At the time, [REDACTED] was in Ta'izz. Khan had been staying in a hotel, so [REDACTED] suggested that the [REDACTED] consider asking Khan [REDACTED] Sana'a. [REDACTED] needed money, so they were receptive to the suggestion.

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[REDACTED] was very helpful to the [REDACTED] when they arrived in Yemen. [REDACTED] assisted them in looking for jobs and invited them to his house, as the [REDACTED] did not know how to cook. [REDACTED] was not comfortable with [REDACTED] and advised [REDACTED] not to mix with [REDACTED]

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b7CInvestigation on 06/05/2010 at [REDACTED]File # [REDACTED] (S) Date dictated [REDACTED]  
by SA [REDACTED] rmpb1  
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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 06/05/2010, Page 2

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Khan was working as a teacher in Yemen; however, he was not satisfied with the salary. Khan was angry with [redacted] as [redacted] had presented the employment opportunities in Yemen as more lucrative. On the other hand, Khan did enjoy the better Islamic living. Initially, after arriving in Yemen, Khan complained about the food, the living conditions, and the driving. [redacted] was aware that Khan had a return ticket to the United States. After approximately one week, Khan decided to stay and work at the university.

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After Khan began staying with the [redacted] [redacted] advised [redacted] not to mix much with Khan. [redacted] encouraged [redacted] to view Khan as a roommate, and not as a friend. The [redacted] wanted the rent money Khan provided, but nothing else. Initially, [redacted] stated that his advice did not derive from a particular reason. However, [redacted] later provided two reasons. First, Khan introduced himself as "Shuman". [redacted] later learned from Khan's passport that his name was Samir Jafar Khan. When [redacted] asked Khan about his true name, and whether [redacted] was a nickname, Khan did not provide a straight answer. Second, Khan avoided going to Masjid Hamza, the mosque closest to the apartment. [redacted] viewed this as uncommon, as everyone went to a mosque to pray. [redacted] and [redacted] attended Masjid Hamza on a regular basis. Khan told [redacted] that he did not attend the mosque due to the large number of foreigners there. Khan feared that there were spies at the mosque who could be after him. In order to avoid the hassle, Khan chose to pray at home. [redacted] described Khan as Islamic. Khan had a beard, wore a cap and wore pants above the ankle. Overall, [redacted] did not seriously suspect Khan to the extent of being a terrorist. Rather, [redacted] worried that if Khan was in trouble, [redacted] and [redacted] might get into trouble due to their association with him.

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A day before the [redacted] departed Yemen for a visit in Bangladesh, Samir Khan left Sana'a. [redacted] understood that Khan was going to Aden. [redacted] asked Khan if he knew anyone in Aden and Khan indicated that he had a friend there. [redacted] did not ask for further details, nor did Khan provide any. [redacted] and [redacted] did not intend to rent the same apartment when they returned to Yemen, so [redacted] asked Khan if [redacted] Khan's use. Khan indicated that if he returned to Sana'a, he would [redacted] Khan did not like the [redacted] as there was no heat in the winter, and it was not clean.

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[redacted] (S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/05/2010, Page 3

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When [redacted] and [redacted] returned to Sana'a after spending approximately 20 days in Bangladesh, they called [redacted] in Ta'izz. According to [redacted], they returned to Yemen on the 17th or 18th of December 2009. [redacted] seemed a bit nervous. [redacted] asked about Samir Khan, and [redacted] indicated that he did not know where Khan was. [redacted] was afraid because he assisted Khan with his travel to Yemen and Khan was unreachable. [redacted] indicated that the police could be after him, as Khan could not be located. [redacted] tried to contact Samir Khan on his cell phone; however, the phone was unreachable. [redacted] also tried to call Khan. At the time, [redacted] was not aware that [redacted] was also in email contact with Khan. While in [redacted] heard that Khan was [redacted]

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[redacted] and Samir Khan did not discuss religion or books. Khan brought a laptop with him; however, the laptop was not working properly when Khan first arrived. Both [redacted] and [redacted] possessed laptops, so Khan would borrow one of their laptops and take it to a cybercafé. Khan had his own pen drives, but he also used pen drives belonging to [redacted] and [redacted]. According to Khan, there were so many viruses at the Internet cafes that he preferred to use pen drives. Eventually, Khan fixed his own laptop by changing or updating the Windows software.

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[redacted] was closer to Khan than was [redacted]. [redacted] told [redacted] about a discussion he had with Khan regarding suicide bombing. Khan tried to legitimize suicide bombing as a form of jihad, while [redacted] argued that he was totally against suicide bombings. When [redacted] told [redacted] [redacted] was angry with [redacted] that he continued to talk with Khan regarding the topic. According to [redacted] [redacted] did not discuss with [redacted] why he left Sana'a in December 2009.

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[redacted] was not aware of email communications between [redacted] and Khan. [redacted] recalled advising [redacted] not to give Khan his email address. [redacted] used the following email address: [redacted] or possibly [redacted]. [redacted] was not sure if [redacted] provided an email address to Khan. [redacted] learned [redacted] that [redacted] and Khan had [redacted] [redacted] was likely scared that if [redacted] knew he would be mad. Initially, [redacted] was really mad at [redacted] when he heard about [redacted]. Now, [redacted] is sad. As [redacted] acknowledged trying to find an excuse for [redacted], indicating that [redacted] was [redacted]

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[redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/05/2010, Page 4

young and immature. [redacted] was easily influenced, and [redacted] felt like he should have been stricter with [redacted]

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When asked who else might have influenced [redacted] like Samir Khan did, [redacted] indicated that he was not aware of anyone else who influenced [redacted] in the bad sense. [redacted] encouraged [redacted] to keep away from trouble. [redacted] does not believe that [redacted] was influenced to do something bad. [redacted] does not think that [redacted] was aware of who he was contacting. As far as [redacted] knows, [redacted] was not interested in learning about al-Qa'ida. [redacted] was adventurous and curious. [redacted] viewed these traits as "okay," as long as [redacted] did not get into trouble. [redacted] found it difficult to believe that [redacted] was in contact with al-Qa'ida and was aware of it. [redacted] would never agree with contact with al-Qa'ida, as that was "going too much beyond the bounds."

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While in Bangladesh, [redacted] interacted briefly with an individual named [redacted] was a member of Jamaatul Muhihideen Bangladesh (JMB). [redacted] debated with [redacted] when [redacted] attempted to recruit them to JMB. After attending a JMB recruitment event, they were told to leave at different times so not to draw attention. [redacted] left first, and the [redacted] left later but on the same day. Once [redacted] and [redacted] understood more about JMB and discovered that they did not want to participate, they kept away from [redacted]. [redacted] was serious about keeping away from [redacted]. According to [redacted] JMB was just a regional group and not as big as al-Qa'ida. [redacted] reasoned that if [redacted] was opposed to interactions with JMB, he would not seek affiliation with a larger organization like al-Qa'ida.

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[redacted] always held great respect, admiration and love for Anwar al-Aulaqi. [redacted] would pass recordings of al-Aulaqi's lectures to his family and friends. [redacted] was compelled by al-Aulaqi's message that "we call ourselves Muslims, but we are living far away from Islam. We should come back to religion." [redacted] and [redacted] viewed al-Aulaqi as good and moderate. [redacted] liked the fact that al-Aulaqi did not shout or seem angry in his lectures.

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With their return to Yemen following the visit to Bangladesh, the [redacted] noticed changes in the situation in Yemen. [redacted] heard about the attempted bombing of the airplane in the United States. He saw reporting on al-Jazeera that

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/05/2010, Page 5

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi supported the attack. Before traveling to Bangladesh, [redacted] heard about the soldier who killed several people in the US. [redacted] could not believe al-Aulaqi would support such action. [redacted] recalled that there was a bombing in a Yemeni province, and there was reporting that al-Aulaqi was killed. [redacted] understood later that al-Aulaqi was not harmed.

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[redacted] and [redacted] discussed whether al-Aulaqi was still considered a moderate or if he was going to extremism. They discussed which scholars they could trust. [redacted] explained that there are many sects in Islam, and scholars are needed to guide Muslims. [redacted] felt that if al-Aulaqi was supporting the attack, then [redacted] would not continue to listen to al-Aulaqi's lectures, or to read his writings. [redacted] and [redacted] had distributed recordings of al-Aulaqi's lectures in Bangladesh. After hearing about al-Aulaqi's support of the airplane attack, [redacted] felt that he and [redacted] needed to warn the people who received the recordings that they did not agree with al-Aulaqi's position.

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[redacted] and [redacted] moved from Sana'a to Ta'izz, Yemen for work at the end of December 2009. The [redacted] received a last minute offer to teach full-time at MALI. [redacted] and [redacted] stayed in an apartment belonging to the institute where they were employed. They shared the apartment with two Yemenis. [redacted] lived in an apartment about ten minutes away. [redacted] remained in Sana'a the entire time, and he worked at MALI's Sana'a branch. During their stay in Ta'izz, [redacted] and [redacted] were never visited by Samir Khan. The last time the [redacted] saw Khan was a day or two prior to their departure for Bangladesh.

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At one point, [redacted] returned to Sana'a to prepare for travel back to Bangladesh. At that time, [redacted] recalled discussing the issue of al-Aulaqi with [redacted], as well. Both [redacted] and [redacted] agreed that it was very difficult to believe that al-Aulaqi, a moderate speaker from the West, would become involved in such terrorist acts.

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Of his ten reasons for traveling to Yemen, [redacted] indicated that meeting al-Aulaqi was at the end of the list. If al-Aulaqi was giving a lecture at an Islamic center, then [redacted] would have made an effort to attend. However, [redacted] did not travel to Yemen with the intention of visiting al-Aulaqi. He and [redacted] never discussed going to visit al-Aulaqi. [redacted] was always

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 06/05/2010, Page 6

eager to do things, so he would have acted on the opportunity to hear al-Aulaqi speak in person.

[redacted] described al-Aulaqi as any other notable scholar. As an example, [redacted] referenced Dr. [redacted] a [redacted] India. Dr. [redacted] is a good debater and is well known for interfaith dialogue. If [redacted] were India, he would attend a speech by Dr. [redacted] given the opportunity. [redacted] is a known scholar in the United States. If [redacted] were in the United States, he would take the opportunity to meet [redacted]. Likewise, al-Aulaqi is a known scholar in Yemen and [redacted] would attend one of his lectures.

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[redacted] and [redacted] have always loved Islamic life. That was one of the reasons they went to Yemen. [redacted] had been to Yemen previously, and discussed with the [redacted] the good opportunities to live, study, work and to bring the family to Yemen. Approximately two years ago, [redacted] traveled to Yemen with his family on a student visa. When the [redacted] arrived in Yemen in 2009, they realized that the situation had changed and their families were no longer allowed to enter Yemen on their student visas. One of [redacted] main concerns after arriving in Yemen was bringing his family, as well.

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[redacted] has known [redacted] since 2004. They worked at the same school in Bangladesh. [redacted] traveled to Yemen with his family for approximately six months. [redacted] father-in-law became ill and he encountered financial difficulties, so he returned to Bangladesh. [redacted] was religious, and was a moderate not an extremist. [redacted] was concerned with living a life not in accord with Islam. [redacted] encouraged [redacted] and others to focus on the hereafter. [redacted] advised that they should gain knowledge and not follow blindly. [redacted] viewed [redacted] as a good friend, who was sincere and humble when giving advice. There is trust between them.

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[redacted] traveled to Yemen two or three days after the [redacted] in December 2009. [redacted] had the same reason as the [redacted] for traveling to Yemen. [redacted] wanted to find a place where he could bring his family and where his children could attend school. [redacted] and [redacted] had explained to [redacted] that the situation in Yemen was different. Specifically, the student visa was issued for one month only, and families were not

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/05/2010, Page 7

[redacted] allowed to travel. [redacted] did not discuss wanting to meet al-Aulaqi.

[redacted] knew [redacted] through Samir Khan. [redacted] knew him as [redacted] and did not learn [redacted] last name until [redacted] was [redacted] [redacted] was not aware of any nicknames for [redacted]. Khan took them to [redacted] house on a few occasions. [redacted] was very personable and mixed easily with people. [redacted] was easy going, and treated a person he just met as if he had known him for a long time. [redacted] explained that [redacted] exhibited the Muslim qualities of being kind, polite and hospitable to other Muslims. He was funny guy, with a strange accent. [redacted] had difficulty understanding [redacted] jokes. [redacted] and [redacted] also visited [redacted] a few times after they returned from Bangladesh in December 2009. [redacted] was under the impression that [redacted] was in Yemen studying. The [redacted] did not spend a lot of time with [redacted] and [redacted] never felt that he needed to advise [redacted] to stay away from [redacted].

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[redacted] recalled discussing Samir Khan with [redacted]. [redacted] asked [redacted] if he had received any news from Khan, as he was out of reach. [redacted] seemed a bit concerned, however, took Khan's disappearance lightly. [redacted] joked that Khan went to Aden, met a beautiful girl and decided to stay there. [redacted] did not discuss religion or al-Aulaqi with [redacted] never met [redacted].

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[redacted] identified a photograph of [redacted] as depicting [redacted] [redacted] heard the bad news that [redacted] had [redacted] wondered if [redacted] was "in his conscience when he did this?" and "how could a Muslim do this?"

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[redacted] identified a photograph of [redacted] as depicting [redacted] studied at the Saba Institute. He was a recent convert to Islam. [redacted] and [redacted] traveled to Yemen because after he became a Muslim he was not allowed to pray at the set times. [redacted] gave [redacted] his email address, and [redacted] gave [redacted] the address to his website. [redacted] and [redacted] did not have deep religious conversations; rather, they talked about the usual things. [redacted] did not believe that [redacted] espoused extremist views. [redacted] believed that there was a great conspiracy against humanity. He expressed his concern to everyone

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b7CContinuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 06/05/2010, Page 8

he met. \_\_\_\_\_ was concerned about all mankind, not just Muslims. \_\_\_\_\_ sent \_\_\_\_\_ videos related to the December 2009 airplane attack in the US. The videos suggested that the attack was just propaganda and did not really happen.

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\_\_\_\_\_ identified a photograph of Samir Khan and \_\_\_\_\_ as depicting "Samir \_\_\_\_\_". The photograph was taken at \_\_\_\_\_ house.

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\_\_\_\_\_ always advised \_\_\_\_\_ to stay away from trouble. \_\_\_\_\_ has reminded \_\_\_\_\_ that now that he has children, he should be more responsible. \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ saw each other one time while \_\_\_\_\_ could tell when he saw \_\_\_\_\_ that something was wrong with \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ could tell that \_\_\_\_\_ was sorry for things he had done.

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\_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of \_\_\_\_\_ involvement with al-Aulagi. He viewed \_\_\_\_\_ only concern in Yemen as getting the paperwork in order for his family to travel to Yemen. \_\_\_\_\_ indicated that he felt badly if the only reason \_\_\_\_\_ was \_\_\_\_\_ was because of \_\_\_\_\_. However, \_\_\_\_\_ stated that if \_\_\_\_\_ had his own concerns due to the things he has done, then \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ were not to blame.

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At the end of the interview, \_\_\_\_\_ was allowed to visit with \_\_\_\_\_ for a short period of time. \_\_\_\_\_ asked about \_\_\_\_\_ health and well being, and confirmed that \_\_\_\_\_ had enough money and clothing. \_\_\_\_\_ had spoken to their parents very briefly a few weeks prior, so \_\_\_\_\_ asked for news from the family. \_\_\_\_\_ expressed worry of what \_\_\_\_\_ would do to him once they were sent back to Bangladesh. \_\_\_\_\_ stated "curiosity killed the cat, and I am the cat." \_\_\_\_\_ indicated that there was always a chance for forgiveness, but \_\_\_\_\_ needed to be frank and open with the interviewing agents. \_\_\_\_\_ encouraged \_\_\_\_\_ to be honest and not to hide anything. He reminded \_\_\_\_\_ that others, including him, were \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_ said to \_\_\_\_\_

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REASON: 1.4 (C)  
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DATE: 10-04-2018b6  
b7CALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/09/2010

On 8 June 2010, [redacted] was interviewed at the

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b7D[redacted] national with a date of  
birth of [redacted] and a place of birth of [redacted]  
Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] of  
the Washington Field Office conducted the interview. [redacted]

[redacted] described for the interviewing agents, several groups he was familiar with, or was associated with in Bangladesh. [redacted] came to know some of the main people involved in Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) in 2001 or 2002. At the time, [redacted] was involved in Jamaat-ul Muslimeen (JM), meaning "the body of Muslims." [redacted] specifically recalled interacting with an HT member named [redacted] and some of his friends. [redacted] and his friends were Bangladeshis from the United Kingdom. [redacted] was in Bangladesh spreading the message of HT. [redacted] and some of the HT members had discussions comparing HT and JM; for example, topics included what each group was calling Muslims to, and overall strategies for implementing the group's message. Involvement in HT required membership, while it was not necessary to be a member to participate in JM activities. HT and JM had the similar objective of calling for an Islamic state, or Caliphate state; however, their methodologies differed. Both HT and JM attempted to shift public opinion to support the Islamic state. Neither HT nor JM chose violence as a means of bring about change. HT carried out it's objectives in stages. Stage one was seeking to change public opinion. Stages two and three were using the support of the public and high officials to implement Islam in the government. JM carried out organizational objectives using the exact method modeled by Prophet Muhammad.

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HT was very professional and conducted formal seminars. HT received a large amount in donations, and [redacted] estimated membership to be in the thousands. HT made t-shirts, spread leaflets, and conducted programs every week. JM was much smaller, not more than 500 participants. The JM [redacted] Bangladesh was [redacted] while the JM [redacted] was located in the United Kingdom. Individuals associated with JM gave a pledge of

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b7EInvestigation on 06/08/2010 at [redacted]

File # [redacted] (S) Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted] rmp

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[redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/08/2010, Page 2

obedience to [redacted] was from the family of Prophet Muhammad.

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JM was organized according to areas in Dhaka, Bangladesh. JM gatherings were informal and took place in houses. On rare occasions, JM sponsored an event at a local community center. At one time, [redacted] The responsibilities of the area head included spreading knowledge, encouraging donations and announcing upcoming gatherings. [redacted] was also responsible for informing [redacted] how things were going in relation to his area. The primary goal was to spread Islam as much as possible in his assigned area. There were approximately 10 to 15 men in his group, along with wives. The wives conducted separate gatherings for the purpose of discussing Islam. At his request, [redacted]

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[redacted] JM's curriculum. He [redacted] participated in JM, as did [redacted] when he was back in Bangladesh for the United Kingdom.

Ansar Bait al-Maqdes (ABAM), meaning "Helpers of the Holy Mosque," was a sub-set of JM. The group was created specifically for the purpose of making people aware of the Palestinian cause. [redacted] ABAM. ABAM organized programs and processions, and often requested volunteers to assist with passing out flyers, hosting at events, and other similar activities. [redacted] were not members of ABAM. [redacted] attended some of ABAM's programs; however, he never volunteered to assist with events.

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JM eventually ceased to exist because the Bangladeshi government, or a [redacted] advised [redacted] that it was not permissible for a Bangladeshi group to give a pledge to a foreigner. Additionally, the Bangladeshi government advised that it was not allowed for JM to have an organizational structure. At the time of JM's disbanding, HT continued to operate, as it was not stopped by the government.

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Following the disbanding of JM, [redacted] did not become a member of a different group. He followed the teaching of the Qur'an and Hadith which advised that in the final days there would be many different groups; however, a Muslim should not be involved in any group. Rather, one should remain an individual and stick with the body of Muslims and the leader. [redacted] stayed away from

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/08/2010, Page 3

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the various groups and instead became involved with the Research Center for Unity and Development (RCUD). RCUD [redacted] [redacted] RCUD's aim was to bring Muslim groups in Bangladesh to common group.

With time, both HT and RCUD, along with many other Islamic groups, began facing problems with the Bangladeshi government. Islamic groups, such as Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (Huji) and Hizb-ut-Tawhid, used violence as a means of spreading their messages. These groups killed Muslims, targeting people they viewed as sinful due to the ways they were living, such as going to cinema halls and the like. [redacted] heard that Hizbut Tawheed members killed people who refused to join the group, or those who tried to leave the group. Negative reporting flooded the media and the Bangladeshi government cracked down on all Muslim organizations, both the good and the bad. RCUD conducted open programs, meaning anyone was allowed to attend. Some of those attending were involved with JMB. [redacted] was pressured by government officials and encountered problems because the government claimed that RCUD was connected to JMB. Eventually, [redacted] RCUD to avoid further hassles. Many individuals associated with RCUD were taken by the Bangladeshi authorities for questioning. [redacted] [redacted] for the purpose of helping the families of the detained individuals.

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[redacted] was not aware of individuals who joined JMB or Huji following the disbandment of JM. Most of the individuals at RCUD were former participants in JM. [redacted] knew one man, [redacted] who was a member of JMB. [redacted] had worked at RCUD [redacted] Dhaka.

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[redacted] mentioned an individual, [redacted] who was not involved in JMB, but knew many individuals who were members. [redacted] took [redacted] to a study and discussion seminar. The event, conducted in Old Dhaka, was intended to last three days and individuals were encouraged to stay overnight. [redacted] compared the seminar to the last ten days of Ramadan where people stay at the mosque studying and conducting personal worship. [redacted] participated in the sessions, but he [redacted]

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During the discussions, [redacted] came to understand that the individuals conducting the sessions were from JMB or another

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/08/2010, Page 4

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similar group. The seminar was conducted with the intention of giving dawa, or calling the participants to join the group. At one point, the participants were instructed to take weapons-related lessons, as that was part of Islam. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] just listened to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] felt uncomfortable, as he felt that JMB's agenda as not furthering anything constructive. JMB seemed to follow the motto "kill and bomb." JMB was also known for quickly judging Muslims as disbelievers and hypocrites. [REDACTED] recalled being told during the seminar that "whoever does not have an intention to fight jihad is a hypocrite." [REDACTED] held a different view of jihad than JMB. According to [REDACTED], jihad is undertaken according to the steps shown to Muslims by the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims should fight those who do not allow for the spread of Islam; however, fighting should be considered the last option. Muslims should not conduct jihad until the body of believers is strong. [REDACTED] stated that jihad is not only for Islam, jihad is for the protection of every religion, and their churches and synagogues.

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After RCUD shut down, [REDACTED] began thinking about migrating, or making hijra, to an Islamic country. According to [REDACTED] if an individual is not finding Islam in a Muslim country, it is the responsibility of the person to implement Islam by himself, or to make hijra to an Islamic country. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He described the Taliban as having "tribal culture, or tribal views, termed as Islamic views." He then [REDACTED] Anwar al-Aulaqi and [REDACTED] al-Aulaqi's [REDACTED]

Eventually, JMB was banned by the Bangladeshi government. Hundreds of individuals suspected of being JMB members were arrested. [REDACTED] was questioned once while he was at RCUD. Toward the end of his time in Bangladesh, [REDACTED] began to fear harassment by government officials because he traveled to Pakistan. [REDACTED] faced harassment while RCUD was operational.

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When discussing the network of Bangladeshis in Yemen, who were connected to Anwar al-Aulaqi, [REDACTED] became very defensive. He asked the interviewing agents "have you found me to be a liar?"

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/08/2010, Page 5

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[REDACTED] insisted that his only reason for communications with al-Aulaqi [REDACTED] al-Aulaqi's [REDACTED] did not acknowledge the possibility that the intentions of others in the network in relation to communicating with and meeting al-Aulaqi could have been different from him own. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] also communicated with al-Aulaqi only for the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] claimed that, during the course of multiple interviews, he had told everything he knew regarding what had occurred in Yemen. [REDACTED] accused the interviewing agents of "jihadophobia," explaining that Westerners try to turn every event into something negative motivated by jihad. He advised the interviewing agents that they were incorrect in their understanding of the meaning of jihad. [REDACTED] remained adamant that he was not to blame and he was not hiding any information.

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DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 10-04-2018b6  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/09/2010

On 8 June 2010, [REDACTED] was interviewed at the

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[REDACTED] national with a date of  
birth of [REDACTED] and a place of birth of [REDACTED]  
Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of  
the Washington Field Office conducted the interview. [REDACTED]

During 2 June and 7 June 2010 interviews, [REDACTED]  
referenced several individuals, to include the following: Anwar  
al-Aulagi, [REDACTED] Samir Khan, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] On 8 June 2010, [REDACTED]  
provided the following information regarding the interactions among  
these individuals:

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According to [REDACTED] Samir Khan [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Anwar al-Aulagi. Samir Khan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Khan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Khan [REDACTED]

Khan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] When [REDACTED] was in  
Ta'izz, Yemen, he saw the movie "Traitor." The movie was about a

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File # [REDACTED] (S) Date dictated [REDACTED]

by SA [REDACTED] : rmp

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/08/2010, Page 2

Muslim working for the CIA. During the movie, it was mentioned that a sent email message could be intercepted, while a message saved in the draft folder could not be intercepted. [redacted]

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi. [redacted]

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[redacted] advised the interviewing agents to talk with [redacted] for the rest of the story.

[redacted] al-Aulaqi because al-Aulaqi was a scholar of whom [redacted] considered [redacted] to a place where Islam was practiced more perfectly. According to [redacted] it was common knowledge that al-Aulaqi's village was in a tribal area like Shabwah. However, [redacted] al-Aulaqi's village. He wanted [redacted] al-Aulaqi's village and [redacted] al-Aulaqi's location was [redacted] indicated that [redacted] al-Aulaqi, [redacted] with Samir Khan. Khan [redacted] al-Aulaqi. According to [redacted] Sana'a and Ta'izz were Islamic enough for him.

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi through [redacted] " as [redacted] al-Aulaqi. [redacted]

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understood from Khan that [redacted] When asked which organization, [redacted] indicated that he initially believed the organization to mean those individuals around al-Aulaqi. Currently, it was his belief that the organization was al-Qa'ida, but he was not 100% sure.

Initially, [redacted]

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi. The [redacted] Samir Khan. [redacted]

[redacted] al-Aulaqi [redacted] (meaning Samir Khan) [redacted]

[redacted] Khan [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/08/2010, Page 3

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Samir Khan. [REDACTED] Khan's [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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al-Aulaqi. According to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He advised the interviewing agents that if [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Neither Khan nor [REDACTED] al-Aulaqi's behalf. [REDACTED] al-Aulaqi.

If [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] discussed the media report linking al-Aulaqi to the Nigerian who attempted to bomb the airplane in the United States. [REDACTED] also discussed whether al-Aulaqi could be considered a terrorist. [REDACTED] was "50/50," meaning that he was not sure whether he considered al-

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 06/08/2010, Page 4

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Aulaqi a terrorist. Because of things he heard from news reporting, [redacted] thought that al-Aulaqi might be a terrorist. He advised [redacted] to consider the reporting before traveling to meet al-Aulaqi. [redacted] indicated that he did not believe the media. [redacted] asked the interviewing agents if they had heard that the reporting of a man landing on the moon years ago was fabricated. [redacted] used that as an example of conspiracies perpetuated by the media.

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When [redacted] first met [redacted] he had suspicions that [redacted] was a spy due to his actions. [redacted] watched secular movies on his laptop, he was always eating out and he talked a lot about girls. [redacted] brought up the subject of jihad several times, making [redacted] uncomfortable. [redacted] shared his concerns about [redacted] with [redacted] [redacted] only met [redacted] once, so [redacted] did not discuss his suspicions related to [redacted] with [redacted]. Once [redacted] got to know [redacted] they became close friends and [redacted] viewed him as a "dude." When [redacted] was arrested and [redacted] returned to Sana'a, [redacted] was alone in Ta'izz and he felt very lonely. [redacted] wrote to [redacted] requesting a ticket to return to Sana'a. [redacted] was arrested shortly thereafter. [redacted] heard, [redacted] that [redacted] was sent to the United Kingdom.

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Samir Khan arrived in Yemen and was getting settled, looking for a house and a job. Khan went on a vacation for Eid. [redacted] expected Khan to return. [redacted] speculated that Khan and al-Aulaqi were friends from before, so Khan intended to go visit an old friend. [redacted] believed that Khan's travel to meet al-Aulaqi was arranged via communications with [redacted]

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Two or three days before Khan left Sana'a, he met a man at Citimax. At that meeting, [redacted] believed that Khan gave the address of the apartment where he was staying with [redacted] and [redacted], and they arranged the pick-up time and date. On the morning when Khan left to meet al-Aulaqi, he was in the shower when a man arrived at the apartment. The man, whose face was covered, waited on the staircase. [redacted] speculated that it was the same man Khan met a few days prior at Citimax. Khan grabbed his luggage and left.

Samir Khan and [redacted] had many discussions regarding religious beliefs. With regard to the Islamic perspective, [redacted] explained aspects related to ideology and methodology. Khan and [redacted] were in agreement with regard to ideology. For example,

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/08/2010, Page 5

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[redacted] and Khan believed that God is not everywhere; however, God knows and hears everything, which makes it seem like He is everywhere. [redacted] and Khan differed in opinion with regard to methodology. [redacted] believed in "normal martyrdom," meaning fighting and dying for the cause. As an example, [redacted] indicated that "normal martyrdom" was a Palestinian fighting the Jews by throwing stones, and then being killed by a soldier. Khan believed in "suicide martyrdom," like what was attempted by the Nigerian on the airplane in the United States. [redacted] did not agree with "suicide martyrdom" as a legitimate methodology. Due to their many discussions and arguments related to religious topics, Khan provided [redacted] with books to read. According to Khan, the books supported Khan's views with proofs from the Qur'an and the Hadith.

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[redacted] never thought to ask Khan if he was going to meet al-Aulaqi to pursue suicide martyrdom. [redacted] understood how it could seem that Khan went to al-Aulaqi in order to become a suicide martyr; however, [redacted] did not want to "put Kahn into a situation that he was not in," by stating suicide martyrdom as a possibility for Khan's travel. According to [redacted] Khan was not involved in illegal activities. Khan never told [redacted] that he went to al-Aulaqi's location to assist him. He believed that Khan and al-Aulaqi were really close friends and they wanted to be together. Khan intended to go back to the US after the visit. [redacted] admitted that he did not want to say something about Khan that would put Khan under pressure. [redacted] recalled Khan mentioning the disguise of wearing women's clothes to get past checkpoints in Yemen.

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[redacted] felt used by Samir Khan. Khan [redacted] [redacted] and because Khan did something that the Yemeni government viewed as wrong, everyone Khan associated with was detained. [redacted] felt that his association with Khan, along with his communications with [redacted] led to [redacted] [redacted] indicated that he was sorry for his communications with [redacted] [redacted] now understands that communications with al-Aulaqi are bad, and going to meet al-Aulaqi is bad. [redacted] did not believe that asking for al-Aulaqi lectures was bad.

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When encouraged to be open and to share all of the details of what he knew, [redacted] indicated that he did not know what else to talk about. He insisted that he had shared everything. [redacted] stated that "Allah is enough for me," when advised that his openness would lead to a quicker return to Bangladesh.

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DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 10-04-2018b6  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/08/2010

On 7 June 2010, [redacted] was interviewed at the

[redacted]  
[redacted] national with a date of  
birth of [redacted], and a place of birth of [redacted]  
[redacted] Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] of  
the Washington Field Office conducted the interview. [redacted]

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Several topics were discussed during the course of the  
interview, to include details related to communications with Anwar  
al-Aulaqi, the arrests of friends and associates, details related  
to [redacted], and intentions of travel to Yemen. The following  
information was provided by [redacted]

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During a 1 June 2010 interview, [redacted] referenced  
several individuals, to include the following: Anwar al-Aulaqi.

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[redacted]  
[redacted] During the 7 June 2010 interview,  
[redacted] provided the following details regarding [redacted]

[redacted] al-Aulaqi.

Anwar al-Aulaqi, or a close al-Aulaqi associate, [redacted]

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi, [redacted]

Investigation on 06/07/2010 at [redacted]

File [redacted] (S) Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted] rmp

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Continuation of FD-302 of

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, On 06/07/2010, Page 2

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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al-Aulaqi. When [REDACTED] returned to Sana'a from Ta'izz, he was only there for a short time and was busy preparing for travel back to Bangladesh. As such, [REDACTED] did not talk with [REDACTED] about his contact with al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED] had intended to tell [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] returned to Yemen from Bangladesh.

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/07/2010, Page 4

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[REDACTED] al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED] was not aware of the specific reasons Khan sought a visit with al-Aulaqi; however, he speculated that Khan was seeking knowledge from al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED] did not know anything additional about Khan.

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[REDACTED] al-Aulaqi's [REDACTED] indicated that over time he might go and visit al-Aulaqi, but he was not sure. [REDACTED] al-Aulaqi [REDACTED]

The content of a CD provided to [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] did not reflect the correct interpretation of Islam. The CD, provided to [REDACTED] by Khan, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] According to [REDACTED] he called [REDACTED] and informed [REDACTED] of his opinion.

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[REDACTED] communications

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Other than the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], al-Aulaqi, Samir Khan, or others.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/07/2010, Page 5

[redacted]

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi with questions regarding the procedures for a visit with al-Aulaqi. [redacted] informed al-Aulaqi of his schedule and notified al-Aulaqi of the times when he was free to visit. [redacted] described for al-Aulaqi [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] When asked why he anticipated problems with travel, [redacted] stated that anyone traveling out of Sana'a could get caught for attempting to travel to the tribal areas. [redacted] explained that in Islamic countries there is a great respect for women. As such, they are not scrutinized at checkpoints to the extent that males are. [redacted] recalled discussing his travel to Pakistan with his friends. He likely discussed the method of dressing like a woman in an attempt to pass through checkpoint without scrutiny.

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[redacted] noted that al-Aulaqi [redacted]  
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[redacted] discussed [redacted] and his intentions to join [redacted] in Yemen. When [redacted] was in Yemen, he was pushing [redacted] to join him immediately. [redacted] advised [redacted] of [redacted] desire to travel to Yemen. [redacted] advised [redacted] not to come. [redacted] speculated that [redacted] response was due to the fact that the situation in Yemen at the

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/07/2010, Page 6

[REDACTED] (S)

time was not good for foreigners. [REDACTED] who [REDACTED] believed to be al-Aulaqi, told [REDACTED] that it was not the best time. Al-Aulaqi suggested that [REDACTED] could be helpful in the [REDACTED] in the time before he was able to travel to Yemen. When asked to detail the ways in which [REDACTED] would be helpful to al-Aulaqi, [REDACTED] provided that [REDACTED] did not view [REDACTED] as being useful to al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED]

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Other than [REDACTED] saw no other reason why [REDACTED] would be considered valuable to al-Aulaqi.

At the time, [REDACTED] had a dilemma, as he wanted to make hijra with his family to Yemen, but he also wanted to obtain a [REDACTED] passport. Additionally, [REDACTED]. The passport would have made travel easier for [REDACTED] than if he used his Bangladesh passport. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that if it would take too much time to obtain the [REDACTED] passport, then [REDACTED] should not delay in travel to Yemen. Ultimately, [REDACTED] followed al-Aulaqi's advice and did not travel to Yemen. [REDACTED] viewed the problematic situation in Yemen as temporary and anticipated that [REDACTED] would join him eventually.

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[REDACTED] was asked to explain the purpose of the communication exchange among him, [REDACTED] and al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED] wanted to be in touch with al-Aulaqi for the same reason as [REDACTED]. Meaning, [REDACTED] was seeking to migrate, or make hijra, to al-Aulaqi's location in order to pursue a pure Islamic life. Both [REDACTED] looked up to al-Aulaqi, and were seeking contact with him so that they could take his suggestions. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] al-Aulaqi that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and al-Aulaqi. At one point, [REDACTED] and al-Aulaqi [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/07/2010, Page 7

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[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] a book titled "Defense of Muslim Lands" [REDACTED] found most of the book agreeable; however, he did not agree with the chapter on suicide attacks. [REDACTED] discussed the book. [REDACTED] was quiet and seemed to agree with [REDACTED] view that suicide attacks were not in accord with Islam. [REDACTED] also showed [REDACTED] videos distributed by al-Mujahiroun. The videos showed processions with angry Muslims shouting slogans, to include "you should behead them." The processions were in response to the cartoons of the Prophet. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that such demonstrations did not help the situation. [REDACTED] was not a member of al-Mujahiroun in the United Kingdom, but he had several friends who were part of the group. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] not to be close to individuals affiliated with al-Mujahiroun. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Jammāt-ul-Mujahideen (JM) in Bangladesh.

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*Arrests of friends and associates*

[REDACTED] discussed the arrests of his friends and other individuals with whom he was familiar during his time in Yemen.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/07/2010, Page 8

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*Intentions of travel to Yemen*

Before [redacted] traveled to Yemen in 2009, and when [redacted] and the [redacted] were in Bangladesh for a visit, they had conversations regarding al-Aulaqi. The discussions related to al-Aulaqi's lectures, and the fact that he was a good, outspoken scholar. They were aware that al-Aulaqi had been in prison. [redacted] told [redacted] that the al-Aulaqi was living in a tribal area in Yemen. [redacted] told [redacted] that the tribal area was likely mentioned in a Hadith, or sayings of the Prophet Mohammad, as the Prophet said good things about people living in the tribal areas. While discussing the option of migration to al-Aulaqi's

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 06/07/2010, Page 9

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village with [redacted] referenced his experiences in Pakistan and told [redacted] that being around al-Aulaqi was a better option for hijra than the tribal areas Pakistan. Al-Aulaqi's and his followers were educated and [redacted] felt they would relate better to al-Aulaqi. Prior to the travel of [redacted] and the [redacted] to Yemen, they did not discuss how to get in contact with al-Aulaqi.

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[redacted] did not recall having conversations with either [redacted] or [redacted] in which al-Aulaqi was described as having extremist views, or as a terrorist. [redacted] never called al-Aulaqi a terrorist. [redacted] was aware that people accused al-Aulaqi of being a terrorist. [redacted] informed [redacted] of the accusations, and emphasized that the accusations might not be true. [redacted] advised [redacted] not to accuse without knowledge. [redacted] did not recall discussing al-Aulaqi's support of attacks in the United States; specifically, the soldier attack and the airplane attack in late 2009.

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Throughout the interview, [redacted] was insistent that his only reason for contact with al-Aulaqi [redacted] al-Aulaqi's [redacted]. When confronted with the content of his interactions with al-Aulaqi, to include [redacted] [redacted], and al-Aulaqi's interest in someone [redacted] indicated it did not occur to him that his interactions with al-Aulaqi were more than just a path to hijra. [redacted] claimed no connection between the airplane attack in December 2009 and his interactions with al-Aulaqi. He stated that with regard to the "Nigerian issue," it was not like al-Aulaqi put the Nigerian on the plane. [redacted] stated adamantly that al-Aulaqi was not a member of al-Qa'ida. [redacted] viewed the December 2009 airplane attack as haram, and not in accord with Islam. [redacted] believed that al-Aulaqi held the same view.

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[redacted] claimed that he had nothing to do with terrorism. If he wanted to participate in terrorist activities, he could have done so in Pakistan. [redacted] explained that according to the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet, jihad is a noble form of worship, for example, speaking the truth or treating your mother well. [redacted] did not travel to Yemen to support al-Qa'ida or a deviant sect of Islam. [redacted] travel to Yemen was nothing more than laying the ground work for hijra, or migration.

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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 06/07/2010, Page 10

[redacted] indicated that during his first interviews while in [redacted], he was intentionally trying to "keep himself from getting involved in anything." He does not recall exactly what he said during the initial interviews.

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REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 10-04-2018b6  
b7CALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
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- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/02/2010

On 1 June 2010, [REDACTED] was interviewed at the

[REDACTED] Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the  
Washington Field Office conducted the interview, while  
[REDACTED]b6  
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b7D[REDACTED] is a Bangladeshi national with a date of  
birth of [REDACTED] and a place of birth of [REDACTED].  
[REDACTED] is married with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] his  
family, and his parents live in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in a house which  
once belonged to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] had lived in Dhaka  
since approximately 1987. [REDACTED] described his father as a  
[REDACTED] during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971.  
[REDACTED] father was born in [REDACTED]b6  
b7CIn 1994, in celebration of Brazil winning the soccer  
World Cup, [REDACTED] family traveled to the United States. They  
visited family and traveled to various sites for approximately one  
and a half months. [REDACTED] was 10 or 11 years old at the time.b6  
b7CIn December 2009, [REDACTED] was in Dhaka, Bangladesh when  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] returned from Yemen for a brief  
period. [REDACTED] did not meet often with the [REDACTED]  
during this period, as it was [REDACTED] were  
staying in a village, not in Dhaka. When they did interact, the  
[REDACTED] asked about Arabic institutes in Yemen. They  
discussed where they were living in Sana'a and informed [REDACTED]  
that they had a roommate; however, they did not provide further  
details. At the time, the [REDACTED] did not mention contact  
with Anwar al-Aulaqi, or other al-Aulaqi associates in Yemen.b6  
b7CDuring their initial stay in Yemen from mid-to-late 2009,  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] assisted [REDACTED] in obtaining a Yemen  
visa. [REDACTED] sent money for the purpose  
of obtaining [REDACTED] Yemen visa. [REDACTED] of the Sana'a  
Institute for the Arabic Language (SIAL) facilitated the  
acquisition of [REDACTED] visa. Like [REDACTED] also known as  
[REDACTED] the [REDACTED] were studying Arabic at the Sabab6  
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b7EInvestigation on 06/01/2010 at [REDACTED]

File #

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Date dictated

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 06/01/2010, Page 2

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Institute for Arabic Language and Eastern Studies in Sana'a. [redacted] Palestinian friend assisted the [redacted] upon their arrival in Yemen. According to [redacted] did not improve their Arabic skills during their first months in Yemen. They were busy getting settled and enjoying Sana'a.

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Following a brief stay in Bangladesh, [redacted] and [redacted] returned to Yemen in December 2009. [redacted] traveled to Yemen two days after the [redacted]. During the first week in Sana'a, [redacted] stayed in two or three hotels while he looked for more permanent housing. [redacted] rented a house and the [redacted] stayed with him briefly before [redacted] and [redacted] moved to Ta'izz, Yemen. While in Yemen, [redacted] did not travel throughout the country, rather he spent the entirety of his time in Sana'a.

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Prior to moving to Ta'izz, [redacted] informed [redacted] that the [redacted] Samir Khan, was connected to Anwar al-Aulaqi. [redacted] was aware that al-Aulaqi was wanted in Yemen and that he had been in prison in Yemen due to a tribal dispute. [redacted] also heard that al-Aulaqi was very outspoken against the Yemeni government which caused problems for him. As such, al-Aulaqi moved out to the tribal areas. [redacted] informed [redacted] al-Aulaqi [redacted] and that it was also possible to arrange a visit with al-Aulaqi. [redacted]

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[redacted] explained how [redacted] communication with al-Aulaqi evolved. [redacted] arrived in Yemen in July or August of 2009. [redacted] became friends with an individual from the [redacted] named [redacted] [redacted] to Samir Khan. [redacted] had assisted Khan [redacted] believed that [redacted] Samir Khan [redacted] in a mosque in Sana'a, or at a university. Eventually, Samir Khan [redacted] met [redacted] however, [redacted] did not meet Samir Khan. [redacted] described Khan as a decent, trustworthy guy.

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According to [redacted] Samir Khan had met Anwar al-Aulaqi. [redacted] was not able to provide additional information regarding the time frame or location of the meeting. Samir Khan was the main individual connecting people to al-Aulaqi. Because Samir Khan

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[REDACTED]

, On 06/01/2010, Page 3

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might have met al-Aulaqi, [REDACTED] believed interactions with Khan had led to other individuals getting into trouble. When asked why he considered himself in trouble in Yemen, [REDACTED] speculated he was linked to Samir Khan, who in turn may have met Anwar al-Aulaqi. Because of that association, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] also met al-Aulaqi in a tribal area of Yemen. [REDACTED] speculated that [REDACTED] and occurred in the recent past.

Samir Khan [REDACTED]

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Prior to leaving for Ta'izz, [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/01/2010, Page 4

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[REDACTED] wanted to visit al-Aulaqi and the village where he was living. [REDACTED] was seeking a place to live with his family, which was free from corruption. He desired to raise his children in a better place. [REDACTED] intended to meet al-Aulaqi, visit the area to ensure that it was suitable, and then move his family there. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that al-Aulaqi would guide [REDACTED] on how to get to the village. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] had similar reasons for contacting al-Aulaqi, and assumed that [REDACTED] had similar plans for his family.

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Toward the end of December 2009, likely the 29th or 30th of December 2009, [REDACTED] al-Aulaqi. At that time, [REDACTED] had already departed for Ta'izz. [REDACTED] wrote about himself and why he desired to meet al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED] explained that he was teaching in Yemen. Additionally, [REDACTED] informed al-Aulaqi that he had been to Pakistan to the tribal areas where he [REDACTED] indicated that he preferred the tribal areas in Yemen to those in Pakistan, as Yemen offered better opportunities for knowledge and for living according to Islam. Additionally, there are Islamic prophecies regarding Yemen and the attainment of faith and wisdom. [REDACTED] explained to al-Aulaqi that he wanted to first

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/01/2010, Page 5

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visit al-Aulaqi, and when the situation was right, to move his family to al-Aulaqi's village. Al-Aulaqi [redacted] that the time was not right for [redacted] to visit al-Aulaqi, nor for [redacted] family to move to the area.

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In response to a query as to why he informed al-Aulaqi of [redacted] indicated that if an individual wished to live in al-Aulaqi's village, the person needed to be useful. According to [redacted] it is necessary to defend oneself and be familiar with self-security in order to live in tribal areas. As such, [redacted] informed al-Aulaqi [redacted]

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Al-Aulaqi requested that [redacted]

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When asked what he thought of the request related to the specific topic of [redacted] advised that he thought the request was a bit strange. However, [redacted] speculated that al-Aulaqi's request was to determine [redacted]

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi's [redacted]

In addition to a request for information about himself, al-Aulaqi requested information about friends of [redacted] intending travel to Yemen, and descriptions of the types of skills they possessed. [redacted] provided al-Aulaqi with information related to five of his friends, to include [redacted] believed that [redacted]

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[redacted] al-Aulaqi. [redacted] suggested that [redacted] al-Aulaqi's behalf. According to [redacted] also planned to move his family to Yemen. [redacted] provided information about both [redacted] and [redacted] referencing them as [redacted] described [redacted] as a devoted guy who did things properly.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/01/2010, Page 6

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He suggested that al-Aulaqi [redacted] emphasized the [redacted] also provided information about a friend in Bangladesh, [redacted] described as [redacted] wanted to travel to Yemen. Lastly, [redacted] provided information related to [redacted] was in the process of [redacted] as [redacted] wanted to travel to Yemen with his family. [redacted] told al-Aulaqi of [redacted] intent, and indicated that he was a good guy.

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[redacted] recalled [redacted] al-Aulaqi regarding the arrest of [redacted] told [redacted] that a man from the Asbahi area had been arrested and that his wife might be in trouble. [redacted] passed the information along to al-Aulaqi because he was aware that [redacted] and al-Aulaqi had met and he thought they were friends. [redacted] knew [redacted] as well. [redacted] did not recall al-Aulaqi ever mentioning [redacted] in any of [redacted] Al-Aulaqi responded that [redacted] should not worry about the wife, as the Yemeni people were respectful of women and someone would provide her assistance.

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During the late December 2009 and early January 2010 time frame, [redacted] became busy in Sana'a working on travel-related documents for his wife and friends who were planning to travel to Yemen. He advised al-Aulaqi that he was a bit busy, and that al-Aulaqi should consider finding someone else to assist with research. [redacted]

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[redacted] to al-Aulaqi. [redacted]

In [redacted] he again queried al-Aulaqi as to when he would be able to travel with his family and live in al-Aulaqi's village.

After learning that [redacted]

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During the interview, [redacted] provided information related to his interactions with his [redacted] In the June to July 2009 time frame, [redacted] and his [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of

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, On 06/01/2010 , Page 7

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[REDACTED] indicated that he traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan and that his [REDACTED] was aware of his travel. One of [REDACTED] intentions for the travel was to [REDACTED]. Due to the nature of his travel, he was unable to maintain normal telephonic and email contacts. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] decided that he related more to al-Aulaqi than [REDACTED]

While in Yemen, [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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While in [REDACTED], [REDACTED] read that in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] al-Aulaqi [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 06/01/2010, Page 8

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According to [redacted] never considered, nor had an inclination toward jihad involving the killing of innocent people. When [redacted] discussed the issue, [redacted] seemed to agree that such action was not part of their religion. [redacted] had friends who were part of al-Muhajiroun in the United Kingdom. [redacted] had advised [redacted] that it was best to stay away from that group. At one time, [redacted] were part of Jamaat al-Muslimeen (JM) in Bangladesh. JM was against suicide bombings. [redacted] found it hard to believe [redacted] would take a u-turn from his previous beliefs.

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Previously, [redacted] did not consider meeting with al-Aulaqi to be a problem; however, from the things [redacted] has heard recently, he has reconsidered. While in [redacted] heard that al-Aulaqi may be teaching individuals to conduct attacks. [redacted] considers al-Aulaqi to be a good scholar and a decent person. What [redacted] does not match with his view of al-Aulaqi.

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Based on listening to al-Aulaqi's sermons, [redacted] believed that al-Aulaqi was not in favor of jihad which supported suicide bombings. [redacted] heard that al-Aulaqi was blamed for the attacks of September 11th; however, he recalled al-Aulaqi responding to the attacks as not justified in Islam. [redacted] recalled hearing about the December 2009 airplane incident in the United States; however, he did not recall reading articles which linked the attack to al-Aulaqi. [redacted] did not hear of the Fort Hood shootings until [redacted]

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[redacted] was not sure why Samir Kahn wanted to meet al-Aulaqi. [redacted] reiterated that his desire to meet al-Aulaqi was to find a place for his family where they could live a pure Islamic lifestyle. [redacted] wanted to live in al-Aulaqi's village, as well. [redacted] did not disclose the reason to [redacted] but [redacted] speculated that [redacted] also wanted to live in an area where Islamic Law was implemented more closely. [redacted] was aware that al-Aulaqi was a wanted man. The area where al-Aulaqi lives in Yemen is not a normal village, as al-Aulaqi and the people with him are there. The villagers are trying to implement Islamic Law.

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[redacted] discussed jihad, and the proper method for bringing jihad. [redacted] believed that suicide operations were not in accord with the religion. [redacted] believed that the society should be ruled by Islam. If a foreign country attacks, then Muslims are allowed to fight back. [redacted] considered the 25

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/01/2010, Page 9

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December 2009 attack of the airline in Detroit as haram, or not justified according to Islam. According to [REDACTED] the attacks on people carried out in Bangladesh were not following Islam. Previously, while living in Bangladesh, [REDACTED] wanted to get involved with Jamaatul Mujaahideen Bangladesh (JMB), and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that getting involved with JMB was not a good idea.

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After all that has occurred, [REDACTED] has bad memories. He will make "tawba," meaning turn away in Arabic, from al-Aulaqi. Before, he looked up to al-Aulaqi; however, [REDACTED] now feels that if association with al-Aulaqi is trouble, he does not want trouble. He wanted to live in al-Aulaqi's village, as there is a Hadith which references Abyan in Yemen as a place of blessing. [REDACTED] believed that his experience in Yemen may teach him that his desire was in error. He will take reflective steps, as shortcomings in his understanding of his religion may have gotten him into the current situation. When he was looking for a tribal place where he could live under Islamic Law, he was not thinking about his mother. Now, he feels that it may be best to consider her, go back to Bangladesh, and remain [REDACTED] Following [REDACTED] [REDACTED] intends to remain in Bangladesh, studying and spending time with his family.

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During the interview, [REDACTED] indicated that interactions with Americans during his [REDACTED] had changed his views of Americans. Previously, he thought of Americans in terms of the incident at Abu Ghraib; however, he now saw Americans in a more positive light.

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CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]  
 REASON: 1.4 (C)  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
 DATE: 10-04-2018

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/07/2010

On 6 June 2010, [redacted] was interviewed at the [redacted]

[redacted] is a Bangladeshi national with a date of birth of [redacted] and a place of birth of [redacted]. Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] of the Washington Field Office conducted the interview, while [redacted]

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During a 2 June 2010 interview, [redacted] referenced several individuals, to include the following: Anwar al-Aulaqi [redacted] [redacted] Samir Khan, [redacted] and [redacted] was asked to describe how these individuals were connected, the reasons why they were interacting, and what was really going on in Yemen. [redacted] provided the following information:

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The first time [redacted] arrived in Yemen; they were [redacted] was studying at Saba Institute, which was where [redacted] began to study. [redacted] developed [redacted] upon arrival in Yemen, and [redacted] introduced the [redacted] [redacted] helped the [redacted] settle in Sana'a, as he spoke both English and Arabic. Eventually, [redacted] moved to Ta'izz, Yemen. [redacted] Samir Khan, [redacted] in an apartment in Sana'a. Khan provided [redacted]

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Khan [redacted] Samir Khan left Sana'a just prior to the return of [redacted] to Bangladesh for a visit. When the [redacted] returned from their visit to Bangladesh in December 2009, al-Aulaqi was a "big shot."

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[redacted] was looking for a place to settle where Islam was practiced. As such, [redacted] had visited either Afghanistan or Pakistan. When [redacted] returned to Yemen from [redacted]

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Investigation on 06/06/2010 at [redacted]

File [redacted] (S)

Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]  
 SA [redacted] :rmp

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/06/2010, Page 2

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Bangladesh, [REDACTED] arrived in Yemen a few days later. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Khan. [REDACTED] was interested in visiting al-Aulaqi, and if al-Aulaqi's village was suitable, [REDACTED] intended to move his family there. [REDACTED] was happy with life in Sana'a and felt that it was Islamic enough for him. On the other hand, [REDACTED] wanted to live life with al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]. After approximately one week in Sana'a, [REDACTED] moved to Ta'izz for work. Eventually, [REDACTED] returned to Sana'a in preparation for travel to Bangladesh while [REDACTED] remained in Ta'izz. While [REDACTED] was in Ta'izz, he talked on the telephone with [REDACTED] approximately four or five times in a one month period. According to [REDACTED] they did not discuss items related to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that he had no idea about [REDACTED] connection to al-Aulaqi. He was sure that [REDACTED] was not connected to al-Aulaqi, as [REDACTED] was always asking [REDACTED] if he had conversations with al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as very [REDACTED] feared that [REDACTED] might cause a problem if he was given [REDACTED]. Specifically, [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/06/2010, Page 3

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[REDACTED] of the group.  
Initially, [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] neighbor to ask for information on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not provide information of [REDACTED] or any other information related to [REDACTED] or to the other individuals he knew in Yemen. [REDACTED] believed that he was [REDACTED] of the group. He was [REDACTED] became aware of [REDACTED] when he saw [REDACTED] approximately a week after [REDACTED]

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Initially, [REDACTED] claimed that he heard of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] indicated that he did not know any other names for [REDACTED] and claimed that he was unaware of [REDACTED] Later in the interview, [REDACTED] contradicted himself when he stated that either [REDACTED] a Bangladeshi girl, called [REDACTED] to inform him that [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and that he became aware of [REDACTED] around the time that [REDACTED] previous statement during the interview that he was the [REDACTED] was also contradicted by these latter statements related to [REDACTED] told [REDACTED]

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[redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/06/2010, Page 4

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[redacted] but he was sure that he did not [redacted]  
[redacted]

Three of four days before [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] Initially, al-Aulaqi was popular in a good sense; however, with the events in the US and the media attention, al-Aulaqi became popular in a bad sense.

[redacted]  
[redacted] knew what his position was in the group and he understood his current situation. [redacted] recognized that he had a problem, as he was [redacted] [redacted] reasoned that [redacted] was relaxed and open with the interviewing agents because he did not have the same problem as [redacted] regretted that [redacted]

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[redacted] feared that he would have to face the current situation, having to answer for his actions. [redacted] stated that he would leave his fate to God.

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~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2035  
DATE: 10-04-2018b6  
b7CALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/03/2010

On 2 June 2010 [REDACTED] was interviewed at the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the  
Washington Field Office conducted the interview, while [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] is a Bangladeshi national with a date of  
birth of [REDACTED] and a place of birth of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] is married with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the [REDACTED]  
Prior to traveling to Yemen, the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Dhaka, Bangladesh.

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[REDACTED] Samir Khan in Yemen two weeks  
before Ramadan, during Eid al-Adha. [REDACTED], who was very  
busy [REDACTED] Samir Khan at the university Jama'at  
al-Yemen, [REDACTED] Samir Khan. Because Samir Khan  
spoke both English and Arabic, he was able to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Sana'a. [REDACTED] was a  
friend of the [REDACTED] who also [REDACTED] when  
they arrived in Yemen.

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Shortly after arriving in Yemen, [REDACTED]  
rented a two bedroom and one bathroom house. Khan was staying in a  
hotel when [REDACTED] met him. One or two days after meeting Khan  
Khan [REDACTED] The [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and Khan [REDACTED]

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Samir Khan was an English teacher at Jama'at al-Yemen.  
Khan emigrated to Yemen in order to live, teach and marry. [REDACTED]  
thought that Khan's long hair was odd. Khan was very quiet, unlike  
[REDACTED] Khan kept to himself and spoke only when he had something  
important to say. [REDACTED] got to know Khan over time. They  
discussed life and work in the United States. [REDACTED] asked  
questions about Khan's brothers and his parents. Khan did not have  
any sisters.

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 06/02/2010 at [REDACTED]

File [REDACTED] (S)

Date dictated [REDACTED]

by SA [REDACTED] rmp

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/02/2010, Page 2

[REDACTED] (S)

Using his laptop computer, Khan showed [REDACTED] a video of Khan's computer set-up at home in the United States. Khan had two monitors. The video also showed the inside of a computer processing unit (cpu). [REDACTED] was also shown a video of Khan's pregnant cat.

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[REDACTED] believed that Khan traveled to Yemen initially to teach and live, and to look for a wife. When Khan left to live with Anwar al-Aulaqi, things changed. Khan left during the middle of his teaching job, thus breaking the contract. [REDACTED] assumed that Khan was going to find out more information about al-Qa'ida, but thought he was planning to return. [REDACTED] did not know where Khan traveled; however, he indicated that people said al-Aulaqi was possibly living in Shabwah or Ma'arib, as that was where the terrorists were.

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Samir Khan [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] expressed an interested in obtaining more information about al-Qa'ida from Samir Khan. Khan had several books on his laptop which espoused an al-Qa'ida type extreme ideology. The books provided proof from the Qur'an and the Hadith to support the views of al-Qa'ida. Khan encouraged [REDACTED] to read the books. [REDACTED] recalled that one book was titled "Killing Oneself," and contained the views that al-Qa'ida was seeking to propagate.

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[REDACTED] indicated that he was interested in learning more about al-Qa'ida; however, during the interview he also made a contradictory statement that al-Qa'ida's actions worked against others Muslims.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/02/2010, Page 3

[REDACTED] (S)

Samir Khan never stated what his intentions were. [REDACTED] understood that Khan was convinced of al-Qa'ida's ideology. At one point, [REDACTED] and Khan had a debate regarding suicide and suicide bombings. [REDACTED] argued that according to Islam, suicide is haram. Khan argued that suicide bombings were legal in Islam. After two of three days [REDACTED] Khan left to meet al-Aulaqi.

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Khan [REDACTED]

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When [REDACTED] returned to Bangladesh for a brief stay, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When the [REDACTED] traveled to Bangladesh, they left most of their luggage and belongings in Yemen with [REDACTED], a Palestinian, to hold until their return. [REDACTED] remained with [REDACTED] luggage in Yemen. After Khan left the house in Sana'a, [REDACTED] did not [REDACTED] him. When [REDACTED] heard the news of a bombing, which involved the death of an unidentified Pakistani male, [REDACTED] wondered if the unidentified individual was Samir Khan, as he had not [REDACTED] Khan.

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One week after returning to Yemen from Bangladesh, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] talked with [REDACTED] about Samir Khan and Anwar al-Aulaqi. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] understood things deeply. He was more intuitive in matters of religion than [REDACTED]

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[redacted] (S)

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/02/2010, Page 4

[redacted] looked to [redacted] to guide him as to whether [redacted] Samir Khan and Anwar al-Aulagi were right or wrong. [redacted] and then left the next day for Ta'izz, Yemen. [redacted] remained in Sana'a. [redacted] was busy in Ta'izz and did not discuss the issue of [redacted] Samir Khan and Anwar al-Aulagi any further with [redacted] [redacted] noted that he was in Ta'izz with [redacted]

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[redacted] heard Anwar al-Aulagi's lectures and did not view al-Aulagi as extreme. However, [redacted] understood differently after hearing about the man who killed the American soldiers in the United States and al-Aulagi's statement regarding the attack, and hearing about the man on the US plane in December 2009 from [redacted] [redacted] MALI (Modern American Language Institute). [redacted] understood that Anwar al-Aulagi supported al-Qa'ida in his statements. [redacted] also came to understand al-Aulagi differently during [redacted]

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During the interview, [redacted] expressed remorse for his involvement and described his [redacted] [redacted] He indicated that he felt badly about the situation and did not like to think about the mistakes he had made. While [redacted] heard that [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] stated that if [redacted] situation was actually true, he felt the situation was because of him. [redacted]

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According to [redacted] was just a passerby in that [redacted] was [redacted]. Throughout their life, [redacted] tried to protect him and guide him. [redacted] Samir Khan.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/16/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

UC

SSA

IA

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International Operations

Attn: [redacted]

UC

SSA

FOS

FOS

UC

SSA

Attn: A/SSA

SA

SA

Attn: SSA

SA

Attn: SSA

SA

Charlotte

From: [redacted]

Contact: TDY [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #:

(S)

(S)

(U)

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(U)

(S)

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b7E

Title: (S)

(S)

(U) (S)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

[redacted] - RADICALIZER/RECRUITER;

CT - GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
(S) Re: (S) [redacted] 08/16/2010

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(S)

[redacted] (S)

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(U)

[redacted]

(U) Synopsis: (S) To cover lead.

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20080301  
Declassify On: 20350816

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Reference: (S)

[redacted] (S)

(U) Administrative: (S) Please cover the referenced lead.

(U) Details: (S) By way of background, the FBI assesses Yemen has become an operational base and a safe haven for al-Qa'ida (AQ) and its affiliates and the refuge of US-born Anwar al-Aulaqi - ideologue and regional commander for al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

(U) (S//NF) In January 2009, al-Qa'ida in Yemen and AQ elements in Saudi Arabia formally merged into a single Yemen-based organization named AQAP. This new organization vowed to conduct attacks regionally and against American interests in Yemen and elsewhere. AQAP is utilizing Yemen as a base to train operatives, procure weapons, launch operations against targets in the region and develop capabilities to operate globally.

(S)

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(S) (S//NF) [redacted] SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN (KHAN), an USPER [redacted]  
[redacted], is a self-proclaimed Salafi-Jihadi and a promoter of  
the Salafi-Jihadist ideology [redacted]

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(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/16/2010

(U)

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(S)

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(U)

~~(S)~~ On or about 08/16/2010, [redacted]

b7D

Agent assigned to [redacted]

Special

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/16/2010

(U) [redacted] considers this lead covered.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]  
Re: (S) [redacted] 08/16/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) For information only.

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~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/01/2010

To:

Attn:

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Attn:  
Attn:  
Attn:  
Attn:  
Attn:  
Attn:

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From:

Contact: IA

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b7E

Approved By:

⊗ MLK

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

Title: (S)

~~SECRET~~ // ~~ORCON~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

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To: [redacted] From: [redacted]  
(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 09/01/2010

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1  
Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

Number: 1  
Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

b6  
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Number: 1  
Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

Number: 1  
Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

Number: 1  
Type: [redacted]  
ITU: [redacted]  
Claimed By:  
SSN: [redacted]  
Name: [redacted]  
Squad [redacted]

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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To: [redacted]  
(S) Re: (X) [redacted] 09/01/2010

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

[redacted]

AT [redacted]

(U) For information.

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~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~ [redacted] (S)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/20/2010

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA  
IA  
SOS

Attn:

IA

b6  
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From:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

nr *nr*

Case ID #:

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Title:

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(S//NF)

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(S//NF)

SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN  
CT-GLOBAL EXTREMIST INSPIRED

(U)

b7E

Synopsis: (U) To report results of investigation in

b7E

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301

Declassify On: 20350920

Reference:

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*Handwritten mark*

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 09/20/2010

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LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

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Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT [REDACTED]

(U) Read and clear.

b7E

Set Lead 3: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/01/2010

To: Charlotte

Attn:

Attn:

From: GENERAL COUNSEL

(S)

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SAMIR ZAFAR KHAN

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Derived From : Multiple Sources  
See Classification Authority Reference  
Section.

Declassify On: 20350910

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Classification Authority Reference: ~~(S)~~ "FBI NSISCG 06152009"

(S)

Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~

Details: ~~(S)~~

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~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~

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To: Charlotte From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 10/01/2010

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~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~

(U) To: Charlotte From: GENERAL COUNSEL  
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 10/01/2010

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NC

(U) READ AND CLEAR.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(S)

(Attn: [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

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Set Lead 3: (Action)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(S)

(Attn: [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

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Set Lead 4: (Action)

[REDACTED]

AT

[REDACTED]

(S)

(Attn: [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

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CC: 1 - [REDACTED] (w/o enclosures)

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~~SECRET//ORCON,NOFORN~~